Cited by

(“The matter of continuance to permit substitution of counsel is traditionally within the discretion of the trial judge; [their] decision is to be based on the facts and circumstances surrounding the request.”).

79 (Minn. 2005); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).

And courts are charged with “maintaining an efficient and effective judicial system.”

(considering the time between the indictment and trial); (considering the number of requests for continuances and the proximity of the request to the start of trial); (“A motion for a continuance is properly denied when the defendant has not been diligent in procuring counsel or in preparing for trial.”).

(“The matter of continuance to permit substitution of counsel is traditionally within the discretion of the [district court].” (quotation omitted)).

“In determining the relevanc[e] and materiality” of other-acts evidence, courts “consider the issues in the case, the reasons and need for the evidence, and whether there is a sufficiently close relationship between the charged offense and the [prior] offense in time, place, or modus operandi.”

Appellate courts “review [a district] court’s ruling on a defendant’s request for a continuance for [an] abuse of discretion.”

“An error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if the guilty verdict actually rendered was ‘surely unattributable’ to the error.” ().

For a harmless-error analysis, we consider other evidence of the defendant’s guilt, “the manner in which the evidence was presented, whether the evidence was highly persuasive, whether it was used in closing argument, and whether it was effectively countered by the defense.”

In its analysis, however, the court quoted Blasus for the proposition that “[a]n error is harmless if the jury could have reached the same ‘verdict based on the other be deemed harmless, it must be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”

“A defendant must show that he was prejudiced to justify reversal.”

“For an error to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury’s verdict must be ‘surely unattributable’ to the error.” State v. Gilleylen¸ ().

(explaining that the court need not address whether the admission of evidence violated the appellant’s confrontation rights when the court was satisfied that the admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).

We have held that a party challenging on constitutional or other grounds a district court’s refusal to continue or reschedule a hearing must establish that the party was prejudiced in the preparation or presentation of their case so as to “materially affect the outcome of the trial.” –59 (Minn. 1977); (stating that the burden is on the party 23 The court of appeals affirmed the order terminating S.T.’s parental rights for different reasons than we do today.

-80 (Minn. 2005) (“[A] conviction may stand so long as the erroneous admission of the evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

(explaining that the determination of harmless error in wrongfully admitted evidence considers the whole record, including all previously mentioned factors, with no one factor being entirely dispositive).

We examine the record as a whole and “consider the manner in which the evidence was presented, whether the evidence was highly persuasive, whether it was used in closing argument, and whether it was e ffectively countered by the defense.” .

This determination requires that we review the record as a whole and “consider the manner in which the evidence was presented, whether the evidence was highly persuasive, whether it was used in closing argument, and whether it was effectively countered by the defense.”

But it is well set tled that “violations of the Confrontation Clause are subject to [a harmless-error] analysis.”

(appl ying these factors when determining whether erroneously admitted Spreigl evidence significantly affected the verdict); (same).

To make this determination, we examine the record as a whole, and “consider the manner in whic h the evidence was presented, whether the evidence was highly persuasive, whether it was used in closing argument, and whether it was effectively countered by the defense.” -99 (Minn. 1995).

A district court may properly deny a continuance request “when the defendant has not been diligent in procuring counsel or in preparing for trial.” State v. Courtney

See State v. Courtney , d 73, 81 (Minn. 2005) (“We recognize that a defendant’s constitutional right to assistance of counsel includes a fair opportunity to secure counsel of his own choice.”).

29, 2004); see also State v. Courtney , rev’d on other grounds

Even under harmless -error review , the less -onerous standard for a criminal defendant seeking rev ersal of his conviction, appellant cannot show “a reasonable possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict.”

State v. Courtney , , 79 (Minn. 2005).

Factors that weigh against granting a continuance include lack of diligence in preparing for trial, and previous continuances granted to the defendant, Sanders, d at 654.