Cited by

17(1) (1976) (“Motions for directed verdict are abolished and motions for judgment of acquittal shall be used in their place.”)); (“A motion for acquittal is procedurally equivalent to a motion for a directed verdict.”) .

6 “A motion for acquittal is ‘procedurally equivalent to a motion for a directed verdict.’” (), rev. denied (Minn. Oct.

a judgment of acquittal on one or more of the charges if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction.” To grant this motion, the district court must determine whether “the evidence is sufficient to present a fact question for the jury’s determination.” (-75 (Minn. 2005)).

State v. Slaughter , d 70, 76 (Minn. 2005); Smith, 1 This instruction mirrors the model jury instruction.

” Allwine v. State , ( ).

The district court properly denies a motion to acquit if “the state’s evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the state, [is] sufficient to sustain a conviction.”

Likewise, “intent is a subjective state of mind usually 5 established only by reasonable inference from surrounding circumstances.” (quotation omitted).

The test for granting a motion for acquittal is whether “the evidence is sufficient to present a fact question for the jury’s determination.” Allwine argues that the conclusion that he killed Amy rests on ten circumstances: (1) that he drugged Amy with scopolamine; (2) that the time of death was between 1:30 and 3:30 p.m.; (3) that the gun shot residue on Allwine’s hand indicated that he fired the gun; (4) that Allwine moved Amy to her final locat

(holding that denial of a motion to acquit is proper if “the state’s evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the state, [is] sufficient to sustain a conviction”).

“[I]ntent is a subjective state of mind usually established only by reasonable inference from surrounding circumstances.” d 70, 77 (Minn. 2005) (quotation omitted).

(holding that a court may sua sponte consider a lesser-included offense at a bench trial even over the defendant’s objection); (holding that the court’s failure to sua sponte consider a lesser-included offense at a bench trial was not rever

“Given the presumption of innocence and the state’s burden to prove the offense, a defendant has no obligation to present any evidence and should not be put at risk of providing evidence that fills gaps in the state’s case.”

“[I]ntent is a subjective state of mind usually established only by reasonable inference from surrounding circumstances.” (quotation omitted).

“[I]ntent is a subjective state of mind usually established only by reasonable inference from surrounding circumstances.” (quotation omitted).

( review denied (Minn. Oct.

A district court must instruct a jury on a lesser-included offense if “(1) the offense in question is an included offense; and (2) a rational basis exists for the jury to convict the defendant of the lesser-included offense and acquit the defendant of the greater crime.”

A district court must acquit a defendant of a charged offense at the close of the state’s case - in-chief “if the evidence is ins ufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense.” (quoting Minn. R. Crim.

State v. Slaughter , (“ [It] is well established that unexplained possession of stolen property within a reasonable time after a burglary or theft will in and of itself be sufficient to sustain a conviction.” (quotation omitted)).

See, e.g. , State v. Slaughter , , 74-75 (Minn. 2005) (describing the standard to prevail on a motion for judgment of acquittal).

Even sc ratches establish “physical injury, sufficient to sustain a co nviction of aggravated robbery.” State v. Slaughter

-75 (Minn. 2005) (stating that the test for a motion for judgment of acquittal is “whether the evidence is sufficient to present a fact question for the [fact-finder’s] determination”); (noting this court applies the same standard to challenges based

“A motion for acquittal is procedurally equivalent to a motion for a directed verdict.”

In fact, we have explicitly held that theft is a lesser-included offense of robbery, -78 (Minn. 2005), meaning that theft is a “lesser degree of the same crime," (emphasis added) (citing Mjnn.

We review de novo a motion for judgment of acquittal because it is “procedurally equivalent to a motion for a directed verdict.” (), review denied (Minn. Oct.

–75 (Minn. 2005); see McCormick, d at 506 (noting that defendant’s challenge to district court’s denial of motion for judgment of acquittal required the court to examine sufficiency of the evidence).

(“A motion for judgment of acquittal is properly denied where the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, is sufficient to sustain a conviction.” ()).

To grant this motion, the district court must determine “whether the evidence is sufficient to present a fact question for the jury’s determination, after viewing the evidence and all resulting inferences in favor of the state.” -75 (Minn. 2005).

-76 (Minn. 2005) (concluding that knife-like object is a dangerous weapon).

“[I]ntent is a ‘subjective state of mind usually established only by reasonable inference from surrounding circumstances.’” (quoting State v. Schweppe, 306 Minn. 395, 401, ).

A district court may deny a motion for judgment of acquittal if “the state’s evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the state, was sufficient to sustain a conviction.”

7 2(e); –63 (Minn. 2008) (deeming district court to have found premeditation in light of, inter alia, its general finding of guilt of first- degree premeditated murder); (quoting rule 26.01, subdivision 2, and concluding that evidence in trial without jury was sufficient to prove that defendant intended to permanently deprive victim of her necklaces although district court did not specifically make that finding).

Indeed, “[the supreme court] ha[s] determined that intent is a subjective state of mind usually established only by reasonable inference from surrounding circumstances.” (quotation omitted).

he heightened standard of review required by Al-Naseer is “based on the standard of review for the appellate court [and] may prevail on appeal,” and “that the heightened review standard is the appellate standard, not the trial court standard.” In this, the district court erred.2 “A motion for acquittal is procedurally equivalent to a motion for a directed verdict.” see also McCormick, d at 506.

.” No other evidence was offered to show that the “dangerous weapon” was a “firearm.” As not all dangerous weapons are firearms, see, -76 (Minn. 2005) (concluding that knife-like object is a dangerous weapon), the record is inadequate to support imposition of the mandatory minimum sentence under section 609.11, subdivision 5(a).

A motion for acquittal is “procedurally equivalent to a motion for a directed verdict.”

“A motion for acquittal is procedurally equivalent to a motion for a directed verdict.”

17(1) (2009) 4 ; -75 (Minn.2005).

17(1) (2009) [4] ; -75 (Minn.2005).

(explaining that a motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause to support the charged offense should be denied if the record establishes that "the prosecutor possesses substantial evidence that will be admissible at trial and that would justify denial of a motion” for a judgment of acquittal); -75 (Minn.2005) (explaining that "the test for granting a motion for a directed verdict is whether the evidence is sufficient to present a fact question for the jury's determination, after viewing the evi