Cited by

“Prejudice” in this context does not include damage to a party’s case “from the legitimate probative force of the evidence.” (quotation omitted).

But prejudice does not mean the damage to a party’s case “from the legitimate probative force of the evidence.” (quotation omitted).

Unfair prejudice “does not mean the damage to the opponent’s case that results from the legitimate probative force of the evidence; rather, it refers to the unfair advantage that results from the capacity of the evidence to persuade by illegitimate means.” (quotation omitted).

See Kennedy, d at 392 (concluding that “the fact that the trial court read two cautionary instructions,” one before the Spreigl witness’s testimony and one at the close of the entire case, “lessened the probability of undue weight being given by the jury to the evidence”); (stating that appellate courts presume that a jury followed cautionary instructions).

Prejudice does not mean the damage to a party ’s case “from the legitimate probative force of the evidence.” (quotation omitted).

trict court “lessen[ed] the probability of undue weight being given by the jury to the [ Spreigl] evidence.” (holding that district court’s cautionary instructions regarding permissible uses of Spreigl evidence “minimized” concerns about potential for undue prejudice); (stating that appellate courts presume jury followed cautionary instructions).

Unfair prejudice “does not mean the damage to the opponent’s case that results from the legitimate probative force of the evidence; rather, it refers to the unfair advantage that results from the capacity of the evidence to persuade by illegitimate means.” (quotation omitted).

(explaining, in the context of Spreigl evidence, that “a cautionary instruction lessens the probability of undue weight being given by the jury to the evidence” (quotation omitted)); (stating that appellate courts presume the jury followed cautionary instructions).

Prejudice does not mean the damage to a party’s case “from the legitimate probative force of the evidence.” d 360, 366 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted).

(explaining that reviewing courts presume that the jury followed cautionary instructions).

In this context, prejudice does not mean the damage to a party’s case “from the legitimate probative force of the evidence.” (quotation omitted).

In the context of the admission of Spreigl evidence, “prejudice does not mean the damage to the opponent’s case that results from the legitimate probative force of the evidence; rather, it refers to the unfair advantage that results from the capacity of the evidence to persuade by illegitimate means.” (quotation omitted).

“[P]rejudice” in this context does not mean the damage to a party’s case “from the legitimate probative force of the evidence.” (quotation omitted).

In the context of the admission of Spreigl evidence, “prejudice does not mean the damage to the opponent’s case that results from the legitimate probative force of the evidence; rather, it refers to the unfair advantage that results from the capacity of the evidence to persuade by illegitimate means.” (quotation omitted).

“Prejudice does not mean the damage to the opponent’s case that results from the legitimate probative force of the evidence; rather, it refers to the unfair advantage that results from the capacity of the evidence to persuade by illegitimate means.” (quotations omitted).

This court reviews the district court’s decision to admit “evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Welle

We review the district court’s decision to admit “evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts for an abuse of discretion.”

Unfair Prejudice to Griffin Unfair prejudice “does not mean the damage to the opponent’s case that results from the legitimate probative force of the evidence; rather, it refers to the unfair advantage that results from the capacity of the evidence to persuade by illegitimate means.” (quotation omitted).

(explaining that “[w]e presume that the jury followed these cautionary instructions”).

We review the district court’s decision to admit “evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts for an abuse of discretion.”

See State v. Welle , (concluding that the charged offense and Spreigl offense were markedly similar because both involved the defendant punch ing an individual’s head, a verbal disagre ement preceding other acts, a disagreement of minor significance, the defendant claiming self - defense, and the defendant showing no

(affirming district court’s admission of Spreigl evidence because district court carefully weighed potential for prejudice against probative value and instructed jury on how to treat the evidence).

Id.; see State v. Spreigl, 272 Minn. 488, 491

As the supreme court has explained, “[P]rejudice does not mean the damage to the opponent’s case that results from the legitimate probative force of the evidence; rather, it refers to the unfair advantage that results from the capacity of the evidence to persuade by illegitimate means.” (quotation omitted and emphasis added ).

We review a district court’s decision to admit “evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts for an abuse of discretion.”

“We presume that the jury followed these cautionary instructions.”

“We review a trial court’s decision to admit evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts for an abuse of discretion.”

DECISION Spreigl evidence Evidence of a defendant’s prior bad acts, often called Spreigl evidence, “is inadmissible to prove a defendant’s bad character, but may be admitted for other purposes, 3 such as to show motive, intent, absence of mistake, identity, or a common scheme or plan.” (citing Minn. R. Evid.