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See Andersen v. State , (explaining that appellate courts generally will not review an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim that is based on trial strategy, which “includes the selection of evidence presented to the jury”).

d 493, 506 (Minn. 2013) (“We give trial counsel wide latitude to determine the best strategy for the client.”).

(noting that the decision to call exculpatory witnesses falls within trial strategy and is not reviewable on appeal) ; (stating that strategic trial decisions include “what evidence to present to the jury, what witnesses to call, and whether to

“We need not address both the performance and prejudice prongs if one is dispositive.”

(“[T]rial tactics should not be reviewed by an appellate court, which, unlike the counsel, has the benefit of hindsight.”); (reasoning that the decisions to call certain witnesses falls within trial strategy and are not reviewable); State v. Davis , n.10 (Minn. 2012) (stating that whether to cross -examine a witness constituted trial strategy).

(citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 & n.9 (2004)).

“[T]here is a strong presumption that counsel’s performance was reasonable.”

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Andersen v. State

Thus, “w hen a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel can be determined on the basis of the trial record, the claim must be brought on direct appeal or it is Knaffla-barred.” .

Under the Strickland test, a defendant “must demonstrate that ( 1) his counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that a reasonable probability exists that the outcome would have been different but for counsel’s errors.” Andersen v. State , .

We assign “a strong presumption that counsel’s performance was reasonable.”

However, “[w]hen a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel can be determined on the basis of the trial record, the claim must be brought on direct appeal.”

Andersen v. State (Andersen II)

Strickland requires an appellant to establish that “(1) [their] counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that a reasonable probability exists that the outcome would have been different but for counsel’s errors.” (citing Strickland, 446 U.S. at 687).

We assign “a strong presumption that counsel’s performance was reasonable.”

A petition raising the interests- of-justice exception “must have substantive merit and must be asserted without deliberate or inexcusable delay.”

There is “a strong presumption that counsel’s performance was reasonable.”

Under this prong, this court will not review conduct that “falls within trial strategy.”

7 prong we do not review conduct th at “falls within trial strategy.” Andersen v. State , (Andersen I).

Under the Strickland test, a defendant “must demonstrate that (1) his counsel’s perform ance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that a reasonable probability exists that the outcome would have been different but for counsel’s errors.”

See id.; (declining to review an attorney’s decision not to call exculpatory witnesses as an act falling within trial strategy).

App. 2017) (citing Andersen v. State , ).

(noting that trial strategy, which includes selection and presentation of evidence, which witnesses to call, and extent of investigation into particular theories, is not reviewable).

“[A] claim that [a defendant’s] attorneys’ actions denied him the right to testify must fail ‘absent some indication in the record that his lawyers coerced him into not testifying by applying undue pressure, using illegitimate mean s, or otherwise depriving him of his free will.’” ().

However, “[w]hen a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel can be determined on the basis of the trial record, the claim must be brought on direct appeal.”

See Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); d 1, 10 (Minn. 2013).

Admission of an out-of-court statement violates the Confrontation Clause when “the statemen t in question was testim onial, the statement was admitted for the truth of the matter asse rted, and the defendant was unable to cross- examine the declarant.” (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 39, 59 n.9 (2004).

Strickland requires an appellant to show that “(1) his counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that a reasonable probability exists that the outcome would have been different but for counsel’s errors.” (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).

(stating that a claim is Knaffla barred if it should have been known at the time of direct appeal).

10 “[T]here is a strong presum ption that counsel’s performance was reasonable.”

“[T]here is a strong presumption that counsel’s performance was reasonable.” Andersen v. State

(explaining that defense counsel’s presentation of evidence to the jury is considered part of trial strategy).

admitting the jail phone calls; the cumulative effect of the district court’s errors deprived him of a fair trial; and the evidence of unlawful possession of a firearm was insufficient because the juvenile adjudication to which he stipulated is not a “crime of violence.” Sutter did not petition for review of these issues; therefore, they are not before us. 7 declarant.”

Admission of an out -of-court statement violates the Confrontation Clause when “the statement in question was testimonial, the sta tement was admitted for the truth of the matter asserted, and the defendant was unable to cross -examine the declarant.” (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 5 9 & n.9, 124 S. Ct. at 136 9 & n.9 ).

1 (Minn. 2013) (“Solemn declar ations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity and subsequent presentation of conclusory allegations unsupported by specifics is subject to summary dismissal.”).

“We will generally not review an ineffec tive-assistance-of-counsel claim that is based on trial strategy.”

“Under the Strickland test, [a criminal defendant] must demonstrate that (1) his counsel’ s performance fell below a n objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that a reasonable probability exists that the outcome would have been different but for counsel’s errors.”

“[T]here is a strong presumption th at counsel’s performance was reasonable.”