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“A jury is permitted to infer that a pers on intends the natural and pr obable cons equences of their actions.” State v. Johnson

8 must point to [the] defendant’s guilt in some substantial way.” State v. Johnson , State v. Her , review denied (Minn. Dec.

To warrant reversal, the prosecuting attorney’s misconduct, “considered in the context of the trial as a whole, [must be] so serious and prejudicial that the defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial was impaired.” -28 (Minn. 2000).

see also State v. Johnson , (“A state of mind generally is proved circumstantially, by inference from words and acts of the acto r both before and after the incident.”).

See, (affirming the district court’s finding that juror’s experience of being falsely accused of stealing and juror’s connection with potential witnesses were acceptable reasons for peremptory challenge).

If the misconduct is less serious, we determine whether the misconduct “likely played a substantial part in influencing a jury to convict.” Id.5 When evaluating claims of misconduct arising out of closing argument, we look to the closing argument “as a whole rather than focus on particular phrases or remarks that may be taken out of context or given undue prominence.” State v. Johnson , (quotation omitted).

State v. Johnson, 15 -28 (Minn. 2000).

We will not reverse a district court’s decision regarding alleged prosecutorial misconduct unless “the misconduct, considered in the context of the trial as a whole, was so serious and prejudicial that the defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial was impaired.” -28 (Minn. 2000).

State v. Johnson , -28 (Minn. 2000).

Intent is inferred “from words and acts of the actor both before and after the incident .” 726 (Minn. 2000).

When a conviction is based on circumstantial evidence , (stating that intent is usually proved circumstantially ), the 1 Because of our conclusion that S.R. was a “prospective or contemplated witness” and therefore within the purview of the bribery statute, we need not address Kalland’s argument that the s

This court will reverse a conviction for prosecutorial misconduct “only when the misconduct, considered in the context of the trial as a whole, was so serious and prejudicial that the defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial was impaired.” -28 (Minn. 2000).

It is also “belittling the defense” to tell the jurors they “would be ‘suckers’ if they believed the defense.”

Marchand, d at 915; Schweppe, d at 614; (“A state of mind generally is proved circumstantially .

Lastly, Bazoff argues that the prosecutor made statements during closing argument that improperly belittled Bazoff and disparaged the defens e. When assessing alleged prosecutorial misconduct during a closing argument, we “consider the closing argument as a whole rather than focus on particular phrases or remarks.” d 720, 728 (Minn. 2000) (quotation omitted).

State v. Johnson , –28 (Minn. 2000).

In evaluating alleged misconduct, we look to the closing argument as a whole, rather than evaluating specific “phrases or remarks that may be taken out o f context or given undue prominence.” (quotation and citations omitted).

When evaluating claims of prosecutorial misconduct arising out of closing argument, appellate courts “consider the closing argument as a whole rather than focus on particular phrases or remarks that may be taken out of context or given undue prominence.” (quotation omitted).

-30 (Minn. 2000) (noting that a prosecutor’s comments must be considered in the context of the entire closing argument).

Because the state offered primarily circumstantial evidence of Bradley’s intent, we apply “heightened scrutiny” to review that circumstantial evidence.5 (“A state of mind generally is proved circumstantially .

State v. Johnson , , 730 (Minn. 2000) (quoting State v. Porter , , 365 (Minn. 1995) ).

See State v. Johnson , (ruling that attorney argument based on facts not in evidence did not prejudice the defendant because the jury was instructe d that attorneys’ arguments were not evidence); see also Matthews, d at 550 (reiterating presumption “that juries follow instru ctions given by the court”).

He argues that “there is no direct evidence here of [his] intent to offer to hire someone to engage in sex.” Intent is a state of mind that “is generally proved by inferences drawn from a person’ s words or actions in light of all the surrounding circumstances.” s ee also State v. Johnson , (noting that intent is “proved circumstantially, by inference from words and acts of the actor both before and after the incident”).

If the attorneys or I have made any statement a bout what the evidence is that differs from your recollection of the evidence, you should disregard the statement and rely solely on 8 your own memory.” (ruling that attorney argument based on facts not in evidence did not prejudice the defendant because the jury was instructed that attorneys’ arguments were not evidence).

(noting that intent is “proved circumstantially, by inference from words and acts of the actor both before and after the incident”).

(noting that a prosecutor’s comments must be consi dered in the context of the entire closing argument).

A prosecutor may argue “reasonable inferences from the facts pr esented.”

We reverse a district court’s determination regarding alleged prosecutorial misconduct “only when the misconduct, considered in the context of the trial as a whole, was so serious and prejudicial that the defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial was impaired.” State v. Johnson , –28 (Minn. 2000).

“A new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct will only be granted if ‘the misconduct, considered in the context of the trial as a whole, was so serious and prejudicial that the defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial was impaired.’” Myrland, d at 421 (-28 (Minn. 2000)).

See State v. Johnson , , 728 (Minn. 2000) (concluding that alleged prosecutorial misconduct was not prejudicial in part because the jury was properly instructed that remarks made by the attorneys in closing were not evidence).

Li kewise, “[e]vidence that merely shows 7 the commission of the crime or the circumstances thereof is not sufficient to corroborate accomplice testimony.”

This court will reverse a district court’s determination regarding alleged prosecutorial misconduct “only when the misconduct, considered in the context of the trial as a whole, was so serious and prejudicial that the defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial was impaired.” -28 (Minn. 2000).

A [fact- finder] is permitted to infer that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of their actions.” State v. Johnson , (citation omitted); review denied (Minn. Oct.

A prosecutor may argue “reasonable inferences from the facts presented.”

Corroborating evidence may be direct or circumstantial and “need not establish a prima facie case of the defendant’s guilt, [but] it must point to [the] defendant’s guilt in some substantial way.” State v. Johnson

are aware of our case law proscribing particular conduct as well as the standards of conduct prescribed by the ABA”); (“In evaluating claims of prosecutorial misconduct we have looked to the American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice as a model.”).

“A jury is permitted to infer tha t a person intends the natural and probable consequences of [his or her] actions.”

But a prosecutor may argue reasonable inferences from the facts presented, and a prosecutor need not present a colorless argument.