Cited by

State v. Franks , State v. Watkins

The supreme court has defined “te rrorize” as “to cause extreme fear by use of violence or threats.” State v. Schweppe , (discussing the term in the context of making threats of violence); d 68, 73 -74 (Minn. 2009) (interpr eting the statutory phrase “feel terrorized” as to “feel extreme fear resulting from violence or threats”).

And case law “does not permit us to re-weigh the evidence.”

The term “feel terrorized” means to “feel extreme fear.”

In this context, to “terrorize” means “to cause extreme fear by use of violence or threats.”

(“Our precedent does not permit us to re -weigh the evidence.”); State v. Pippitt , 4 (Minn. 2002) (“weighing the credibility of witnesses is a function exclusively for the jury”); (holding that appellate courts defer to the jury’ s

See State v. Franks , (“Our precedent does not permit us to re-weigh the evidence.”).

See State v. Franks , (noting that “it is proper to view a defend ant’s words and acts in the context of the defendant’s relationship with the victim, incl uding evidence of past crimes against the victim,” and doing so in a cas e involving domestic violence).

6 in Black’s Law Dictionary mean s “in high degree, exceedingly, extremely.” (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1562 (6th ed. 1990)).

(holding that the district court must impose a sentence for the pattern of harassing conduct offense rather than the four violations of an order for protection because it was the most serious offense against the single victim); Kebaso, d at 322 (concluding that the court of appeals did

2 Under the first element, “the State does not have to prove that the conduct amounted to an express threat.”

see also State v. Franks , -78 (Minn. 2009) (noting approval of the comparison of severity levels and maximum sentences in determining the relative severity of multiple offenses).

6 In sum, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and deferring to the jury’s credibility determinations, the jury could reasonably conc lude that appellant was guilty of the charged crimes.

See State v. Franks , , 77 (Minn. 2009).

(“Our precedent does not permit us to re-weigh the evidence.”).

(“Our precedent does not permit us to re-weigh the evidence.”).

d 68, 73 (Minn. 2009) (“Our precedent does not permit us to re-weigh the evidence.”).

We “assume that the [fact- finder] believed all of the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.” (noting that the same standard applies to court trials).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and deferring to the jury’s credibility determinations, the evidence establishes the following circumstances: controlled substances were found in the apartment, appellant lived at the apartment, police officers discovered a digital scale next to appellant’s bed, a second scale and baggies were discovered in the residence, and appellant admitted to poli

(“Our precedent does not permit us to re-weigh the evidence.”).

“Our precedent does not permit us to re-weigh the evidence.” (“We reject defendant’s request .

5 means to ‘feel extreme fear resulting from violence or threats.’”

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and deferring to the jury’s credibility determinations, the evidence establishes the following circumstances: appellant hit S.R. on the head while her back was turned away from him, S.R. struggled with appellant and knocked the phone out of his hand, and appellant picked up the phone and hit S.R. on the mouth with it.

A defendant’s conduct may be viewed in 4 the context of his relationship with the victim, and a victim’s reaction to that conduct is circumstantial evidence that is relevant to intent, see State v. Schweppe, 306 Minn. 395, 401, (concluding that a victim’s reaction to a threat was circumstantial evidence relevant to the intent element of a terroristic-threats

A defendant’s conduct may be viewed in the context of his relationship with the victim, and a victim’s reaction to that conduct is circumstantial evidence that is relevant to intent, State v. Schweppe, 306 Minn. 395, 401