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That was not true; he had given a different address.” The second misrepresentation is: “[T]he tip reported [that the juvenile]’s mother believed her son was with [Gutierrez].” “A search warrant is void, and the fruits of the search must be excluded, if the application includes intentional or reckless misrepresentations of fact material to the findings of probable cause.”

This court assumes “the [factfinder] believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.”

Because the appellate court does not evaluate the credibility of witnesses, it “must assume the fact-finder believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary,” C.J.W.J., d at 334 (d 101, 108 (Minn. 1989)).

“A search warrant is void, and the fruits 14 of the search must be excluded, if the application includes intentional or reckless misrepresentations of fact material to the findings of probable cause.” (quotations omitted); see also State v. Moore , (stating that “innocent or negligent misrepresentations will not invalidate a warrant”).

The reviewing court must assume “the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.”

We also assume that the factfinder “believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.”

We assume that “the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.”

We also assume that the factfinder “believed the state’ s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.”

In conducting this analysis, we view the evidence in the 11 light most favorable to the verdict, and assume that the factfinder “believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary,”

When reviewing the evidence presented at trial, we must assume that “the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.”

This court assumes that “the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.” State v. M oore

We assume that the fact-finder “believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.”

We assume that the fact -finder “believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.”

We assume that the fact -finder “believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.”

4 We assume that “the jury be lieved the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.”

We assume that the fact -finder “believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.”

We assume that “the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.”

Franks, 438 U.S. at 155; see also State v. Moore , (discussing and applying Franks).

The reviewing court must assume “the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.”

d 101, 107-08 (Minn. 1989).

We assume that “the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.”

8 The state conflates these frameworks, quoting State v. Moore , for the proposition that we assume the jury believed the state’s witnesse s. The relevant language from Moore concerns a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, not a claim of prosecutorial misconduct.

In urging us to conclude otherwise, and argues that we have previously held that law enforcement contact is a race -neutral basis for exercising a peremptory strike.

We assume that “the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.”

We assume that “the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.”

We must assume that the fact -finder “believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.”

Appellate courts assume that “the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.”

We assume that “the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.”

(“Our precedent does not permit us to re -weigh the evidence.”); State v. Pippitt , 4 (Minn. 2002) (“weighing the credibility of witnesses is a function exclusively for the jury”); (holding that appellate courts defer to the jury’ s credibility determinations even in the face of contrary evi dence).

We must assu me that the jury “b elieved the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.”

A search warrant is invalid —therefore requiring suppression of t he fruits of the search—“if the application includes intentional or reckless misrepresentations of fact material to the findings of probable cause.” (citing Franks, 438 U.S. at 171 -72, 98 S. Ct. at 2684 -85).

The reviewing court must assume “the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.” State v. Moore

See State v. Moore (Moore I), d 101, 108 (Minn. 1989).

When considering a sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument, we “view[] the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, assuming the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.”

If a defendant makes such a showing, the “search warrant is void, and the fruits of the search must be excluded.”

23 We assume that “the jury believe d the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.”