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Indeed, the Minnesota Supreme Court has stated that district courts “should, sua sponte, give an unequivocal limiting instruction both at the time the evidence is admitted and at the close of trial” but the supreme court has also stated that “in the absence of a request, the district court’s failure to do so [is] not reversible error.” (quotations omitted).

Barker requires us to weigh the following factors: “(1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) whether the defendant asserted [their] right to a speedy trial; and (4) whether the delay prejudiced the defendant.” State v. Taylor , (quotation omitted).

(generally, briefs without an argument or citation to legal authority in support of allegations are deemed waived).

Prejudice We consider three interests in determining whether a defendant suffered prejudice: “(1) preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) minimizing the anxiety and concern 12 of the accused; and (3) preventing the possibility that the defense will be impaired.” (quotation omitted).

This privilege protects from disclosure “communications that seek to elicit legal advice from an attorney acting in that capacity, that relate to that purpose, and that are made in confidence by the client unless the privilege is waived.” (quotation omitted).

Rather, they are related factors and must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant.’” (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 533); see also Mikell, d at 244 (explaining that “the central question” is whether the state brought “the accused to trial quickly enough so as not to endanger the values that the right to a speedy trial protects”).

“To determine if a jury instruction correctly states the law, we analyze the criminal statute and the case law under it.”

Rather, they are related factors and must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant.” (quotation omitted); (explaining that “the central question” is whether the state brought “the accused to trial quickly enough so as not to endanger the values that the right to a speedy trial protects”).

To establish ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland, the defendant must prove (1) “that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and (2) “there was a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” (quotations omitted).

d 1, 11 (Minn. 2015) (recognizing the preliminary issue of “whether a closure was too trivial to amount to a violation of the Sixth Amendment”) (quotation and alteration omitted).

Therefore, we must first determine “whether a closure even occurred.”

The purpose of the right to a public trial is to benefit the accused by ensuring that the public sees that defendants are “fairly dealt with and not unjustly condemned” and to keep the triers of cases “keenly alive to a sense of their responsibility and to the importance of their functions.” Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46 (1984) (quotation omitted); (quotation omitted).

(“Where there is a conflict between the Minnesota Jury Instructions Guide, Criminal (CRIMJIG) and the statute or our case law, the latter two control.” ()); (noting that model jury instructio

Rather, they are related factors and must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant.” (quotation omitted).

District courts have wide latitude to articulate jury instructions insofar as the instructions do not “confuse, mislead, or materially misstate the law.” -15 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted).

Although we cite CRIMJIG 27.12 herein for its persuasive value, we are mindful that, “[w]here there is a conflict between the Minnesota Jury Instructions Guide, Criminal (CRIMJIG) and the statute or our case law, the latter two control.” (stating that jury instructions “are not the law”).

Rather, they are related factors and must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant.” (quotation omitted); (explaining that “the central question” is whether the state brought “the accused to trial quickly enough so as not to endanger the values that the right to a speedy trial protects”).

District courts generally have wide latitude to articulate jury instructions in so far as the instructions do not “confuse, mislead, or materially misstate the law.” -15 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted).

(holding that attempt to manufacture false alibi was relevant to both credibility and consciousness of guilt).

Rather, they are related factors and must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant.” (quotation omitted).

446, 448 (Minn. 1934) (stating that it is “universally” acknowledged that “an accused’s flight, escape from custody, resistance to arrest, concealment, assumption of a false name, and related conduct, are admissible as evidence of consciousness of guilt” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); (holding that the admission of a jail call in which the defendant stated that he wished he had posted bail so that he could be “on the run” was not error because it suggested a consciousnes

“Where there is a conflict between the Minnesota Jury Instructions Guide, Criminal (CRIMJIG) and the statute or our case law, the latter two control.” (stating that jury instructions “are not the law”).

use the district court failed to advise him properly of his right to a jury trial 1 Gratz also argues in a supplemental brief that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, but we decline to address this claim because we do not consider pro se claims on appeal that are unsupported by argument or legal authority “unless prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection.” (quotation omitted).

Appellate courts deem arguments in a pro se supplemental brief forfeited if the brief “contains no argument or citation to legal authority in support of the allegations” and will consider those arguments only if “prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection.”

(“When there is a conflict between the Minnesota Jury Instructions Guide .

This court considers three interests when assessing the prejudice factor: “(1) preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) minimizing the anxiety and concern of the accused; and (3) preventing the possibility that the defense will be impaired.” (quotation omitted).

We do not consider pro se claims on appeal that are unsupported by argument or legal authority “unless prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection.” (quotation omitted).

Prejudice This court considers three interests when determining whether a defendant suffered prejudice: “(1) preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) minimizing the anxiety and concern of the accused; and (3) preventing the possibility that the defense will be impaired.” (quotation omitted).

(quotation omitted); see also Paige, d at 837 (explaining that “the right must be considered within the context of each case”).

A. “While district courts have broad discretion to formulate appropriate jury instructions, a district court abuses its discretion if the jury instructions confuse, mislead, or materially misstate the law.” –15 (Minn. 2015) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Prejudice In assessing the prejudice factor, we focus on three interests the speedy-trial right advances: “(1) preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) minimizing the anxiety and concern of the accused; and (3) preventing the possibility that the defense will be impaired.” (quotation omitted).

8 D. Prejudice This court considers three interests when determining whether a defendant suffered prejudice: “(1) preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) minimizing the anxiety and concern of the accused; and (3) preventing the possibility that the defense will be impaired.” (quotation omitted).