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“A threat is a declaration of an intention to injure another or [their] property by some unlawful act.”

“A threat is a declaration of an intention to injure another or his property by some unlawful act.”

But “[t]he effect of a terroristic threat on the victim is not an essential element.”

“Terrorize means to cause extreme fear by use of violence or threats.” (defining “terrorize” for purposes of the terroristic-threats statute); (using the same definition of “terrorize” for purposes of the felony-stalking statute).

“A threat is a declaration of an intention to injure another or his property by some unlawful act.”

1; see also State v. Schweppe , (“The effect of a terroristic threat on the victim is not an essential element of the statutory offense proscribed by [Minn. Stat.] § 609.713, subd.

Such a reaction is “circumstantial evidence relevant to the element of intent of the defendant in making the threat.”

“A threat is a declaration of an intention to injure another or his property by some unlawful act.”

“A threat is a declaration of an intention to injure another or [their] property by some unlawful act.”

1 (noting that the threats-of-violence offense includes threatening to commit a crime of violence with the purpose to terrorize); (stating that to act with “[p]urpose” means to have an objective or intent).

“A threat is a declaration of an intention to injure another or his property by some unlawful act.”

1; (describing the three elements).

“A threat is a declaration of an intention to injure another or his property by some unlawful act.”

“A threat is a declaration of an intention to injure another or his property by some unlawful act.”

A threat “may be communicated by actions or words,” State v. Smith, 11 is made with “an intention to injure another or his property,” and has a “reasonable tendency to create apprehension that its originator will act according to its tenor.” (quotation omitted).

at 915–16 (affirming a threats-of-violence conviction after the appellant left dead animal parts and fake bombs at multiple victims’ residences); (upholding the appellant’s conviction where he communicated a threat to kill the victim to the victim’s friends, and the friends relayed the threat to the victim the following day).

A jury may infer intent from a defendant’s “words or actions in light of all the surrounding circumstances,” Nelson, d at 860 (quotation omitted), including “the natural and probable consequences” of the defendant’s actions, Cooper, d at 179, and the effect those actions have on the victim, d 609, 614 (Minn. 1975).

(a defendant’s intent may be reasonably inferred from other facts and is usually resolved circumstantially by the fact-finder); - 26 (Minn. 1999) (the fact-finder can discern a defendant’s intent from the totality of 5 circumstances); (a victim’s reaction to threatening words or conduct is “circumstantial evidence relevant to the element of intent of the defendant in making the threat”); Hough, d at 397 (a person intends to cause fear of immediate bodily harm if such fear would be a “natural and

concluding that although the defendant’s “ plea colloquy [did] not contain any statement describing [the victim’s] response to the threats,” it could be inferred from context that the threats “would have a reasonable tendency to create apprehension” in the victim that the defendant would follow through on his threats, making his guilty plea to threats of violence accurate); -14 (Minn. 1975).

at 105 (noting that “‘purpose’ in the context of this statute means ‘aim, objective, or intention.’” (); (holding that phrase “for the purpose of” created specific-intent crime because “‘purpose’ is synonymous with ‘intention’ and is defined as the ‘result or an effect that is intended or desired.’” (quoting American Heritage Dictionary 14

(emphasis added ).3 “[T]he question of whether a given statement is a threat turns on whether the communication in its context would have a reasonable tendency to create apprehension that its originator will act according to its tenor.” State v. Schweppe , (emphasis added) (quotation omitted).

15, 2000); (determining, in the context of a terroristic threats charge, “that a defendant need not 5 directly communicate the threat to the intended victim to be guilty of making a criminal threat”).

“[T]he question of whether a given statement is a threat turns on whether the communication in its context would have a reasonable tendency to create apprehension that its originator will act according to its tenor.” (quotation omitted).

A threat is “a declaration of an intention to injure another or his property by some unlawful act.”

The supreme court has defined “te rrorize” as “to cause extreme fear by use of violence or threats.” State v. Schweppe , (discussing the term in the context of making threats of violence); d 68, 73 -74 (Minn. 2009) (interpr eting the statutory phrase “feel terrorized” as to “feel extreme fear resulting from violence or threats”).

“A threat is a declaration of an intention to injure another or [her] property by some unlawful act.”

See State v. Schweppe , (explaining that victim’s reaction to threat was circumstantial evidence relevant to defendant’s intent in making the threat).

Relevant circumstances may include events occurring before and after the incident, as well as the victim’s reaction to a threat

Intent is a “subjective state of mind” that usually can only be established by “reasonable inference[s] from surrounding circumstances.”

Relevant circumstances may include “events occurring before and after the crime,” Davis v. State , as well as the victim’s reaction to a threat

or in a reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror.” “Terrorize means to cause extreme fear by use of violence or threats.”

(concluding that “the victim’s reaction to the threat was circ umstantial evidence relevant to the element of intent of the defendant in making the threat” in a terroristic threats case).

(concluding that a victim’s reaction he said that she would or would not live to regret appearing at court.

The definition comes from a which cited as support cases from the Western District of Tennessee and Kansas.