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Because the materiality analysis under Brady “involves a mixed issue of fact and law, we review a district court’s materiality determination de nov o.”

But because we determine the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion when it determined Wiseman’s claims fail on the merits, “we need not decide whether [they] are Knaffla barred.”

“Under Brady, the suppression by the State, whether intentional or not, of material evidence favorable to the defendant violates the constitutional guarantee of due process.” (addressing Brady).

“The State violates the constitutional guarantees of due process when, whether intentionally or unintentionally, it suppresses ‘material evidence favorable to the defendant.’” d 295, 304 (Minn. 2021) ().

“[A] new trial is not required simply because a defendant uncovers previously undisclosed evidence that would have been possibly useful to the defendant but unlikely to have changed the verdict.”

Under Brady, the state must disclose “material evidence favorable to the defendant.” (citing Brady, 373 U.S. at 87).

(Confrontation Clause); (Due Process Clause).

“The State violates the constitutional guarantees of due process when, whether intentionally or unintentionally, it suppresses ‘material evidence favorable to the defendant.’” ().

“Under Brady[4], the suppression by the [s]tate, whether intentional or not, of material evidence favorable to the defendant violates the constitutional guarantee of due process.”

“The State violates the constitutional guarantees of due process when, whether intentionally or unintentionally, it suppresses ‘material evidence favorable to the defendant.’” ().

Thus, “[u]nder Brady, the suppression by the [s]tate, whether intentional or not, of material evidence favorable to the defendant violates the constitutional guarantee of due process.”

See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153–54 (1972)

“Because a Brady materiality analysis involves a mixed issue of fact and law, we review a [postconviction] court’s materiality determination de novo.” d 213, 216 (Minn. 2010).

“Under Brady, the suppression by the State, whether intentional or not, of material evidence favorable to the defendant violates the constitutional guarantee of due process.”

To establish a Brady violation, “(1) the evidence must be favorable to the defendant because it would have been either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the evidence must have been suppressed by the prosecution, intentionally or otherwise; and (3) the evidence must be material.”

(citing Brady, 373 U.S. at 87).

The state violates a defendant’s due- process rights when it suppresses “material evidence favorable to the defendant.” (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)).

(citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999)).

“Because a Brady materiality analysis involves a mixed issue of fact and law, we review a district court’s materiality determination de novo.”

The State violates the constitutional guarantee s of due process when , whether intentionally or unintentionally , it suppresses “material evidence favorable to the defendant.” (citing Brady, 373 U.S. at 87).

(“Generally, without a showing of prejudice to the defendant, the state’s violation of a discovery rule will not result in a new trial.”); Walen v. State , (requiring that the evidence at issue be material, which means that “the absence of the evidence must have caused prejudice to the defendant”).

The court makes this determination “by considering the effect the undisclosed evidence would have had in the context of the whole trial record.”

“Evidence is material under Brady if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” (quotation omitted).

5 evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different” (quotation omitted)); (“[A] new trial is not required simply because a defendant uncovers previously undisclosed evidence that would have been possibly useful to the defendant but unlikely to have changed the verdict.”).

Walen v. State , , 216 (Minn. 2010).

d 213, 216 (Minn. 2010).

Appellate courts “make a materiality determination by considering the effect the undisclosed evidence would have had in the context of the whole trial record.”

“[T]he suppression by the State, whether intentional or not, of material evidence favorable to the defendant violates the constitutional guarantee of due process.” (citing Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 , 83 S.Ct.

(citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281- 82, 119 S. Ct. 1936, 1948 (1999)).