Cited by

It also “has the right to analyze and explain the evidence, and to argue all proper inferences to be drawn from the evidence.” d 526, 532 (Minn. 2006).

“Assessing the credibility of a witness and the weight to be given a witness’s testimony is exclusively the province of the [fact-finder].”

(“The record reflects that the district court carefully considered motions made by both sides; and the court ruled in favor of appellant on some very important motions.

“The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 6 of the Minnesota Constitution provide that a criminal defendant has the right to the assistance of counsel for his defense, which includes a fair opportunity to secure counsel of [their] choice.” (quotation omitted).

And “[p]rior adverse rulings by a judge, without more, do not constitute judicial bias .”

Ali, d at 249; (stating that district courts “are vested with broad discretion in deciding matters of courtroom 15 procedure” (quotation omitted)).

As previously stated, this court will not review claims challenging trial strategy, and trial strategy includes the selection of evidence presented to the jury, “which witnesses to call at trial,” and counsel’s advice to her client.

“Assessing the credibility of a witness and the weight to be given a witness’s testimony is exclusively the province of the [fact -finder].” State v. Mems , d 526, 531 (Minn. 2006).

without more, do not constitute judicial bias.”

T his concern naturally derives from the district court’s “grave responsibility in overseeing and regulating courtroom conduct and procedure during trials, including criminal trials.”

But witness credibility determinations are made exclusively by the factfinder, and are not reflective of an attorney’s performance.

Carranza next argues that the evidence was insufficient because the court relied “solely” on DR ’s testimony, “there were reasons to question her credibility ,” and “ the evidence was uncorroborated.” “Assessing the credibility of a witness and the weight to be given a witness’s testimony is exclusively the province of the [fact -finder].” State v. Mems , d 526, 531 (Minn. 2006).

“ What evidence to present and which witnesses to call at trial are tactical decisions properly left to the discretion of trial counsel.”

See Anderson, d at 327−29 (holding alleged misrepresentations and omissions regarding weapons owned by defendant in application for search warrant of defendant’s property were not material to probable cause); (“Misrepresentations invalidate a warrant when they are .

(restating that the district court’s adverse rulings, “without more, do not constitute judicial bias”).

A reviewing court presumes “that a judge has discharged his or her judicial duties properly.”

But “[p]rior adverse rulings by a judge, without more, do not constitute judicial bias.” .

“There is the presumption that a judge has discharged his or her judicial duties properly.”

“There is the presumption that a judge has discharged his or her judicial duties properly.”

A “jury is free to accept part and reject part of a witness’s testimony.”

Matters involving trial strategy that we generally do not review include “[t]he extent of counsel’s investigation,” id., counsel’s decisions regarding what evidence to present, (“What evidence to present and which witnesses to call at trial are tactical decisions properly left to the discretion of trial counsel”), and counsel’s advice to the client, e.g., State v. Brocks, 8 (concluding that counsel’s advice about what the defendant should

32 “Our judicial system presumes that judges are capable of setting aside collateral knowledge they possess and are able to ‘approach every aspect of each case with a neutral and objective disposition.’” (quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 561-62 (1994)); d 526, 533 (Minn. 2006) (“There is the presumption that a judge has discharged his or her judicial duties properly.”).

“There is the presumption that a judge has discharged his or her judicial duties properly.”

“There is the presumption that a judge has discharged his or her judicial duties properly.” see also Van Ryswyk v. Van Ryswyk , No. A20- 1360, 2021 WL 3027272, at *4 (Minn. App. July 19, 2021) (nonprecedential opinion persuasively applying this rule to an HRO hearing); WL 426585, at *3 (Minn. App. Feb.

See Cuypers v. State , d 100, 104 (Minn. 2006); State v. Mems

Because “[t]here is the presumption that a judge has discharged his or her duties properly,” a party faces a heavy burden to show a judge is biased.

We begin by recognizing that “[a]ssessing the credibility of a witness and the weight to be given a witness’s testimony is exclusively the province of the [fact-finder].”

Indeed, “[w]hat evidence to present and which witnesses to call at trial are tactical decisions properly left to the dis cretion of trial counsel.” State v. Mems

d 526, 531 (Minn. 2006) (stating that a jury is free to accept part and reject part of a witness’s testimony); (explaining that inconsistencies in a witness’s testimony do not necessarily indicate falsehood but the “fallibility of human perception,” particu

See State v. Mems , (“Counsel has the right to an alyze and explain the evidence, and to argue all proper inferences to be drawn from the evidence.”).

“Assessing the credibility of a witness and the weight to be given a witness’s testimony is exclusively the province of the jury.” State v. Mems

See State v. Mems , (“Misrepresentations invalidate a warrant when they are .

“Assessing the 9 credibility of a witness and the weight to be given a witness’s testimony is exclusively the province of the jury.” State v. Mems

Some of Schiller’s comp laints of ineffectiveness—including his trial attorney’s decision not to “rehabilitate [Schiller] after his incriminating responses” to the county’s questions and his attorney’s decision not to call Schiller during his case in chief—fall squarely within “tactical decisions properly left to the discretion of trial counsel.” (noting such tactical decisions do not prove that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness).

see also Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 533, 123 S. Ct. 2527, 2541 (2003).