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“[A]n appellant who alleges an error in the admission of evidence that does not implicate a constitutional right must prove that there is a reasonable possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict.” (quotation omitted).

A district court has “considerable latitude in selecting jury instructions, including the specific language of those instructions.”

“[A]n appellant who alleges an error in the admission of evidence that does not implicate a constitutional right must prove that there is a reasonable possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict.”

In evaluating the probability that prosecutorial misconduct affected the jury’s verdicts, we must consider (1) the strength of the evidence against appellant ; (2) “the pervasiveness of the erroneous conduct ”; and (3) whether appellant “had an opportunity to rebut any improper remarks.” State v. Peltier , d 792, 805- 06 (Minn. 2016).

To show prejudice under harmless-error review, the appellant must establish “a reasonable possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict.” (quotation omitted); see also State v. Nunn , (stating that on appeal the defendant has the burden to establish both that the district court abused its discretion in admitting evidence and that the defendant was prejudiced as a result).

When assessing whether misconduct affected substantial rights, “we consider: (1) the strength of the evidence against [the defendant]; (2) the pervasiveness of the erroneous conduct; and (3) whether [the defendant] had an opportunity to rebut any improper remarks.” -06 (Minn. 2016).

A district court has “considerable latitude in selecting jury 4 instructions, including the specific language of those instructions.”

(listing factors to consider when determining whether any prejudice arose from inadmissible testimony) .

5 “Under the harmless-error standard, an appellant who alleges an error in the admission of evidence that does not implicate a constitutional right must prove that there is a reasonable possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict.” (quotation omitted).

(concluding that challenged evidence was harmless without deciding whether the evidence was erroneously admitted).

8 (Minn. 2016); (extending the plain-error doctrine to unobjected -to claims of prosecutorial misconduct).

District courts have “considerable latitude in selecting jury instructions, including the specific language of those instructions.”

but not limited to: (1) whether [the defendant] contested the omitted elements at trial and submitted evidence to support a contrary finding; (2) whether the State pres ented overwhelming ev idence to prove those 24 elements; and (3) whether the jury’s verdic t nonetheless encompassed a finding on those elements notwithstanding their omission from the jury instructions.”

But the prosecutor “may not speculate without a factual basis.” State v. 10 Peltier

An erroneous evidentiary ruling that does not implicate a constitutional right, prejudices a defendant if “there is a reasonable possibility that the wrongfully admitted ev idence significantly affected the verdict.” (quotation and citation omitted).

Although d istrict courts “enjoy[] considerable latitude in selecting jury instructions,” those instructions “must fairly and adequately explain the law of the case and not materially misstate the law.” Id.; see also State v. Kelley , ( “We review the jury instructions as a whole to determine whether the instructions accurately state the law in a man

d 792, 796 (Minn. 2016).

(noting that improperly admitted testimony “occupie[d] just three lines in the transcript, while [the witness’s] full testimony [ran] to 69 pages”).

“[T]he [s]tate must show that there is no reasonable likelihood that the absence of the misconduct in question would have had a significant effect on the verdict.” -04 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omit ted).

Prosecutors may present legitimate arguments based on the evidence and argue reasonable inferences based on that evidence but may not speculate without factual basis or “misstate the evidence.” -05 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted).

If the state fails to meet its burden, we will order a new trial only if the error “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public repu tation of judicial proceedings.” State v. Peltier , (quotation omitted).

The state may “present all legitimate arguments on the evidence and all proper inferences that can be drawn from that evidence” but may not “misstate the evidence.” -05 (Minn. 2016) (quotations omitted).

Although district courts enjoy “considerable latitude in selecting jury instructions,” the instructions “must fairly and adequately explain the law of the case and not materially misstate the law.” 6 The question of whether the district court materially misstated the law requires us to interpret the statutory definition of mentally incapacitated, which is a matter subject to de novo review.

If the state fails to meet its burden, we will order a new trial only if the error “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” State v. Peltier , (quotation omitted).

10 an opportunity to rebut any improper remarks.” -807 (Minn. 2016).

Prosecutors may present legitimate arguments based on the evidence and argue reasonable inferences based on that evidence, but may not speculate without factual basis o r “misstate the evidence.” State v. Peltier , -05 (Minn. 2016).

ant factors, including: “(1) whether [the appellant] contested the omitted elements at trial and submitted evidence to support a contrary finding; (2) whether the [s]tate pr esented overwhelming evidence to prove those elements; and (3) whether the jury’s verdic t nonetheless encompassed a finding on those elements notwithstanding their omission from the jury instructions.”

See State v. Peltier , d 792, 804 (Minn. 2016) (“[T]he State may present all legitimate arguments on the evidence and all proper inferences that can be draw n from that evid ence in its closing argument.” (quotation omitted)).

“[A]n appellant who alleges an error in the admission of evidence that does not implicate a constitutional right must prove that there is a reasonable possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict.” (quotation omitted).

“[ T]he State may present all legitimate arguments on the evidence and all proper inferences that can be drawn from that evidence in its closing argument.” (quotation omitted).