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This standard asks whether “there is a reasonable possibility that the verdict might have been different if the evidence had been admitted.”

a reasonable jury[] would have reached the same verdict.” (footnote omitted).

v. Carbo, d 114, 123 (Minn. 2024) (explaining that, “if a [district] court’s evidentiary ruling is determined to be erroneous, and the error reaches the level of a constitutional error, such as denying the defendant the right to present a defense, [the] standard of review is whether the exclusion of evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” (quotation omitted)); (instructing that an error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt when “the reviewing court .

(holding that an error is harmless if this court is “satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that if the evidence had been admitted and the damaging potential of the evidence fully realized, an average jury (i.e., a reasonable jury) would have reached the same verdict.”).

A defendant is entitled to a new trial when the district court erroneously admits Spreigl evidence if “there is a reasonable possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict.” (quotation omitted); see also State v. Post , n.2 (Minn. 1994) (“It is when dealing with a claim of erroneous admission of evidence that the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that the wrongfully admitted evidence significantly 30 affected the verdict .

ny or the determination of a fact in issue; and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.” “[T]he emphasis is not on how a witness expresses himself or herself—i.e., whether in the form of an opinion or a conclusion—but on whether the witness personally knows what he or she is talking about and whether the testimony will be helpful to the jury.” State v. Post

Coleman argues that the concealed-carry instructor’s testimony improperly created a “heightened standard”

a reasonable jury[] would have reached the same verdict.” (footnote omitted).

8 (“Even if acceptable under rule 702, expert testimony should be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.”); -02 (Minn. 1994) (explaining that a rule 701 analysis focuses on “whether the witness personally knows what he or she is talking about and whether the testimony will be helpful to the jury,” unlike the rule 403 balancing factors).

See Ness, d at 691 (citing Bolte, d at 198; n.2 (Minn. 1994)); see also Minn. R. Crim.

An error is harmless if this court is “satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that if the evidence had been admitted and the damaging potential of the evidence fully realized, an average jury (i.e., a reasonable jury) would have reached the same verdict.” (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted).

a reasonable jury[] would have reached the same verdict.”

“An error in excluding evidence is harmless only if the reviewing court is ‘satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that if the evidence had been admitted and the damaging potential of the evidence fully realized, a [reasonable] jury would have reached the same verdict.’” ().

.” n.2 (Minn. 1994) (emphasis omitted)

Only 8 then can it be said that the erroneous exclusion of evidence was harmless.”

“An error in excluding [defense] evidence is harmless only if the reviewing court is ‘satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that if the evidence had been admitted and the damaging potential of the evidence fully realized, a [reasonable] jury would have reached the same verdict.’” (), rev. denied (Minn. Feb.

The exclusion of evidence is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt when, “assuming the potential damage of the excluded evidence were fully realized, a reasonable jury ‘would have reached the same verdict.’ ” ().

whether, assuming that the damaging potential of the excluded evidence were fully realized, a reviewing court might nonetheless say that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (quotation omitted).

-02 (Minn. 1994) (holding it was error for the district court to exclude lay-witness testimony even on an ultimate issue), -66 (Minn. 1968) (holding it was error for the district court to admit witness testimony regarding the speed of a vehicle as the witness was not

(alteration in original) (), rev. denied (Minn. Feb.

n.2 (Minn. 1994) (noting that even if the district court erred in admitting evidence, the reviewing court determines “whether there is a reasonable possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict”).

See, (finding improper prosecutor’s urging jury to “preserve the integrity of society and keep us from having to worry about when we’re going to face the next individual with a gun in his hand and when he’s going to .

“An error in excluding [defense] evidence is harmless only if the reviewing court is ‘satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that if the evidence had been admitted and the damaging potential of the evidence fully realized, a [reasonable] jury would have re ached the same verdict.’” (quoting State v. Post , ).

n.2 (Minn. 1994) (noting that even if the district court erred in admitting evidence, the reviewing court determines “whether there is a reasonable possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the verdic t”).

Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986).

” State v. Bolte , (quoting State v. Post , n.2 (Mi nn.

While neither party discussed this issue, “an appellate court has a ‘responsibility to review the record even though the assignments of error are inadequate.’” ().

“In other words, the reviewing court must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that if the evidence had been admitted and the damaging potential of the evidence fully realized, an average jury (i.e., a reasonable jury) would have reached the same verdict.” (footnote omitted).

See State v. Robinson , (“Erroneous admission of evidence that does not have constitutional implications is harmless if there is no ‘reasonable possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict.’” ( n.2 (Minn. 1994)).

“An erro r is harmless if there is no reasonable possibility that it substantially influenced the jury’s decision.” d 1, 14 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted); see also State v. Post , n.2 The defendant is not being tried for and may not be convicted of any behavior other than the charged offense(s).

Appellate courts have a “responsibility to review the record even though the assignments of error are inadequ ate.” (citation omitted).

A new trial is not required if an appellate court is “satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that if the evidence had been admitted and the damaging potential of the evidence fully realized, an average jury ( i.e., a reasonable jury) would have reached the same verdict.” (footnote omitted).

“[T]he reviewing court must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that if the evidence had been admitted and the damaging potential of the evidence fully realized, an average jury (i.e., a reasonable jury) would have reached the same verdict.” State v. Post , (footnote omitted).

n.2 (Minn. 1994) (discussing prejudice and consid ering whether the verdict would have been more favorable to the defendant without the evidence).