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5 In determining whether reasonable, articula ble suspicion exists to justify a stop, Minnesota courts “consider the totality of the circumstances and acknowledge that trained law-enforcement officers are permitted to make inferences and deduc tions that would be beyond the competence of an untrained person.” State v. Richardson , (“The court may consider the officer’s experien ce, general knowledge, and observations; background information, includ ing the nature of the offens e suspected and th

d 687, 692 (Minn. App. 2012).

The state also contends that the trooper’s expansion of the stop is authorized by this court’s opinion in State v. Klamar

Id.; see also State v. Klamar , (holding that two indicia of intoxication were sufficient for reasonable suspicion).

“A police officer may, however, initiate a limited investigative seizure without a warrant if the officer has reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity.”

see also Wilkes, d at 246 (“[C]redibility determinations are the province of the district court.”).

See State v. Klamar , 693 (Minn. App. 2012) (concluding that it was not a seiz ure but a welfare check for an officer to approach a car stopped on the interstate with a passenger vomiting out the side).

Reasonable suspicion justifies a stop “so long as the facts support at least one inference of the possibility of criminal activity,” (quotation omitted), and it is not “the product of mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity.” (quotation omitted).

20, 1990); (holding that an officer w ho approache d a stopped vehicle to check on t he occupants’ welfare and spoke to the driver through the window did not conduct a seizure until the officer asked the driver to exit the vehicle).

State v. Klamar , see also Wilkes, d at 246 (“[C]redibility determinations are the province of the district court.”).

see also Wilkes v. Comm’r of Pub.

(stating that this court defers to a district court’s credibility determinations when reviewing a pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence).

“[A] seizure occurs when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.” (quotation omitted).

State v. Klamar , , 696 (Minn. App. 2012).

“[T]he reasonable suspicion standard is not high.” d 390, 393 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted); (“ The factual basis required to justify an investigative seizure is minimal.”).

(concluding that an officer’s observation of the odor of alcohol and bloodshot and watery eyes justified the expansion of a traffic stop to investigate a suspicion of impaired driving); State v. Kier , (“An officer needs only one objective indication of i

reasonably justif[ies] further intrusions in the form of field sobriety and preliminary breath testing.” (concluding officer’s observation of odor of alcohol emanating from driver and dr iver’s bloodshot and watery eyes justified expansion of stop).

d 687, 696 (Minn. App. 2012).

es that Officer Gramling’s se arch of the car and of respondent’s backpack located inside the car were lawful under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.1 When reviewing a pretrial order suppre ssing evidence, we “independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the district court erred in suppressing— or not suppressing—the evidence.” ().

“[C]ourts generally have held that it does not by itself constitute a seizure for an officer to simply walk up and talk to a person standing in a public place or to a driver sitting in an already stopped car.” d 687, 692-93 (Minn. App. 2012) (concluding that trooper’s approach of already -stopped vehicle to check welfare of occupants was not a seizure).

“A police officer may, however, initiate a limited investigative seizure without a warrant if the officer has reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity.” State v. Klamar , (citing Terry v. Ohio , 395 U.S. 1, 21 -22, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968)).

In reviewing a pretrial order suppressing evidence, “we may independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the district court erred in suppressing—or not suppressing—the evidence.” State v. Klamar , (M inn.

See, (odor of alcohol and bloodshot and watery eyes); State v. Vonderharr , (odor of alcohol and admission of drinking); (odor of alcohol), review denied (Minn. Sept.

See, (determining that the trooper developed reasonable articulable suspicion to perform an initial stop and concluding that two indicia of intoxication reasonably justified roadside sobriety tests and a PBT).

(stating that district court findings are not reversed unless clearly erroneous, and great deference is given to court’s determinations regarding credibility of witnesses), aff’d, 508 U.S. 366, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993); see also State v. Klamar , (stating that this court defers to a district court’s credibility determinations when reviewing a pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence).

Safety, see -96 (Minn. App. 2012) (observing the odor 5 of alcohol and bloodshot and watery eyes, facts which gave the trooper a reasonable basis to suspect impairment).

See, (odor of alcohol and bloodshot and watery eyes); State v. Vonderharr , (odor of alcohol and admission of drinking); State v. Lopez , (odor of alcohol), review denied (Minn. Sept.

d 687, 696 (Minn. App. 2012); see also State v. Lopez , (upholding the expansion of a stop based on the officer’s noticing the odor of alcohol alone), review denied (Minn. Sept.

“The police may seize a person so long as the facts support at least one inference of the possibility of criminal activity.” (quotation omitted).

Though the police cannot rely on a “hunch” 6 to justify seizing a person, the police may seize that person if objective facts “support at least one inference of the possibility of criminal activity.” d 687, 693 (Minn. App. 2012) (quotation omitted).