Cited by

We are not persuaded otherwise by Schouviller’s rev’d d 312 (Minn. 2005).

But if “the confinement or removal of the victim is completely incidental to the perpetration of a separate felony, it does not constitute kidnapping.”

But the supreme court has held that if “the confinement or removal of the victim is completely incidental to the perpetration of a separate felony, it does not constitute kidnapping.”

“The question of whether verdicts are legally inconsistent is a question of law, which we review de novo.”

But prosecutors are prohibited from speculating in closing arguments about “events occurring at the time of the killing absent a factual basis in the record.”

–43 (Minn. 1998); –800 (Minn. 2000); – 28 (Minn. 2005); –64 (Minn. 2009); Peltier, d at 803–05.

Second, we analyze “whether ‘the circumstances proved are consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than guilt.’ ” d 204, 213 (Minn. 2020) ().

(holding that logical inconsistency—between a verdict of acquittal on one count and a verdict of guilty on another count—does not warrant new trial).

’ ” (d 312, 319 (Minn. 2005)).

“Nothing in the constitution requires consistent verdicts.” (citing United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 64-66 (1984)).

(stating that to determine whether third-degree criminal sexual conduct fulfilled requirement of using “force or violence,” district court must determine whether offense was “committed with force or violence—and not coercion alone”).

“When reviewing a claim of evidentiary insufficiency, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and assume that the factfinder disbelieved any testimony conflicting with that verdict.” State v. Leake

Under that standard, “[t]he verdict will not be overturned if, giving due regard to the presumption of innocence and the prosecution ’s burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the [fact-finder] could reasonably have found the defendant guilty of the charged offense.”

If a “case involves only logical inconsistencies—between a verdict of acquittal on one count and a verdict of guilty on another count—we hold that the verdicts are not legally inconsistent and [the defendant] is not entitled to a new trial.” ; see also State v. Salazar , No. A21 -1046, 202 0 WL 4517291 , at * 3 (Minn. App. Oct.

But because the record also contains circumstantial evidence and a defendant’s state of mind is “generally proven through circumstantial evidence,” see 7 we consider whether the circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain Sandven’s conviction.

Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(1); see 13 n.10 (Minn. 2005) (explaining the elements of first-degree premeditated murder).

We will not overturn a verdict “ if, giving due regard to the presumption o f innocence and the prosecution’s burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury could reasonably have found the defendant guilty of the charged offense.”

Second, we consider whether “the circumstances proved are consistent with the hypothesis that the a ccused is guilty and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than guilt.” State v. Leake

(providing that parties may “argue reasonable inferences from the facts presented at trial”).

Furthermore, the supreme court has noted that a sexual assault based on “coercion” is not the same as “force or violence.” (holding that third-degree sexual assault based on “coercion” was not the same as “force or violence” and thus did not qualify as a “heinous crime” under Minn. Stat. § 609.106, subd.

(noting previous 5 application of circumstantial standard to element of premeditation, despite direct evidence establishing other elements of offense) ().

ciency of the evidence, “[t]he verdict will not be overturned if, giving due regard to the presumption of i nnocence and the prosecution’s burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt , the [factfinder] could reasonably have found the defendant guilty of the charged offen se.” State v. Palmer, 803 (second alteration in original) ().

And if the confinement is “completely incidental to the perpetration of a separate felony, it does not constitute kidnapping.” rev’d

“The plain language of the elements of the offense indicates that third-degree [CSC] can be committed by coercion alone, force alone, or both force and coercion.” –24 (Minn. 2005).

See State v. Leake , , 319 (Minn. 2005) (stating that a reviewing court considers the sufficiency of the evidence in light of the burden of proof in the proceeding below).

State v. Laine , , 435 (Minn. 2006) ; State v. Leake , , 326 (Minn. 2005).

force against A.M.B., but argues that it was incidental to his “goal of engag ing in sex.” Appellant’s argument is rooted in State v. Smith, which held that “where the confinement or removal of the victim is completely incidental to the perpetration of a separate felony, it does not 6 constitute kidnapping.”

The supreme court relied on its earlier decision in State v. Smith, which held, in the context of kidnapping, that “confinement or removal must be criminally significant in the sense of being more than merely incidental to the underlying crime in order to justify a separate criminal sentence.” overruled on other grounds by State v. Leake

In making this argument, he relies on two kidnapping cases, overruled on other grounds by State v. Leake

See State v. Ortega , , 101 (Minn. 2012) (concluding that cleaning up and disposing of evidence were efforts to evade detection and supported a finding of premeditation); State v. Leake , , 321 (Minn. 2005) (concluding that burning evidence supported finding of premeditation); State v. Lodermeier , , 398 (Minn. 1995) (noting that a defendant's "words and actions before, during and after the killing" can support an inference of premeditation).

State v. Leake , , 319 (Minn. 2005) ; see also State v. Fleck , , 236 (Minn. 2010) ("The [factfinder] is in the best position to weigh credibility and thus determines which witnesses to believe and how much weight to give their testimony.").

" State v. Chavarria-Cruz , , 519 (Minn. 2013) (quoting State v. Leake , , 319 (Minn. 2005) ).