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The test for determining whether two offenses arose from a single behavioral incident is “whether the offenses occurred at substantially the same time and place and arose out of a continuous and uninterrupted course of conduct, manifesting an indivisible state of mind or coincident errors of judgment.” n.3 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted).

In so doing, the district court used the 12 Under section 609.035, subdivision 1, “if a person’s conduct constitutes more than one offense under the laws of this state, the person may be punished for only one of the offenses.” The statute prohibits “multiple sentences for crimes that arise from a single behavioral incident.”

12 C. Closing Argument Not Based on Reasonable Inferences A prosecuting attorney’s closing argument “should be based on [the] evidence presented at trial and inferences reasonably drawn from that evidence.” State v. Bauer , (quotation omitted), aff’d, (concluding that an argument in closing was based on “a reasonable inference” because “some evidence” supported it).

(considering instructions to jurors and strength of the evidence in concluding that “less-serious prosecutorial misconduct” was harmless), aff’d

“In order to determine whether two intentional crimes are part of a single behavioral incident, we consider factors of time and place and whether the segment of conduct involved was motivated by an effort to obtain a single criminal objective.” (quotation omitted).

“A prosecutor’s closing argument should be based on [the] evidence presented at trial and inferences reasonably drawn from that evidence.” d 462, 475 (Minn. App. 2009) (quotation omitted), aff’d

B. Facts Not Offered into Evidence Grace also argues that the “prosecutor committed misconduct by arguing facts not in evidence and by referencing [his] punishment.” “A prosecutor ’s closing argument 8 should be based on the evidence presented at trial and the inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence.” (quotation omitted), aff’d

18 (1) occurred at substantially the same time and place and (2) arose from a continuing and uninterrupted course of conduct, manifesting an indivisible state of mind or coincident errors of judgment.” (quotation omitted), aff’d

(“[A]ppeals to common sense are permitted.”), aff’d, (“[A]ppeals to common sense .

To determine whether multiple offenses constitute a single course of conduct “Minnesota courts consider whether the conduct (1) shares a unity of time and place and (2) was motivated by an effort to obtain a single criminal objective.” aff’d, .

But during closing argument a prosecutor may appeal to jurors’ common sense, aff’d on other grounds , if the prosecutor does not improperly “urge the jurors to look at their own experiences as proof 12 that the defendant’s defense is not credible ,”

1, “if a person’s conduct constitutes more than one offense under the laws of this state, the person may be punished for only one of the offenses.” The statute prohibits “multiple sentences for crimes that arise from a single behavioral incident.”

aff’d, d 825 (Minn. 2011).

“The application of this test depends heavily on the facts and 18 circumstances of the particular case.” see Bakken, d at 270 (“[d]etermining whether multiple offenses are part of a single behavioral incident is not a ‘mechanical’ exercise”).

1 (2020), “if a person’s conduct constitutes more than one offense under the laws of this state, the person may be punished for only one of the offenses.” Courts have interpreted subdivision 1 “to bar multiple sentences for crimes that arise from [the same] behavioral incident.”

A defendant asserting such a defense must “establish by a fair preponderance of the e vidence that the state induced the defendant to commit the offense by improper pressure, badgering, or persuasion.” aff’d

“ The application of this test depends heavily on the facts and circumstances of the particular case.” see Bakken, d at 270 (“Determining whether multiple offenses are part of a single behavioral incident 10 is not a ‘mechanical’ exercise .

1 If any of the crimes lack an intent element, we consider whether they occurred “at substantially the same time and place and ar[ose] out of a continuous and uninterrupted course of conduct, manifesting an indivisible state of mind or coincident errors of judgment.” n.3 (Minn. 2011) (stating same).

(holding that two different crimes relat ing to the same controlled substance were not part of the same behavioral incident).

(stating that appellate courts “ordinarily will not decide issues that were not presented to the district court”), aff’d

Whether offenses were committed during a single behavioral incident depends on whether the conduct shares a “unity of time and place” and “was motivated by an effort to obtain a single criminal objective.” -29 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted); see Bookwalter, d at 294.

To determine whether two intentional offenses were part of the same behavioral incident, this court examines “factors o f time and place and whether the segment of conduct involved was motivated by an effort to obtain a single criminal objective.” d 825, 828 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted).

7 The supreme court uses different tests to determine whether two crimes arose from a single behavioral incident, and “[w]hich te st applies depends on whether the crime at issue contains an intent element.” -28 (Minn. 2011).

15 commit the offense by improper pressure, badgering, or persuasion.” aff’d

A determination of whether two intentional offenses aros e from a single behavioral incident depends on whether the conduct shares a unity of time and place and “was motivated by an effort to obtain a single criminal objective.” State v. Bauer , (quotation omitted).

(quotation omitted); (applying sufficiency-of-evidence sta ndard in reviewing jury’s rejection of entrapment defense), aff’d on other grounds

The determination of whether two intentional offenses arise from a single behavioral incident depends on whether the conduct shares a unity of time and place and “was motivated by an effort to obtain a single criminal objective.” State v. Bauer , (quotation omitted) .

E.g., Munt, d at 416 -17 (“[A]cts that lack a unity of time and place or are motivated by different criminal objectives do not constitute a single b ehavioral incident, and therefore, are not ‘conduct,’ for purposes of section 609.035 .” ( -30 (Minn. 2011) )).

(concluding that sharing illegal drugs with friends is too broad to constitute a single criminal objective); see also State v. Gould , (concluding that financial hardship is too broad to constitute a single criminal

The analysis of whether offenses were committed as part of a single behavioral incident “depends heavily on the facts and circum stances of the particular case.” State v. Bauer