Cited by

(“A claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel that can be decided on the basis of the trial court record must be brought on direct appeal.”).

And “[a] claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel that can be decided on the basis of the trial court record must be brought on direct appeal and is procedurally barred when raised in a postconviction petition.”

become an automatic ground for a new trial.” (quotation omitted).

“A claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel that can be decided on the basis of the trial court record must be brought on direct appeal and is procedurally barred when raised in a postconviction petition.”

5 See, 5 In the postconviction context, the supreme court has explained that, “[w]hen a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel can be determined on the basis of the trial record, the claim must be brought on direct appeal or it is Knaffla-barred.” Andersen v. State, 15 (considering a postconviction petition and stating that a “claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel that can be decided on the basis of the trial court record must be brought on direct appeal”).

An implied concession of guilt occurs only when “a reasonable person viewing the totality of the circumstances would conclude that counsel conceded the [ defendant’s] guilt.” (quotation omitted).

This court “will find an implied concession only [when] a ‘reasonable person’ viewing the ‘totality of the circumstances’ would conclude that counsel conceded the defendant’s guilt.”

(declining to decide ineffective-assistance claim based on an inadequate trial record because if the analysis “requires evidence of attorney-client communications, [a postconviction] evidentiary hearing should be held”).

(holding that an ineffecti ve-assistance claim is not barred from consideration in a collateral postconviction proceeding if the appellate court cannot decide it based on the district court record).

Counsel’s statements constitute an implied concession of guilt only when “a reasonable person viewing the totality of the circumstances would conc lude that counsel conceded the defendants [sic] guilt.” (quotation omitted).

But if the claim can “be determined on the basis of the trial record, the claim must be brought on direct appeal or it is Knaffla-barred.” Sontoya, d at 604; (“A claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel that can be decide d on the basis of the trial c ourt record must be brought on direct appeal and is procedurally barred when raised in a postconviction petition.”).

A court should conclude that defense counsel’s statements constituted an implied concession of guilt “only where a reasonable person viewing the totality of the circumstances would conclude that counsel conceded the defendant[’]s guilt.” (quotation omitted).

” Torres v. State , , 573 (Minn. 2004) (quotation omitted).

In so reasoning, the court of appeals primarily relied on our statement in Torres v. State, that “we first conduct a de novo review of the trial record to determine whether Torres[ ’] trial counsel conceded guilt on any element of the two charges.” (emphasis added).

This court exercises “great caution when defining an implied concession” and “will find an implied concession only where a reasonable person viewing the totality of the circumstances would conclude that counsel conceded the [ defendant’s] guilt.” (quotation omitted).

Torres v. State , , 572 (Minn. 2004).

“We will find an implied concession only where a reasonable person viewing the totality of the circumstances would conclude that counsel conce ded the defendant [’]s guilt.” (quotation omitted).

First, when it is clear that a claim can be decided based on the trial court record, it “must be brought on direct appeal and is procedurally barred when raised in a postconviction petition.”

at 535–36; (Minn. 2 As part of John’s direct appeal —during a discussion of the admissibility of statements John made while in a squad car at the scene, and that any error was harmless —we commented that “the evidence strongly supported a guilty ve rdict.” John

(holding‘that defense counsel’s closing statement was not a concession when counsel requested surrebuttal to clarify that no concession occurred).

See, e.g., Torres v. State , (Mi nn.

The Knaffla rule is intended to preserve “the goals of finality and efficiency where appropriate and overrides them only where necessary in the interests of justice.”

Hooper argues that the interests of justice require an exception to the Knaffla rule because the recantations, considered together, establish his innocence.3 See Hooper III, d at 787; (stating that the Knaffla rule “preserves the goals of finality and efficiency where appropriate and overrides them only where necessary in the interests of justice”).