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Appellate courts “generally do not review a n ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim that is based on trial strategy.” Andersen v. State , .

Under the first prong, “there is a strong presumption that counsel’s performance was reasonable.”

Under the two-prong Strickland test, a defendant must show that (1) “counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that a reasonable probability exists that the outcome would have been different but for counsel’s errors.”

(“Generally, an ineffective assistance of counsel claim should be raised in a postconviction petition for relief, rather than on direct appeal.”).

There is a “strong presumption that counsel’s performance was reasonable.”

But where “a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel can be determined on the basis of the trial record, the claim must be brought on direct appeal.”

“[T]here is a strong presumption that counsel’s performance was reasonable.”

When applying the first prong of Strickland, “there is a strong presumption that counsel ’s performance was reasonable.” .

But “[w]hen a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel can be determined on the basis of the trial record, the claim must be brought on direct appeal.”

“[T]here is a strong presumption that counsel’s performance was reasonable.”

Strickland test, we nevertheless conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying postconviction relief because Cookson has not satisfied Strickland’s prejudice prong.6 5 “When a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel can be determined on the basis of the trial record, the claim must be brought on direct appeal or it is Knaffla-barred.”

(citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004)).

“that took place between the plea and sentencing hearing.” A claim for ineffective assistance of trial counsel is not procedurally barred “when the claim requires examination of evidence outside the trial record or additional fact-finding by the postconviction court, because the claim is not based solely on the briefs and trial court transcript.” see, (stating that defendant’s claim that “his trial counsel failed to communicate two plea offers requires additional factfinding, so it is not barred

Under the Strickland test, the appellant must show (1) that “his counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that a reasonable probability exists that the outcome would have been different but for counsel’s errors.”

6 This court will not second guess the trial-strategy decision of which 6 See, (noting that decision to call exculpatory witnesses falls within trial strategy and is not reviewable on appeal); -27 (Minn. 1992) (determining that trial counsel’s failure to call three potential witnesses was within counsel’s trial strategy).

does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9

And “there is a strong presumption that counsel’s performance was reasonable.”

(state bears the burden of proving that a statement is not testimonial); (state bears the burden of proving that defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights were not violated); (state bears the burden of establ

Anderson v. State , (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004)).

(citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 & n.9).

Under Strickland, a defendant “must demonstrate that (1) his counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that a reasonable probability exists that the outcome would have been different but for counsel’s errors.”

(noting that counsel’s alleged conduct—including that he was unprepared at trial, did not read the discovery, failed to investigate the case, and did not call exculpatory witnesses—“arguably falls within trial strategy and therefore is not reviewable”).

(citing Crawford 7 v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 & n.9 (2004)).

Admission of an out-of-court statement violates the Confrontation Clause when “the statement in question was testimonial, the statement was admitted for the truth of the matter asserted, and the defendant was unable to cross-examine the declarant.” (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 & n.9 (2004)).

(“We give trial counsel wide latitude to determine the best strategy for the client.”).

See Andersen v. State , (explaining that appellate courts generally will not review an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim that is based on trial strategy, which “includes the selection of evidence presented to the jury”).

d 493, 506 (Minn. 2013) (“We give trial counsel wide latitude to determine the best strategy for the client.”).

(noting that the decision to call exculpatory witnesses falls within trial strategy and is not reviewable on appeal) ; (stating that strategic trial decisions include “what evidence to present to the jury, what witnesses to call, and whether to

“We need not address both the performance and prejudice prongs if one is dispositive.”