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When assessing objected-to alleged misconduct in a prosecutor’s closing argument, “we consider the closing argument as a whole rather than focus on particular phrases or remarks that may be taken out of context or given undue prominence.” (quotation omitted).

“A state of mind generally is proved circumstantially, by inference from words and acts of the actor both before and after the incident.”

Intent may be inferred “from words and acts of the actor both before and after the incident.”

We will reverse a district court’s decision to overrule an objection based on an allegation of prosecutorial misconduct when, “considered in the context of the trial as a whole,” the misconduct was so serious “that the defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial was impaired.” -28 (Minn. 2000).

“A state of mind generally is proved circumstantially, by inference from words and acts of the actor both before and after the incident.” State v. Johnson

clinic property.” Intent is a state of mind that is “frequently proven with circumstantial evidence.” State v. Irby , see also State v. Johnson , (noting that intent is “proved circumstantially, by inference from words and acts of the actor both before and after the incident”).

usually proved with circumstantial evidence.” (“Intent is a state of mind that is generally proved by using circumstantial evidence by drawing inferences from the defendant’s words and actions in light of the totality of the circumstances.” (quotation omitted)); (“A state of mind generally is proved circumstantially, by inference from words and acts of the actor both before and after the incident.”).

e not “so serious and prejudicial [such] that [Bauer’s] right to a fair trial was denied.” This 34 court will reverse a district court’s determination regarding alleged prosecutorial misconduct “only when the misconduct, considered in the context of the trial as a whole, was so serious and prejudicial that the defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial was impaired.” -28 (Minn. 2000).

As for the pervasiveness of the erroneous conduct, appellate courts “consider the closing argument as a whole rather than 21 focus on particular phrases or remarks that may be taken out of context or given undue prominence.” (quotation omitted).

Intent is inferred “from words and acts of the actor both before and after the incident.”

“A state of mind generally is proved circumstantially, by inference from words and acts of the actor both before and after the incident.” d 720, 726 (Minn. 2000).

Appellate courts will reverse a district court’s determination regarding objected-to prosecutorial misconduct “only when the misconduct, considered in the context of the trial as a whole, was so serious and prejudicial that the defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial was impaired.” -28 (Minn. 2000).

The supreme court has instructed that, when evaluating an argument for misconduct, appellate courts should not take statements out of context but “look at the closing argument as a whole.” (stating that an appellate court should not “focus on particular phrases or remarks that may be taken out of context or given undue prominence” in considering prosecutorial misconduct in a closing argument (quotation omitted)).

(“With respect to claims of prosecutorial misconduct arising out of closing argument, we consider the closing argument as a whole rather than focus on particular phrases or remarks that may be taken out of context or given undue prominence.” 7 (quotation omitted)).

e victim’s reaction, the type of crime, the events surrounding the crime, the relationship between the defendant and the victim, the defendant’s words and actions, and “the idea that a person intends the natural consequences of his or her actions.”); -37 (Minn. App. 2012) (victim’s reaction is circumstantial evidence showing intent); (“A state of mind generally is proved circumstantially, by inference from words and acts of the actor both before and after the incident.”).

See Portillo, d at 250; (“With respect to claims of prosecutorial misconduct arising out of closing argument, we consider the closing argument as a whole rather than focus on particular phrases or remarks that may be taken out of context or given undue prominence.” (quotation omitted)).

14 A. Misconduct “With respect to claims of prosecutorial misconduct arising out of closing argument, [appellate courts] consider the closing argument as a whole rather than focus on particular phrases or remarks that may be taken out of context or given undue prominence.” (quotation omitted).

“[I]ntent is a state of mind that is usually proved with circumstantial evidence.” accord State v. Johnson , (“A state of mind generally is proved circumstantially, by inference from words and acts of the actor both before and after the incident.”).

at 250; (explaining that we “ consider the closing argument as a whole rather than focus on particular phrases or re marks that may be taken out of context or given undue prominence” when reviewing prosecutorial-miscond uct claims (quotation omitted) ).

When evaluating whether a prosecutor committed misconduct in a closing argument, we consider the arguments in their totality rather than focusing on “phrases or remarks that may be taken out of context or given undue prominence.” (quotation omitted).

“With respect to claims of prosecutorial misconduct arising out of closing argument, we consider the closing argument as a whole rather than focus on particular phrases or remarks that may be taken out of context or given undue prominence.” (quotation omitted).

This argument is unavailing, as “the failure to provide limiting instructions absent a request is not reversible error.” (reasoning that the defendant’s failure to request a limiting instruction weighed against prejudice).

Intent is a state of mind, which “generally is proved circumstantially, by inference from words and acts of the actor both before and after the incident.”

Independently examining the reasonable inferences that might be drawn from these circumstances, we recognize that a fact-finder “is permitted to infer that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of their actions.” d 720, 726 (Minn. 2000).

7 “A state of mind generally is proved circumstantially, by inference from words and acts of the actor both before and after the incident.”

d 720, 727-28 (Minn. 2000).

d 720, 727- 28 (Minn. 2000).

he improper statement was only two sentences in a closing argument that amounted to over 20 transcribed pages .”); State v. Glaze , (holding that alleged prosecutorial misconduct in closing arguments did not require a new trial because “the remarks were isolated and not representative of the closing argument when reviewed in its entirety”); (concluding that alleged prosecutorial misconduct was not prejudicial in part because the jury was properly instructed that remarks made by the attorneys in

-28 (Minn. 2000) (holding we will only reverse a district court when the prosecution’s misconduct, considered in the context of the trial as a whole, was so serious and prejudicial that the defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial was impaired); (Minn. 2016

“A state of mind generally is proved 5 circumstantially, by inference from words and acts of the actor both before and after the incident.”

improper statement was only two sentences in a closing argument that amounted to over 20 transcribed pages”); State v. Glaze , (holding that alleged prosecutorial misconduct in closing arguments did 12 not require a new trial because “the remarks were isolated and not representative of the closing argument when reviewed in its entirety”); (concluding that alleged prosecutorial misconduct was not prejudicial in part because the jury was properly instructed that remarks made by the attorneys in cl

-99 (Minn. 2013) (applying circumstantial-evidence test to first- degree premeditated murder).

This court will reverse a district court’s determination regarding alleged prosecutorial misconduct “only when the misconduct, considered in the context of the trial as a whole, was so serious and prejudicial that the defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial was impaired.” - 28 (Minn. 2000).

t]he improper statem ent was only two sent ences in a closing argument that amounted to over 20 transcribed pages”); (holding that alleged prosecutorial misconduct in closing arguments did not require a new trial because “the remarks we re isolated and not representative of the closing argument when reviewed in its entirety”); (concluding that alleged prosecutorial misconduct was not prejudicial in part because the jury was properly instructed that remarks made by the attorneys in closing were n

whole, the prosecutor’s statement was brief and did not “permeate the entire argument” or establish a “theme.” See State v. Matthews , (finding that defendant’s substantial rights were not affected by prosecutor’s 11 alleged misconduct during closing arguments where prosecutor’s improper statements did not “permeate the entire argument”); State v. Johnson , -30 (Minn. 2000) (finding no prosec utorial misconduct in part because prosecutor did not emphasize allegedly inadmissible testimony and “th

(“A state of mind generally is proved circumstantially, by inference from words and acts of the actor both before and after the incident.”).