Cited by

d 537, 543 (Minn. App. 2014) (noting that reasonable suspicion “ must be present at the moment a person is seized” (quotation omitted)).

“Reasonable, articulable suspicion must be present at the moment a person is seized.” (quotation omitted).

“Reasonable, articulable suspicion must be present at the moment a person is seized.” (quotation omitted).

(addressing “issues raised by defendant on appeal that may arise on retrial”); (addressing an issue raised by a defendant “in the interests of judicial economy because it will likely arise again on remand”).

are sufficient to constitute reasonable suspicion.”

We have held that “a defendant must exercise dominion and control over the [item] itself in order to constructively possess it.”

16, 2001), the defendant must exercise dominion and control over the substance itself, not merely the area in which it was located, -43 (Minn. App. 2014).

He cites State v. Hunter, where the appellant argued that a jury instruction materially “misstate[d] the law by diverting the jury’s attention from whether [the appellant] exercised dominion and control over the cocaine to whether he merely exercised dominion and control over his SUV where the cocaine was found.” d 537, 542 (Minn. App. 2014).

consciously exercising dominion and control over [the item].” -43 (Minn. App. 2014) (holding that dominion and control is required over the item, not the place where the item is found).

at 611; (explaining that constructive possession requires a suspect’s exercise of dom inion and control over the item, not over the place where it is found).

at 611; (explaining that constructive possession requires a suspect’s exercise of dom inion and control over the substance, not over the place where it is found).

see also State v. Hunter , (clarifying that constructive possession requires a suspect’s exercise of dominion an d control over the substance, not over the place where it is found).

Salyers, d at 159; d 537, 542 (Minn. App. 2014).

13 See, e.g., State v. Hunter

Prior to conducting an investigatory stop, a police officer “must have a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity.”

See id.; d 537, 542-43 (Minn. App. 2014).

State v. Hunter , -43 (Minn. App. 2014).

Prior to condu cting an investigatory stop, a police officer “must have a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity.”

See State v. Hunter , (finding reasonable suspicion to stop and investigate where officers conducting surveillance in an area known for drug activity observed appellant park his SUV in a remote area of a parking lot, a sedan entered and parked next to the SUV a few minutes later, and the individuals in the sedan

(“[A] defendant must exercise dominion and control over the [contraband] itself in order to constructively possess it.”); (noting that “mere proximity to criminal activity” is insufficient to establish probable cause for arrest for po

d 537, 542 (Minn. App. 2014) (quotation omitted).