Cited by

27, 2010); (“[P]olice can order a passenger out of a vehicle, as the passengers are already stopped by the stop of the vehicle, and the only change is that they are outside of, and not inside of, the stopped vehicle.”); see also Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 415 (1997) (holding that “an officer making a

4; n.1, 149 (Minn. 2009) (stating that review of a Rule 26.01, subd ivision 4 proceeding is limited to the dispositive pretrial ruling).

Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454- 55 (1971)

n.2 (Minn. 2009), and emphasized in Torgerson, d at 172, 174–75, after 1976 possession of marijuana is not necessarily a criminal offense.

Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454- 55 (1971)

d 145, 149 (Minn. 2009).

When reviewing a pretrial order denying a motion to suppress, appellate courts “review the district court’s factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard and the district court’s legal determinations de novo.” (quotation omitted).

Pennsylvania v. Mimms , 434 U.S. 106, 109-11 (1977); State v. Ortega

d 145, 149 (Minn. 2009).

“Warrantless searches are generally unreasonable unless they fall within a recognized warrant exception.”

“When reviewing a district court’s pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence, [appellate courts] review the district court’s factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard and the district court’s legal determinations de novo.” (quotation omitted).

2 “When reviewing a district court’s pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence, [appellate courts] review the district court’s factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard and the district court’s legal determinations de novo.” (quotation omitted).

See, d 145, 150- 51 (Minn. 2009) (explaining joint constructive possession); (stating that possession charges encompass theories of independent and joint possession); (stating that circumstantial evidence may prove constru

5 First, aff’d on other grounds, this court stated that “the odor of marijuana provides an officer with probable cause to suspect criminal activity.” Id.

State v. Ortega , d 145, 150 (Minn. 2009).

(stating that because defendant stipulated to evidence against him, review was limited to the pretrial order denying the motion to suppress).

“There is probable cause to arrest without a warrant when a person of ordinary care and prudence, viewing the totality of circumstances objectively, would entertain an honest and strong suspicion that a specific individual has committed a crime.”

U.S. 443, 474-75 (1971) (“The most basic constitutional rule in this area is that searches conducted 4 outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well delineated exceptions.” (quotation omitted))

When reviewing a pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence, appellate courts “review the district court’s factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard and the district court’s legal determinations de novo.” (quotation omitted).

Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474 (1971)

2(4) (1976), n.2 (Minn. 2009).

Warrantless searches and seizures are unreasonable under both the state and federal constitutions unless a recognized warrant exception applies, Coolidge v. New Hampshire , 403 U.S. 443, 454- 55 (1971); and the state must show that such an exception applies

DECISION “When reviewing a district court’s pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence, ‘we review the district court’s factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard and the district court’s legal determinations de novo.’” (quotation omitted).

Probable cause exists “when a person of ordinary care and prudence, viewing the totality of circumstances objectively, would entertain an honest and strong suspicion that a specific individual has committed a crime.”

“Warrantless searches and seizures are generally unreasonable unless they fall within a recognized warrant exception.”

- 88 (Minn. 1985) (concluding that the evidence was sufficient to infer that the defendant jointly possessed marijuana found in the defendant’s bedroom in an apartment defendant shared with a roommate).