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It requires “a showing that the seizure was not the product of mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity.” d 687, 691 (Minn. App. 2012) (quotation omitted).

“Deference must be given to the district court’s credibility decisions.”

(concluding that an officer’s reasonable suspicion that a driver was impaired justified expanding the scope of a traffic stop by asking a driver to undergo field sobriety tests).

(considering whether a “trooper’s initiation of field sobriety and preliminary breath testing was reasonable”) .

An investigatory stop is justified “so long as the facts support at least one inference of the possibility of criminal activity.” (quotation omitted).

(noting that we defer to a district court’s determination of a witness’s credibility).

The factors we may consider when applying this test include “the officer’s experience, general knowledge, and observations; background information, including the nature of the offense suspected and the time and location of the seizure; and anything else that is relevant.”

This court may consider “the officer’s experience, general knowledge, and observations; background information, including the nature of the offense suspected and the time and location of the seizure; and anything else that is relevant.”

(concluding that a “trooper’s approach to [a stopped] vehicle to check on the welfare of its occupants was not a seizure”).

“Deference must be given to the district court’s credibility determinations.” ().

d 476, 488 (Minn. 2016) (reiterating that, when forming reasonable, articulable suspicion, an officer may “draw inferences and deductions that might well elude an untrained person,” though it requires more than an unarticulated hunch)(quotations omitted); (stating that an odor of alcohol emanating from defendant and bloodshot and watery eyes were indicia of intoxication which “reasonably justified further intrusion”).

And “this court has found a show of authority sufficient to constitute a seizure where officers asked a person to exit a parked vehicle and approach the officer.” (stating that “it is likely to be a seizure if a person is ordered out of 11 a vehicle, or the police engage in some other action or show of authority which one would not expect between two private citizens”), rev. denied (Minn. D

State v. Klamar , 6 (recognizing odor of alcohol as an objective fact that indicates intoxication); Mesenburg, d at 648 (holding that odor of alcohol justified field sobriety tests).

d 687, 691 (Minn. App. 2012).

This court has held that an officer’s approach to a car “to check on the welfare of its occupants was not a seizure.”

(holding that the standard is always whether “the conduct of the police would communicate to a reasonable person in the defendant’s physical circumstances an attempt by the police to capture or seize” and that when an officer appro

Id.; see State v. Klamar , (“[A]n intrusion that is not closely related to the initial justification for the seizure is invalid unless there is independent reasonableness to justify that particular intrusion.” (quotation omitted)); see also Mesenburg v. Comm’r of Pub.

d 687, 691 (Minn. App. 2012) (“Deference must be given to the district court’s credibility determinations.”).

“[A] seizure occurs when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.” (quotation omitted).

In addition, appellate courts give “due weight to the inferences drawn from those facts by the district court ,” (quotation omitted) , and we must defer to the district court’s credibility determinations , State v. Klamar , (Minn. 1 Even though revocation of a driver’s license under the implied consent statute is a civil remedy, the exclusionary rule applies to these proceedings.

Whether officers have reasonable articulable suspicion to conduct an investigative seizure depends on the totality of the circumstances, and a showing that the seizure was not “the product of mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity.” State v. Klamar , d 687, 691 (Minn. App. 2012) (quotation omitted).

see also Wilkes, d at 246 (“[C]redibility determinations are the province of the district court.”).

But a police officer may initiate a limited, investigatory stop “if the officer has reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity.” (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968)).

“A person generally is not seized merely because a police officer approaches him in a public place or in a parked car and begins to ask questions.” (concluding “that the trooper’s approach to Klamar’s [parked] vehicle to check on the welfare of its occupants was not a seizure”).

We do not weigh credibility on appeal, and the district court did not find the officer’s testimony incredible.

We consider “the officer’s expe rience, general knowledge, and observations; background information, includi ng the nature of the offense suspected and the time and location of the seizure; and anything else that is relevant.”

Waltz argues that the officers violated her state and federal constitutional rights by seizing her without justifica tion and then searching her ca r. She does not challenge the officers’ authority for the initial interaction, which she characterizes as a “welfare check.” (holding that a seizure does not occur when an officer a pproaches a stopped vehicle fo r a welfare check).

Courts consider the totality of the circumstances to determine 6 whether reasonable suspicion exists, including “the officer’s experience, general knowledge, and observations; background information, including the nature of the offense suspected and the time and location of the seizure; and anything else that is relevant.”