Cited by

see also Honn, d at 417 (stating that in reviewing the grant or denial of a special use permit, “reasonableness is measured by the standard set out in the particular local ordinance,” and the appellate court’s “inquiry focuses on whether the proposed use is contrary to the general welfa

( , 332 (Minn. 2008) (internal quotation omitted)).

“[D]istinctions in [statutory] language in the same context are presumed to be intentional, and we apply the language consistent with that intent.” -29 (Minn. 2008).

(“Whether a local zoning body’s decision is reasonable is measured against the standards set forth in the applicable ordinance.”); Alexandria Lake Coal ., Inc. v. Douglas C nty., (considering challenge based on procedural irregularities).

“[D]istinctions in [statutory] language in the same context are presumed to be intentional, and we apply the language consistent with that intent.” –29 (Minn. 2008).

See, -33 (Minn. 2010); -33 (Minn. 2008)

Livingood, d at 895; -33 (Minn. 2008).

“Whether a local zoning body’s decision is reasonable is measured against the standards set forth in the applicable ordinance.”

Compare aff’d, with d 323, 331 (Minn. 2008).

(quoting 14 In re Stadsvold , ) (quotation omitted).

This amendment partially superseded the holdings in and which listed discretionary factors for zoning authorities to consider in the absence of a specific statutory definition of the practical difficulties standard.

We have also observed that the purpose of zoning laws is “ ‘to control land use[] and development in order to promote public he alth, safety, welfare, morals, and aesthetics .’ ” In re Stadsvold , (quoting State ex rel.

(declining to address an issue that was not presented and addressed below); (declining to address a claim alleging a violation of the Consumer Fraud Act that was first raised on appeal).

See, e.g., In re Stadsvold , (explaining that zoning laws control land use and development for public purposes).

” In re Stadsvold , (quotation omitted).

See Nelson v. Schlener , (explaining that when the legislat ure uses different words in a statute, we normally presume that those words have differe nt meanings); see also In re Stadsvold , -29 (Minn. 2 008) (“[D]istinctions in [stat utory] language in the same context are presumed to be intentional, an d we apply the language consistent with that intent.”).

Appellate courts review a board’s decision by determining whether the board “was within its jurisdiction, was not mistaken as to the applicable law, and did not act arbitrarily, oppressively, or unreasonably, and to determine whether the evidence could reasonably support or justify the determination.” (quotation omitted).

-83 (Minn. 1988) (“An appellate court may not base its decision on matters outside the record on appeal, and may not consider matters not produced and received in evidence below.”).

-29 (Minn.2008) (stating that “distinctions in language in the same context are presumed to be intentional”).

The city determined that 2 CPG argues that the city did not use the proper legal framework in analyzing its request because it did not address the factors in

(declining to address zoning issue that “was not presented to or considered by the Board [of Adjustment]” ()).

Corp., (stating that “a condition expressly mentioned in one clause of a subdivision provides evidence that the Legislature did not intend for the condition to apply to other clauses in which the condition is not stated”); -29 (Minn.2008) (stating that “distinctions in language in the same context are presumed to be intentional”).

Corp., (stating that “a condition expressly mentioned in one clause of a subdivision provides evidence that the Legislature did not intend for the condition to apply to other clauses in which the condition is not stated”); -29 (Minn. 2008) (stating that “distinctions in language in the same context are presumed to be intentional”).

-29 (Minn. 2008); see Johnson v. Paynesville Farmers Union Coop.

VanLandschoot, d at 508.

“[D]istinctions in [statutory] language in the same context are presumed to be intentional, and we apply the language consistent with that intent.” -29 (Minn. 2008).