Cited by

Id.; d 379, 382 (Minn. App. 2011).

To the contrary, we have 6 “recognize[d] the demanding circumstances in which district court judges function and have rejected arguments that district courts must comport with rule 15’s lists of questions and advisories verbatim.” rev. denied (Minn. Mar.

2 As we stated in State v. Lopez, a district court’s evaluation of a presentence plea-withdrawal motion under only the manifest-injustice standard “may in some circumstances warrant a remand for reconsideration.”

n. 1988) (remanding to permit withdrawal of a guilty plea where the defendant mistakenly believed that the presumptive sentence would be a stayed sentence, rendering the plea invalid); State v. Benson , -81 (Minn. 1983) (remanding to permit withdrawal of a guilty plea where the defendant was mistaken regarding the applicable criminal history score); (“A district court’s failure to comply with a rule 15 inquiry warrants plea withdrawal under the manifest-injustice standard when the failure denies

State v. Lopez , (quotation omitted).

A plea withdrawal may occur “if one of two standards is met.”

P. 15.05 may occur “if one of two standards is met.”

“Guilty pleas facilitate the efficient administration of justice, and more than a change of heart is needed to withdraw a guilty plea.”

see also State v. Tuttle , -57 (Minn. App. 1993) (finding no merits in claim that plea withdrawal should be permitted based upon “ a mistaken apprehension of the strength of the state’s case”).

(noting that no hearing is necessary when the record supports that a defendant is entitled to relief under the fair-and-just standard).

“The fair-and-just standard is less demanding than the manifest-injustice standard.” State v. Lopez

A plea withdrawal may only occur “if one of two standards is met.” .

12 (Minn. App. 2011) (“The defendant has the burden to prove that a fair -and-just reason exists to withdraw his plea.”).

“Guilty pleas facilitate the efficient administration of justice, and more than a change of heart is needed to withdraw a guilty plea.”

He alleges briefly that any time a defendant is deprive d of effective 7 assistance of counsel, it is fair and just as a matter of law to permit withdrawal of a guilty plea, citing State v. Lopez , -84 (Minn. App. 2011).

First a plea may be withdrawn if ‘wit hdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.’” State v. Lopez , (quoting Minn. R. Crim.

(review ing record “to determine whether the facts and circumstances satisfy the fair-and-just sta ndard).

First a plea may be withdrawn if ‘withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.’” State v. Lopez , (quoting Minn. R. Crim.

(reviewing record “to determine whether the facts and circumstances satisfy the fair-and-just standard”).

“Guilty pleas facilitate the efficient administration of justice, and more than a change of heart is needed to withdraw a guilty plea.” State v. Lopez , (M inn.

d 379, 382 (Minn. App. 2011).

see also State v. Propotnik, 299 Minn. 56, 58, (collecting cases supporting the presumption that when a “defendant had full opportunity to consult with his counsel before entering his plea, we may safely presume that counsel informed him adequately concerning” a right on which he was not “specifically” questioned); (stating that when a defendant has no attorney “the duty of inquiry” falls upon the district court).

“In determining whether a defendant’s reason for withdrawal is fair and just, a district court must give due consideration to two factors: (1) the reasons a defendant advances to support withdrawal and (2) [any] prejudice granting the motion would cause the [s]tate [as a result of] reliance on the plea.” (alterations in original) (quotations omitted).

(holding that an unrepresented defendant who entered a plea without signing a written plea petition and who had limited experience with the criminal-justice system satisfied the fair-and-just standard for pre-sentence plea withdrawal).