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A district court also has discretion “over the mode and order of presenting evidence so as to make the presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth.” d 864, 874 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted); see Minn. R. Evid.

“We afford the district court broad discretion when ruling on evidentiary matters,” Doe 136 v. Liebsch, and we “will not lightly overturn a trial court’s evidentiary ruling.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

See State v. Robertson, 13 (stating that, “[w]hen viewed in isolation, the facts cited by [the defendant] might support a rational inference other than guilt.

d 895, 902 (Minn. 2019) (“When our careful review of each claim raised in a pro se supplemental brief leads us to conclude that the claims are without merit, we have not included a detailed discussion of each claim in our opinion.”); (“After carefully considering each argument in full, we conclude that [appellant’s] pro se claims lack merit.”).

“A district court’s evidentiary rulings will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion.”

conclude that the only reasonable inference is that Smith shot Boughton.15 When an appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, “we review the evidence to determine whether, given the facts in the record and the legitimate inferences that can be drawn from those facts, a jury could reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty of the offense charged.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

A. This court has long stated that it “ ‘largely defer[s] to the trial court’s exercise of discretion in evidentiary matters and will not lightly overturn a trial court’s evidentiary ruling.’ ” (quoting State v. Kelly, C/D-1 ).

(requiring “reasonable likelihood” that non- constitutional error affected result); (stating that denial of constitutional right to a sentencing jury is not harmless if there is reasonable doubt the result would have been different without the error

And “[a] district court’s evidentiary rulings will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion.”

“A district court’s evidentiary rulings will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion.”

Sserwanja did not follow this typical behavior [he] must be guilty.” “A district court’ s evidentiary rulings will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion.” d 864, 872 (Minn. 2016).

-73 (Minn. 2016) (citing this aspect of Minn. R. Evid.

“We largely defer to the trial court’s exercise of discretion in evidentiary matters and will not lightly overturn a trial court’s evidentiary ruling.” (quotation omitted).

Similarly, in State v. Robertson, we reiterated our holding from Munt, stating, “For the reasons we discussed in Munt, we hold that Miller does not apply to Robertson, who was 22 years old at the time of the shooting.”

“A district court’s evidentiary rulings will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion, and we ‘largely defer to the trial court’s exercise of discretion in evidentiary matters and will not lightly overturn a trial court’s evidentiary ruling.’ ” ().

Under that heightened standard, we first identify the circumstances proved, deferring to the fact - finder’s “acceptance of the proof of these circumstances and rejection of evidence in the record that conflicted wit h the circumstances proved by the [s]tate.” State v. Robertson , (quotations omitted).

Under that heightened standard, we first identif y the circumstances pr oved, deferring “to the jury’s acceptance of the proof of these circumstances and rejection of evidence in the record that conflicted with the circumst ances proved by the [s]tate.” State v. Robertson , (quotation omitted).

801(d)(2); n.8 (Minn. 2016) (recognizing that “[a] statement of a party opponent 9 We note that if the district court had ruled in Dolo’s favor a nd required the state to introduce the entire recording of the interview, the state coul d have withdrawn its request to play a p

See , e.g. , State v. Robertson , , 877 (Minn. 2016) ("After carefully considering each argument in full, we conclude that [appellant's] pro se claims lack merit."); State v. Davis , , 539 (Minn. 2012) ("After carefully reviewing each of these claims, we conclude that they all lack merit and, therefore, we hold that [appellant] is not e

We first identif y the circumstances proved, deferring “to the [factfinder’s] acceptance of the proof of these circumstances and rejection of e vidence in the record that conflicted with the circumstances proved by the [s]tate.” (Mi nn.

See Munt v. State , , 383 (Minn. 2016) ("The Supreme Court's holding in Miller is plainly limited to juvenile offenders and does not apply to [appellant], who was 35 years old at the time he committed the murder and kidnappings"); see also State v. Robertson , , 877 (Minn. 2016) (holding that Miller does not apply to a 22-year old defendant).

We first identify the circumstances proved, deferring “to the jury’s acceptance of th e proof of these circumstances and rejection of evidence in the record that conflicted with the circumstances proved by the [s]tate.” (quotations omitted).

We first identify the circumstances proved, deferring “to the jury’s acceptance of the proof of these circumstances and rejection of evidence in the record tha t conflicted with the circumstances proved by the [s]tate.” State v. Robertson , (quotations omitted).

(setting forth circumstantia l evidence standard of review).

And this court will “not generally review a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial strategy.”

depends on circumstantial evidence, the reviewing court applies a two-step analysis that first identifies the circumstances that are proved and then determines whether the circumstances proved “are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” -99 (Minn. 2013) (quotations omitted); see State v. Robertson

D E C I S I O N “When an appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial, we review the evidence to determine whether, given the facts in the record and the legitimate inferences that can be drawn from those fact s, a [fact-finder] could reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty of the offense charged.” (quotation omitted).

D E C I S I O N “When an appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial, we review the evidence to determine whether, given the facts in the record and the legitimate inferences that can be drawn from those facts, a [fact -finder] could reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty of the offense charged.” (quotation omitted).

Under the circumstantial-evidence standard, which is applicable in this instance, we review the evidence using a two-step analysis: first, we identify the circumstances proved, deferring “to the jury’s acceptance of the proof of these circumstances and rejection of evidence in the record that conflicted with the circumstances proved by the [s]tate.” (quotations omitted).

The appellate c ourt first identifies the circumstances proved, deferring “to the jury’s acceptance of the proof of these circumstances and rejection of evidence in the record that conflicted with the circumstances proved by the [s]tate.” State v. Robertson , (quotations omitted).

Under the circumstantial-evidence standard , we review the evidence using a two- step analysis: we first identify the circumstances proved, deferring “to the jury’s acceptance of the proof of these circumstances and rejecti on of evidence in the record that conflicted 7 with the circumstances proved by the [s]tate.” (quotations omitted).

Under the circumstantial-evidence standard, an appellate court reviews the evidence using a two-step analysis: the appellate court first identifies the circumstances proved , deferring “to the jury’s acceptance of the proof of these circumstances and rejection of ev idence in the record that conflicted with the circumstances proved by the [s]tate.” (quotation omitted).

(stating that “[w]hen viewed in isolation, the facts cited by [the defendant] might support a rational inference other than guilt.

“An e rror affects substantial rights if there is a reasonable likelihood that it substa ntially affects the verdict.” State v. Robertson