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In that analysis, we “must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that if the evidence had been admitted and the damaging potential of the evidence fully realized, an average jury ( i.e., a reasonable jury) would have reached the same verdict.”

Harmless beyond a re asonable doubt means that “the reviewing court must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that if the evidence had been admitted and the damaging potential of the evidence fully realized, an average jury (i.e., a reasonable jury) would have reached the same verdict.”

See, (quoting State v. Post , ).

To conclude t hat an error was harmless under this standard, the reviewing court must be “satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that if the evidence had been admitted and the damaging potential of the evidence fully realized, an average jury (i.e., a reasonable jury) would have reached the same verdict.”

This court “must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that if the evidence had been 7 admitted and the damaging potential of the evidence fully realized, an average jury ( i.e. a reasonable jury) would have reached the same verdict.”

(stating the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard is applied when an evidentiary ruling concerns a defendant’s right to present evidence).

(stating that erroneous exclusion of defense evidence is reviewed to determine whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).

the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (quotation omitted).

State v. Post , , 102 n.2 (Minn. 1994) ; see also Ness , d at 691 (conducting a reasonable possibility analysis of the erroneous admission of bad-acts evidence and holding that there was no prejudice because the evidence merely "bolstered" the finding of guilt and "was not the critical push beyond a reasonable doubt").

When defense evidence is erroneously excluded, we must determine “whether, assuming that the damaging potential of the [excluded evidence] were fully realized, a 16 reviewing court might nonetheless say that the error was harmle ss beyond a reasonable doubt.” (quotation omitted).

“[I]f there is a reasonable possibility that the verdict might have been more favorable to the defendant if the evidence had not been admitted, then the error in admitting the evidence was prejudicial error.” n.2 (Minn. 1994).

State v. Post , , 102 (Minn. 1994).

(quoting State v. Post , n.2 (Minn. 1994).

An error will be deemed 15 harmless if an appellate court is “satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that if the ev idence had been admitted and the damaging potential of the evidence fully realized, an average jury (i.e., a reasonable jury) would have reached the same verdict.” State v. Post , (footnote omitted).

“In other words, the reviewing court must be satisfied beyond a rea sonable doubt that if the evidence had been admitted and th e damaging potential of the ev idence fully realized, an average jury (i.e., a reasonable jury) would have reached the same verdict.” (footnote omitted).

the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (quotation omitted).

n.2 (Minn. 1994) (holding that, if there is a reasonable possibility that the verdict might have been more favorable to the defendant without the evidence, then the error in admitting it is prejudicial).

See State v. Post , (stating that standard for co nstitutional error).

Accordingly, “when the ruling results in the erroneous exclusion of defense evidence in violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights, the verdict must be reversed if ‘there is a reasonable possibility that the verdict might have been different if the evidence had been admitted.’” ().

This abuse of discretion is harmless if the reviewing court is satisfied “beyond a reasonable doubt that if the e vidence had been admitted and the damaging potential of the evidence fully realized, an average jury ( i.e., a reasonable jury) would have reached the same verdict.” State v. Post

We must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doub t that an average ju ry (i.e., a reasonable jury) would have reached the same verdict “if the evidence had be en admitted and the damaging potential of the ev idence fully realized.” State v. Greer , ().

But even an erroneous evidentiary ruling will not be reversed on appeal unless the appellant demonstrates “a reasonable possibility that the verdict might have been different if the evidence had been admitted.”

When the district court’s evidentia ry ruling “results in the erroneous exclusion of defense evidence in violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights, the verdict must be reversed if “there is a reasonable possibility that th e verdict might have be en different if the ‘evidence had been admitted.’” State v. Graham , (quoting State v. Post , ).

See State v. Post , , 102 n.2 (Minn. 1994) (holding that, if a district court erred in admitting evidence, a reviewing court must determine whether there is a reasonable possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence "significantly affected the verdict").

Harmless beyond a reasonable doubt means th at the reviewing court “must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that an average jury (i.e. a reasonable jury) would have reached the same verdict ‘if the evid ence had been admitted and th e damaging potential of the evidence fully realized.’” ().

“[I]f there is a reasonable possibility that the verdict might have been more favorable to the defendan t if the evidence had not been admitted, then the error in admitting the evidence was prejudicial error.” State v. Post , n.2 (Minn. 1994).

would have reached the same verdict.”

(noting that an error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where, even with “the damaging potential of the evidence fully realized, an average jury (i.e., a reasonable jury) would have reached the same verdict”).

( n.2 (Minn. 1994)) Daher argues that the error was not harmless because his testimony would have allowed him to explain his intent.

Even if the district court erred in admitting evidence, the reviewing court determines “whether there is a reasonable possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict.” n.2 (Minn. 1994).

Under this rule, “the emphasis is not on how a witness expresses himself or herself—[i.e.], whether in the form of an opinion or a conclusion—but on whether the witness personally knows what he or she is talking about and whether the testimony will be helpful to the jury.”

“If a trial court’s evidentiary ruling is: determined to be erroneous,, and the error-reaches the .level, of a constitutional error, such as denying the defendant the right to present a defense, our standard of review is whether the exclusion of evidence was ‘harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Richardson, d at 277 ().