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Moreover, “while it is well settled that jury instructions must define the crime charged and explain th e elements of that cr ime to the jury, we nevertheless give district courts broad discretion and considerable latitude in choosing the language of jury instructions.” State v. Milton , (quotation omitted).

e v. Milton that this jury instruction was erroneous because accomplice-liability instructions “must explain to the jury that in order to find a defendant guilty as an accomplice, the jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew his alleged accomplice was going to commit a crime and the defendant intended his presence or actions to further the commission of that crime.” ().

The individual instructions for each of the t hree aiding and abetting counts also contain specific instructions that set out each element

When there is no objection to jury instructions at trial, the appellate court has discretion to “consider a claim of error on appeal if there was plain error affecting substantial rights or an error of fundamental law in the jury instructions.” (quotation omitted); -08 (Minn. 2012).

Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 8, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1415-16 (2013); -801 (Minn. 2012) (stating that shared areas of multi-family dwellings are not curtilage and police may lawfully enter without a warrant).

8 (Minn. 2012) (d 675, 682 (Minn. 2007)).

“When reviewing a pretrial order on a motion to suppress, [appellate courts] review the district court’s factual findings” for clear error and “review the district court’s legal determinations, including a determination of probable cause, de novo.”

hires, counsels, or conspires with or otherwise procures the other to commit the crime.” To prove that Bishop was guilty of intentionally aiding or abetting a crime, the state was required to prove beyond a reas onable doubt that Bishop “(1) knew his alleged accomplices were going to commit a crime, and (2) intended his presence to further the commission of that crime.”

“It is generally misconduct for a prosecutor to ‘knowingly offer inadmissible evidence for the purpose of bringing it to the jury’s attention.’” State v. Mosley , (quoting State v. Milton , ).

State v. Milton , , 798 (Minn. 2012).

See State v. Milton , (noting modified plain -error test imposes initial burden upon defendant to prove plain error, then burden shifts to state to prove plain error did not affect defendant’s substantial rights).

Plain error “affects a defendant’ s substantial rights if there is a reasonable likelihood that the error had a significant effect on the jury’s verdict.” (quotations omitted).

See State v. Milton , , 807-08 (Minn. 2012) (clarifying the law after holding that the defendant failed to establish an error that was plain because our court had not yet clearly required district courts to give the jury instruction in question).

Reynolds relies on State v. Milton to support his argument, but in that case the district court failed to properly instruct the jury on the element of “intentionally aiding.”

“It is generally misconduct for a prosecutor to ‘knowingly offer inadmissible evidence for the purpose of bringing it to the jury’s attention.’” ().

2001) (quotation omitted); -08 (Minn. 2012).

4 See State v. Milton , , 805 (Minn. 2012) ("[T]he element of 'intentionally aiding' embodies two important and necessary principles: (1) that the defendant 'knew that his alleged accomplices were going to commit a crime,' and (2) that the defendant 'intended his presence or actions to further the commission of that crime.'

State v. Milton , , 805 (Minn. 2012).

State v. Milton , , 805 (Minn. 2012).

“When reviewing a pretrial order on a motion to suppress, we review the district court’s factual findings under our clearly erroneous standard and we review the district court’s legal determinations, including a determination of probable cause, de novo.” (citation omitted).

“[T]he element of ‘intentionally aiding’ embodies two importan t and necessary principles: (1) that the defendant knew that [her] alleged accomplices were going to commit a crime, and (2) that the defendant intended [her] presence or actions to further the co mmission of that crime.” State v. Milton , 05 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted).

State v. Milton , , 798 (Minn. 2012).

See State v. Milton , , 807-08 (Minn. 2012) (holding jury instruction was not "clear" or "obvious" error where the supreme court had not clearly articulated specific explanation for accomplice-liability instruction).

But the s upreme court has held that the element of “intentionally aiding” includes “two important and necessary princi ples: (1) that the defendant ‘knew that his alleged accomplices were going to commit a crime,’ and (2) that the defendant ‘intended his presence or actions to further the commission of that crime.’” ().

State v. Milton , , 805 (Minn. 2012).