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12 “A prosecutor may not personally endorse the credibility of witnesses.”

And in State v. Swanson, the supreme court held that the prosecutor was not 11 vouching for witnesses when they said the witnesses were “very believable,” but the prosecutor was impermissibly vouching for a witness when they stated “[t]he state believes [the witness] is very believable.”

(holding that intent to aid in the commission of a crime can be inferred from factors such as “defendant’s presence at the scene of the crime, defendant’s close association with the principal before and after the crime, defendant’s lack of objection or surprise under the circumstances, and defend

The Importance of the Defendant’s Testimony and Centrality of Credibility The supreme court has held that “[i]f credibility is a central issue in the case, the fourth and fifth Jones factors weigh in favor of admission of the prior convictions.”

His testimony was after discovery of the police reports and grand jury testimony was provided by the State.” In State v. Swanson , the supreme court addressed whether “[t] he state’s questions and arguments implying that defendant used his constitutional right to confront witnesses against him to tailor his testimony were error .” .

Importance of the Defendant’s Testimony and the Centrality of Credibility The supreme court has held that “[i]f credibility is a central issue in the case, the fourth and fifth Jones factors weigh in favor of admission of the prior convictions.”

” -59 (Minn. 2006) (quotation omitted).

Welch, d at 621; see also 20 -60 (Minn. 2006) (stating that “[i]f a kidnapping is completely incidental to another offense and the imposition of a separate conviction for kidnapping unfairly exaggerates the criminality of a defendant’s conduct, the kidnapping conviction and sentence may be vacated”).

The supreme court has instructed that, when evaluating an argument for misconduct, appellate courts should not take statements out of context but “look at the closing argument as a whole.” (stating that an appellate court should not “focus on particular phrases or remarks that may be taken out of context or given undue prominence” in considering prosecutorial misconduct in a closing argument (quotation omitted)).

antial evidence, including the “defendant[’]s presence at the scene of the crime, [a] close association with the principal before and after the crime, [a] lack of objection or surprise under the circumstances, and defendant[’]s flight from the scene of the crime with the principal.” (internal quotation marks omitted) ().

“When determining whether a person played a knowing role in the commission of the crime, we may infer criminal intent from the person’s presence, companionship, and conduct both before and after the crime.” (“Jurors can infer the necessary intent from factors including: defendant’s presence at the scene of the crime, defendant’s close association with the principal before and after the crime, defendant’s lack of objection or surprise under the circumstances, and defendant’s flight from the scene

The district court 3 Foster uses a two-step approach in analyzing the issue : first, he applies the five factors commonly called the Jones factors that are used for evaluating the admissibility of felony convictions under rule 609(a)(1), (), and then he evaluates “unusual need” under rule 609(b).

Additionally, an “accessory after the fact is not an accomplice.”

(any prosecutorial misconduct was harmless error in light of the whole trial’s 1,200-page record and strong evidence of guilt).

-98 (Minn. 1998); (stating that a prosecutor commits misconduct when they “personally endorse the credibility of witnesses”).

Since Caron, however, and the “continued viability of the two-tiered approach set forth in State v. Caron .

(2018), “[a] person is criminally liable for a crime committed by another if the person intentionally aids, advises, hires, counsels, or conspires with or otherwise procures the other to commit the crime.” Under the aiding-and-abetting statute, “liability attaches when one plays some knowing role in the commission of the crime and takes no steps to thwart its completion.” -59 (Minn. 2006) (quotation omitted).

Caselaw establishes that prosecuting attorneys “may not personally endorse the credibility of witnesses.”

We revi ew the first four on ly for plain error, Ramey, d at 302, and the objected-to inst ance for harmless error beyond a reasonable 10 doubt

Since Caron, however, the Minnesota Supreme 16

The district court “should demonstrate on the record that it has considered and weighed the Jones factors.” State v. Swanson , 54 (Minn. 2006).

That is, to warrant an accomplice-testimony instruction, “there must be some evidence that the defendant and witness were accomplices.” State v. Swanson

State v. Swanson , d 645, 656 (Minn. 2006).

Id.; (defining the third prong as whether “the error affected the defendant’s substantial rights”).

“A prosecutor may not personally endorse the credibility of witnesses.”

This court “will reverse a conviction if prosecutorial error, considered in light of the whole trial, impaired the defendant’s right to a fair trial.” d 125, 133 (Minn. App. 2006) (), review denied (Minn. Mar.

A statement that a witness is “very believable” does not constitute a direct endorsement when the prosecutor does not directly vouch for the witness and when the statements are “made within a discussion of factors affecting the credibility of the witnesses.” 2; see also State v. Googins , (stating that 2 The prosecutor made several statements during closing argument related to witness credibility.

The jury may infer the necessary intent from the circumstances of the crime, including the “defendant’s presence at the scene of the crime, [his] close association with the principal before and after the crime, [his] lack of objection or surprise under the circumstances, and [his] flight from the scene of the crime with the principal.” d 645, 659 (Minn. 2006) (quotation omitted).

3 Here, the district court never discussed the five factors or ruled on the admissibility of Bennett’s prior convictions because Bennett chose not to testify.

This court consider s the “closing argument as a whole.” State v. Swanson

Gassler, d at 67; see, (explaining that if credibility is a central issue, the fourth and fifth Jones factors weigh in favor of admission of the prior convictions).

“If credibility is a central issue in the case, the fourth and fifth Jones factors weigh in favor of admission of the prior convictions.”