Cited by

“The [s]tate bears the burden of proving any exception.”

(reviewing unobjected-to challenge for plain error).

(reviewing unobjected-to jury instructions for plain error); (reviewing an unobjected-to evidentiary ruling for plain error).

d 789, 805 (Minn. 2012).

This court typically affords the district court “broad discretion and considerable latitude in choosing the language of jury instructions.” 19 (quotation omitted).

9 I. Aiding and Abetting Third-Degree Criminal Sexual Conduct1 “A defendant is guilty of aiding and abetting if the defendant ‘intentionally aids, advises, hires, counsels, or conspires with or otherwise procures another to commit’ a crime.” (quoting Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subd.

6 “[J]ury instructions must define the crime charged and explain the elements of that crime to the jury,” and we typically afford the district court “broad discretion and considerable latitude in choosing the language of jury instructions.” (quotations omitted).

(explaining that aiding and abetting means that the defendant knew her accomplices were going to commit the offense and intended her presence or actions to further the commission of that offense).

If the three prongs are met, an appellate court decides whether it “must address the error to ensure fairness and the integrity of the judicial proceedings.” (quotation omitted).

But if the three prongs of the plain- error test are met, this court must then decide whether to address the error “to ensure fairness and the integrity of the judicial proceedings.” (quotation omitted).

A person “intentionally aids” in the commission of a crime if “two important and necessary principles” are satisfied: (1) “the defendant knew that his alleged accomplices were going to commit a crime,” and (2) “the defendant intended his presence or actions to further the commission of that crime.” (quotation omitted).

-43 (Minn. 2016) (“Where, as here, the facts are undisputed, we review the pretrial order on a motion to suppress de novo.” (quotation omitted)); State v. Milton , (“We review the district court’s legal determinations, including a determination of probable cause, de novo.”).

Under plain-error review, we analyze “whether the jury instructions contained an (1) error (2) that was plain and (3) that affected the defendant’s substantial rights.”

Warrantless 4 seizures are “presumptively unreasonable unless one of a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions applies.” State v. Milton , (quotation omitted).

the plain-view doctrine, the police may, without a warrant, seize an object they believe to be the fruit or instrumentality of a crime as long as three criteria are met: (1) [the] police are legitimately in the position from which t hey view the object; (2) they have a lawful right of access to the object; and (3) the object ’s incriminating nature is immediately apparent.” State v. Milton , (quotation omitted).

(determining that district court’s error in instructing jury was not plain when court had “not yet clearly required district courts to include” specific language at issue); State v. Moore , (concluding that jury-instruction error was not plain when other cases

al offense element: that the state had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt Williams intended to refuse the breath test.” We review jury instructions in their entirety to assess whether the instructions “fairly and adequately explain the law” and reviewing courts “give district courts broad discretion and considerable latitude in choosing the language of jury instructions.” (quotation omitted).

(explaining, “if the evidence sought to be admitted is questionable, a prosecutor should obtain a ruling from the trial court before commenting on the evidence”); (warning prosecuting attorneys not to refer to evidence without good-faith basis that the evidence is admissible).

Citing State v. Milton , the court of appeals reasoned that a failure to provide a specific explanation of an element of the offense is not plain if an appellate court has not yet cl early required such an explanation.

We review jury instructions in their entirety to determine whether they “fairly and adequately explain the law.” (quotation omitted).

When there is no objection to jury instructions at trial, we have discretion to consider a claim of error on a ppeal if there was “plain error affecting substantial rights or an error of fundame ntal law in the jury instructions.” 13 (quotation omitted); s –09 (Minn. 2012).

The elements of aiding and abetting are “(1) that the defendant knew that h [er] alleged accomplices were going to commit a crime, and (2) that the defendant intended h [er] presence or actions to further the commission of that crime.” (quotation omitted).

See Webster, d at 787 (“An error is plain if it is clear or obvious, which is typically established if the error contravenes case law, a rule, or a standard of conduct.” (quotation omitted)); (concluding that erroneous jury instructio n was “troublesome” but that the supreme court had not previously articulated a clear requirement on the instruction).

District courts have broad discretion “in choosing the language of jury instructions.” State v. Milton , (quotation omitted).

The term “intentionally aides” means that “the defendant knew his alleged accomplice was going to commit a crime,” and that “the defendant inte nded his presence or actions to further the commission of that crime.”

[and w]e review the district court’s legal determinations, including a determination of probable cause, de novo.” (citation omitted).

“When reviewing a pretrial order on a motion to suppress, we review the district court’s factual findings [for clear error],” (citation omitted), and its determinations of reasonable, articulable suspicion de novo, State v. Diede , .