Cited by

Judicial estoppel “is intended to prevent a party from assuming inconsistent or contradictory positions during the course of a lawsuit.”

King cites two cases to support her argument:

When considering Farah’s claim of insufficient evidence, “we must make a painstaking r eview of the record to determine whether the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, were sufficient to allow the jury to reach its verdict.”

“Evidentiary rulings of the district court will not be overturned absent a clear abuse of discretion, even when constitutional rights are implicated.”

d 500, 510 (Minn. 2005).

12 Still, Roth asserts that he had no method to counter the evidence during deliberations, and that the jury was “allowed to use non-substantive evidence for any purpose [it] saw fit.” However, we presume “that the jury follows the court’s instructions.”

We will not overturn a district court’s evidentiary ruling “absent a clear abuse of discretion.”

Yet, even when a constitutional right is implicated, “[e]videntiary rulings of the district court will not be overturned absent a clear abuse of discretion.”

(stating a reviewing court defers to the jury’s credibility determinations and will not reweigh the evidence on appeal).

(stating a reviewing court defers to the jury’s credibility determinations and will not reweigh the evidence on appeal).

This is especially true when we are to assume the jury followed the district court’s limiting instruction, which directed the jury “not to convict [Abrams] on the basis of similar conduct on a prior occasion.” 13 (stating that a district court’s limiting instruction mitigates the risk that a jury may give undue weight to relationship evidence).

This is especially true when we are to assume the jury followed the limiting instructions “not to convict the defendant on the basis of similar conduct on a prior occasion.” (stating that a district court’s limiting instruction mitigates the risk that a jury may give undue weight to relationship evidence).

d 500, 511 (Minn. 2005).

State v. Pendleton , see also Melrose Gates, -22 (Minn. 2016) ( explaining that a district court ’s determination whether the requirements of an equitable doctrine are met is a legal issue that appellate courts review de novo).

“The doctrine of judicial estoppel has not been expressly recognized by this court.”

See State v. Pendleton , (“It is presumed that t he jury follows the court’s instructions.”).

(noting that when a district court orders a jury to disregard a statement, we presume that the jury followed that instruction).

(holding district court’s curative instruction aptly mitigated the prosecutor’s improper arguments).

B ecause the district court properly instructed the jury on the presumption of innocence –—an instruction we presume the jury followed, —and the prosecutor’s statement likely did not play “a substantial part in influencing the jury to convict,” Trimble, d at 927, the prosecutor’s statement does not require reversal.

(finding prosecutor’s misconduct harmless because “the court’s ruling and instructions adequately addressed the misconduct”).

10 court’s evidentiary ruling unle ss it “abused its discretion and that the abuse of discretion prejudiced the appellant.”

State v. Pendleton , ; -76 (Minn. 1998) (noting that curative instructions informing jury to disregard testimony lessen s prejudicial impact of illicit testimony).

“We assume that the jury believe d the witnesses whose testimony supports the verdict.”

27, 2018); d 500, 509 (Minn. 2005) (“It is presumed that the jury follows the court’s instructions.”).

Judicial estoppel “is intended to prevent a party from assuming inconsistent or contradictory positions during the course of a lawsuit.”

(declining to adopt the doctrine of judicial estoppel).

(“It is presumed that the jury follows the court’s instructions.”).

Judicial estoppel “is intended to prevent a party from assuming inconsistent or contradictory positions during the course of a lawsui t,” State v. Pendleton , d 500, 507 (Minn. 2005), in order “to protect the integrity of the judicial process.” State v. 5 Profit