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A general- intent crime occurs when “a statute simply prohibits a person from intentionally engaging in the prohibited conduct.”

–31 (Minn. 2016); –10 (Minn. 2012).

“When a statu te simply prohibits a person from intentionally engaging in the prohibited conduct, the crime is considered a general- intent crime.”

Appellant argues that the state construc tively amended its complaint when the district court permitted the state to amend the first (and most serious) count of the complaint from assault-fear to assault-harm after jury selection, and that the amendment affected appellant’s substantial right to have “tim ely notice and an opportunity to prepare a defense.” In State v. Fleck , -10 (Min n. 2012), the supreme court discussed the difference between assault-fear and assault-harm under Minn. Stat. §60

“[T]he mens rea element of assault-harm, ‘intentional,’ requires only the general intent to do the act that results in bodily harm.” State v. Dorn , (citing State v. Fleck , (holding that assault-harm is a general-intent crime)).

is a general-intent crime.” State v. Fleck , -10 (Minn. 2012).

Two years after this court decided Dalbec, the supreme court considered the ty pe of intent required to prove assault-fear and assault-harm offenses in State v. Fleck

Assault is a general -intent crime which “requires only that the defendant engaged intentionally in specific, prohibited conduct.” (quotation omitted).

If we cannot tell from the verdict whether the jury relied on erroneous instructions on one of two alternative elements required for a conviction, “ we cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the improper instruction did not have a significant impact on the verdict.” d 303, 311–12 (Minn. 2012).

1(1) requires proof that the defendant “cause[d] the death of a human being with intent to effect the death of that person or another.” This is a specific intent crime requiring “an intent to cause a particular result.” State v. Fleck , (quotation omitted).

d 303, 309 (Minn. 2012).

1989), State v. Hough , -97 (Minn. 1998); -69 (Minn. App. 2017).

See State v. Fleck , (concluding that “assault-harm is a general- intent crime”).

“A statute is ambiguous only when the statutory language is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.”

10 (2018); see also State v. Fleck , (recognizing two types of assault identified as assault-fear and assault-harm).

Likewise, “failure to properly instruct the jury on all elements of the offense charged is plain error.” State v. Vance , d 650, 658 (Minn. 2007), overruled on other grounds by State v. Fleck

“A statute is ambiguous only when the statutory language is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.”

A statute is ambiguous only when it has “more than one reasonable interpretation.”

see also State v. Vance , -55 (Minn. 2007), overruled on other grounds by State v. Fleck

10 (2016); see also State v. Fleck , (categorizing the two types of assault as assault -fear and assault-harm).

said no, appellant came back in the water 1

“A statute is ambiguous only when the statutory language is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.” d 303, 307 (Minn. 2012).

d 303, 309 -10 (Minn. 2012) (holding that assault -harm is a general -intent crime) .

State v. Fleck , -09 (Minn. 2012) .

“A statute is ambiguous only when the statutory language is subject to more than one rea sonable interpretation.” State v. Fleck

We cited to State v. Fleck , -10 (Minn. 2 012) for the proposition that a general-intent crime requires only a showing that the defendant intended to do the physical act, and not that the defendant intended to cause a particular result.

“A statute is ambiguous only when the statutory language is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.”

Olsen’s offense is a general-intent crime that “requires the State to prove that the defendant intended to do the physical act,” but it does not require “proof that the defendant meant to violate the law or cause a particular result.” State v. Fleck , -09 (Minn. 2012).

State v. Fleck , , 307 (Minn. 2012).

See State v. Lindahl , d 763, 766-67 (Minn. 1981) (noting that only general intent is required for criminal -sexual- conduct offenses and that voluntary intoxication is not a defense to general-intent crimes); (“[G]eneral intent only requires an intention to make the bodily movement which constitutes the act which the crime requires.”).

(referring to assault-fear as requiring specific intent and assault-harm as requiring general- 8 intent).