Cited by

see also Leake, d at 539; Opsahl, d at 421 (concluding that counsel’s decision to pursue certain evidence and not other evidence fell within the realm of defense strategy).

(stating that extent of investigation and deciding which evidence to present is trial strategy).

ence to present, and whether to raise a defense are matters of trial strategy “within the proper discretion of trial counsel [that] will not be reviewed later for competence.” (counsel’s failure to file motion, call certain witnesses, and cross-examine certain witnesses represented matters of trial strategy); (counsel’s statements to jury “during closing argument, and his request that .

Generally, we do not “review ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on trial strategy.”

(noting that appellate courts do not “review ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on trial strategy”).

the district court has the inherent authority to consider such a motion.” -57 (Minn. App. 2002); see also State 6 v. Montjoy, -49 (Minn. 2008).

See Sanchez-Diaz v. State , (stating that appellate courts “will not review ineffective -assistance-of-counsel claims based on trial strategy ); (stating that trial strategy includes extent of counsel’s investigation); (“The d

See Carridine, d at 494 (determining trial strategy includes determining which witnesses to call at trial) ; 14 (determining that selecting the evidence to present to the jury is trial strategy); Andersen, d at 10 (determining the extent of an attorney’s investigation is trial strategy); d 515, 518 (Minn. 1995) (noting defense counsel’s decision not to investigate leads

We generally do not “review ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on trial strategy.”

Some ineffective-assistance-of-counsel cl aims are not procedurally barred after a direct appeal because they require the “examination of evidence outside the trial record and additional fact-finding by the postconviction c ourt because it is not based solely on the briefs and the trial court transcript.”

Trial strategy includes determining what witnesses to call at trial, and selecting what evidence to present to the ju ry, Sanchez-Diaz v. State

Appellate courts generally “will not review ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on trial strategy.” Sanchez- Diaz v. State

“[A]n ineffective -assistance-of-counsel claim is not Knaffla-barred when the claim requires examination of evidence outside the trial record and additional fact-finding by the postconviction court because it is not based solely on the briefs and trial court transcript.” Sanchez-Diaz v. State

(“Generally, we will not review ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on trial strategy.”).

See Sanchez-Diaz v. State , , 847 (Minn. 2008) (concluding that, because the petitioner was fully aware of what his trial counsel had done and said during trial, the ineffective-assistance claim should have been brought on direct appeal); McKenzie v. State , , 369-70 (Minn. 2008) (same).

(stating that Knaffla does not bar an ineffective -assistance claim that requires consideration of facts outside the trial record).2 We disagree.

“Generally, we will not review ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on trial strategy.” ().

(noting that statements during closing arguments are a matter of trial strategy); (noting that the extent of investigation is a strategic matter and stating that appellate courts’ “reluctance to scrutinize trial tactics is grounded in the public po

(holding that selection of evidence presented to the fact-finder and extent of counsel’s investigation are matters of trial strategy).

includ[ing] the selection of evidence presented to the jury.”

In doing so, we review questions of law de novo, but our review of questions of fact is “limited to whether there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the findings of the postconviction court.” ().

3 (2014) (stating that a petitioner for postconviction relief bears the burden of proving the facts alleged in the petition “by a fair preponderance of the evidence”); d 843, 846 (Minn. 2008) (stating that allegations made in a postconviction petition “must be more than argumentative assertions without factual support”).