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A. “While district courts have broad discretion to formulate appropriate jury instructions, a district court abuses its discretion if the jury instructions confuse, mislead, or materially misstate the law.” –15 (Minn. 2015) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Prejudice In assessing the prejudice factor, we focus on three interests the speedy-trial right advances: “(1) preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) minimizing the anxiety and concern of the accused; and (3) preventing the possibility that the defense will be impaired.” (quotation omitted).

8 D. Prejudice This court considers three interests when determining whether a defendant suffered prejudice: “(1) preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) minimizing the anxiety and concern of the accused; and (3) preventing the possibility that the defense will be impaired.” (quotation omitted).

See S (analyzing whether a closure occurred before deciding whether the limitations on a public trial were justified).

We review alleged speedy-trial violations de novo, , and we consider the delay’s length, the reason for the delay, whether the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial, and any prejudicial effect

6 (explaining the test in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), applies to speedy-trial challenges ).

“While district courts have broad discretion to formulate appropriate jury instructions, a district court abuses its discretion if the jury instructions confuse, mislead, or materially misstate the law.” d 1, 14-15 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted).

D. Prejudice to Johnson An appellate court considers three interests when determining whether and how the delay prejudiced the criminal defendant: “(1) preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) minimizing the anxiety and concern of the accused; and (3) preventing the possibility that the defense will be impaired.”

The “district court abuses its discretion if the jury instructions confuse, mislead, or materially misstate the law.” -15 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted).

(2016) (providing that the presence of a controlled substance in a car permits the jury “to infer knowing possession of the controlled substance by the driver or person in control of the [car ] when the controlled substance was in [it]”); Porte, d at 308 (noting that “[p]roximity is an important factor in establishing constructive possession” (quotation omitted) ); (explaining that a jury may consider flight before apprehension as suggestive of a defendant’s consciousness of guilt); (concluding

None of these factors are dispositive; “[r]ather, they are related factors and must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant.” (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 533).

d 1, 14–15 (Minn. 2015).

But “a district court abuses its discretion if the jury instructions confuse, mislead, or materially misstate the law.” -15 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted).

“[A] district court abuses its discretion if the jury instructions ‘confuse, mislead, or materially misstate the law.’” -15 (Minn. 2015) ().

A district court abuses this discretion if it provides instructions that “confuse, mislead, or materially misstate the law,” - 15 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted), or if they omit an element of the charged offense, State v. Stay

the first two interests are not implicated.” see also Windish, d at 318 (concluding that defendant’s first two interests did not apply because he “was already in custody for another offense”).

B. Reason for the Delay When considering the second Barker factor, “the key question is whether the government or the criminal defendant is more to blame for th[e] delay.” State v. Taylor, 6 (alteration in original) (quotation omitted).

(stating that Minnesota courts apply “the test articulated” in Barker for speedy-trial claims).

“An error is harmless if there is no reasonable possibility that it substantially influenced the jury’s decision.” (quotation omitted).

An error is harmless if there is “no reasonable possibility that it substantially influence[d] the jury’ s decision.” State v. Taylor , (quotation omitted) .

See Mikell, d at 251 (describing an unavailable witness as a delay that “will not be held against the State”); see, (holding 12 that there was good cause for a continuance because a State’s witness was unavailable and there was a conflict of interest between defendant’s counsel and his co-defendant’s counsel).

Citing State v. Brown , 618 (Minn. 2012), Jackson observes that we have repeatedly urged that courtroom closures be done “carefully and sparingly.” He then asserts that the district courts have not listened, (Anderson, Paul H., J., dissenting), and State v. Taylor , (Page, J., dissenting).

District courts abuse their discretion if the instructions “confuse, mislead, or materially misstate the law,” d 1, 14-15 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted), or if the instructions om it an element of the charged offense

The first two interests listed in Barker—preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration and minimizing anxiety and concern of the accused—are not rele vant when a defendant is in custody on another matter, and Swenson makes no argument regarding the third interest—wheth er the defense was impaired.

When reviewing privilege rulings, we “give great deference to the district court’s findings of fact and will not set them aside unless clearly erroneous.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

None of these factors are dispositive, “[r]ather, they a re related factors and must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant.” State v. Taylor , (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 533).

None of these factors are dispositive ; “[r]ather, they are related factors and must be 5 considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant.” (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 533).

d 1, 19 (Minn. 2015) (citing U.S. Const. amen d. VI; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6).

Maine, 2020 WL 3042248, at *9; see also State v. Taylor , (holding that the Waller standard applies to a “true closure”).

Moreover, “the right to a public trial is not an absolute right.”

“An erro r is harmless if there is no reasonable possibility that it substantially influenced the jury’s decision.” d 1, 14 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted); see also State v. Post , n.2 The defendant is not being tried for and may not be convicted of any behavior other than the charged offense(s).

An error is harmless if there is “no reasonable possibility that it substantially influence[ d] the jury’s decision.” (alteration in original) (quotation omitted).