Cited by

State v. Franks , 8 State v. Watkins

d 738, 741 (Minn. App. 2002) (stating that appellate courts “defer to the fact-finder on determinations of credibility”), -93 (Minn. 1993) (concluding that, on the “unusual” facts of the case, the state failed to meet its burden of proof when the only direct evidence of abuse was th

State v. Franks , State v. Watkins

(stating that we generally defer to the fact -finder’s credibility determination).

d 738, 741 (Minn. App. 2002).

d 26 68, 73 (Minn. 2009)

(“We defer to the fact-finder on determinations of credibility.”).

We do not question the weight of the video evidence, and we presume the district court found the officer’s testimony credible

d 738, 741 (Minn. App. 2002).

We have held that “the presumptive disposition for a permissive consecutive sentence is always an executed sentence.” (interpreting the language in Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.F).

State v. Franks , State v. Watkins

We thus defer to the jury’s credibility determinations, and assume that “the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.”

But the “threshold issue” of whether the consecutive sentences imposed were permissive under the sentencing guidelines “requires interpretation of the sentencing guidelines, which is a question of law subject to de novo review.” State v. Rannow , ().

(deferring to fact-finder on credibility 7 determinations).

Accordingly, we defe r to the jury’s credibility determinations, and assume that “the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieve d any evidence to the contrary,” State v. Moore

(holding that appellate courts defer to fact-finder on witness credibility); d 426, 435 (Minn. 1997) (holding that appellate courts defer to fact-finder on weight of evidence).

State v. Watkins , (stating that appellate courts defer credibility determinations to the fact-finder).

Further, “[w]e defer to the fact-finder on determinations of credibility.”

(“When consecutive sentencing is permissive and the court pronounces a sentence that is to run consecutively to another executed sentence, the presumptive disposition for the consecutive sentence is also execution of the sentence.”).

Accordingly, we defer to the jury’s credibility determinations, and assume that “the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.” d 101, 108 (Minn. 1989).