Cited by

1(1) (2022); (stating that assault (fear) is a specific-intent crime).

1(1) (2024) (stating that second-degree intentional murder requires the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant “cause[d] the death of a human being with intent to effect the death of that person or another, but without premeditation”); (stating a specific intent crime “requires an intent to cause a particular result”).

Second-degree murder is a specific-intent crime, as evidenced by the legislature’s use of the words “with intent to.”

In this case, the district court instructed the jury on the second form of assault in the statutory definition, which often is called “assault-harm.” d 303, 308 (Minn. 2012).

For domestic assault–fear, “the intent of the defendant, 8 as contrasted with the effect upon the victim, becomes the focal point for inquiry.” (quotation omitted).

Assault-fear is a specific-intent crime, as evidenced by the legislature’s use of the words “with intent to.”

The assault-harm offense is a general-intent crime, requiring the state to prove that the defendant “intended to do the physical act” but not that the defendant “meant to violate the law or cause a particular result.”

We refer to the first clause in the assault definition, subdivision 10(1), as “assault-fear.”

1(1) (2022); (stating that assault-fear is a specific- intent crime).

(quoting State v. Fleck , ).

Specific-intent crimes require the state to prove that the offender had “an intent to cause a particular result.” (quotation omitted).

Proof of a general- intent crime requires only evidence that “the defendant engaged intentionally in specific, prohibited conduct,” n.10 (Minn. 2000) (quotation omitted), or, stated differently, evidence of “an ‘intention to make the bodily movement which constitutes the act which the crime requires,’” d 303, 308 (Minn. 2012) (quoting 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 5.2(e) (2d ed. 2003)).

14 An offense is a general-intent crime “[w]hen a statute simply prohibits a person from intentionally engaging in the prohibited conduct.” (citing 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 5.2(e) (2d ed. 2003) (explaining that general intent requires an “intention to make the bodily movement which constitutes the act which the crime requires”)).

d 303, 307 (Minn. 2012).

After our Dalbec decision, the supreme court decided State v. Fleck, concluding that an assault-fear offense is a specific-intent crime and an assault-harm offense is a general- intent crime, implicitly calling into question but not expressly overruling Dalbec’s holding.

This is a specific intent crime, which “requires an intent to cause a particular result.”

“The phrase ‘with intent to’ is commonly used by the Legislature to express a specific-intent requirement.” –09 () .

9(4) (2018); (noting that assault-fear “is a specific-intent crime”).

Assault-fear is a specific- intent crime, as evidenced by the legislature’s use of the words “with intent to.”

A statute is ambiguous “when the statutory language is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.”

9(4) (2020); (holding that assault- fear “is a specific-intent crime”).

In doing so, this court first determines “whether the statute’s language, on its face, is clear or ambiguous.” (quotation omitted).

Assault-fear, in contrast, “does not require a finding of actual harm to the victim.” (cita tion omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

(discussing the difference between assault-fear and assault-harm); Minn. Stat. § 609.222 (2020).

10(1); In an assault-fear crime, “[t]he intent of the [defendant], as contrasted with the effect upon the victim, becomes the focal point for inquiry.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

–09 (Minn. 2012) (discussing the distinction between a specific-intent and general-intent crime).

(“[R]egardless of whether an offense is described as a specific- or general-intent crime, a defendant must voluntarily do an act or voluntarily fail to perform an act.” (quotation omitted)); (“The defendant must have engaged in a volitional

“An assault-fear offense ‘does not require a finding of actual harm to the victim.’” (d 393, 395 (Minn. 1998)).

(interpreting the voluntary intoxication statute and holding that, based on its plain and ordinary meaning, the phrase “particular intent” unambiguously referred to specific-intent crimes, not general-intent crimes)

9(4) (2020); -09 (Minn. 2012) (stating that assault—f ear is a specific-intent crime, which requires a showing of intent to 5 cause a particular result).

d 303, 312 (Minn. 2012).

“A statute is ambiguous only when the statutory language is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.”

Porte emphasizes that witness tampering is a crime of specific intent—“an intent to cause a particular result.” d 303, 308 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted); (“[A]n attempt to commit any crime requires a specific intent to commit that particular offense.” (quotation omitted)); (“[T]he word ‘intentionally’ makes witness tampe

The offense of assault with intent to cause fear is a specific-intent crime that “requires the State to prove the defendant committed an act with an additional special mental element.”

26 “[A]ssault statutes do not require a finding by the jury that a defendant intended to cause a specific level of harm.” overruled on other grounds by Fleck