Cited by

(emphasis added) (quotations omitted).

“Consent is not involuntary merely because the circumstances of the encounter are uncomfortab le for the person being questioned.” State v. Diede , (quotation omitted).

(citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968))

The reasonable-suspicion standard is not a high one, State v. Diede , 3 (Minn. 2011), but the investigatory stop may not be the result of “mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity,” -22 (Minn. 1996).

D E C I S I O N Garner contends that his conviction must be reversed because the police unlawfully stopped the vehicle in which he was a passenger and the firearm “would not have been discovered if [the] officers had not conducted the illegal stop.” 2 See State v. Diede , (“Evidence obtained as a result of a seizure without reasonable suspicion must be suppressed.”).

(citing Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 19-21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879-81 (1968)).

State v. Munson , (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968))

The reasonable-suspicion standard is not high, State v. Diede , 3 (Minn. 2011), but the investigatory stop may not be the result of “mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity,”

See id.; (“While nervousness alone may not be sufficient to provide a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, it may be added to the totality of other circumstances to support a conclusion that drug -related criminal activity is afoot.”).

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12-13, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1875 (1968); d 836, 842 (Minn. 2011).

“Evidence obtained as a result of a seizure without reasonable suspicion must be suppressed.”

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879-81 (1968)

(citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879-81 (1968)).

State v. Diede , , 846 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted).

Both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions “protect ‘[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.’” (quoting U.S. Const. amend.

d 836, 846 (Minn. 2011).

State v. Diede , (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19–21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879–81 (1968)).

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1875 (1968)

Consent is only a valid exception to the warrant requirement, however, if it was given “freely and voluntarily.” State v. Diede

from the perspective of a trained police officer, who may make ‘inferences and deductions that might well elude an untrained person.’”) (quoting United States v. Cortez , 449 U.S. 411, 418, 101 S. Ct. 690, 695 (1981)); State v. Diede , (noting that the court is to determine reasonable, articulable suspicion based on the totality of the circumstances at the time of the seizure, the rational inferences from those facts, from the perspective of a reasonable police office) ; State v. Davis , (noting

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12–13, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1875 (1968)

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968); -43 (Minn. 2011).

See State v. Diede , (“Consent is an exception to the warrant requirement.”).

d 836, 846 (Minn. 2011).

d 836, 846-47 (Minn. 2011).

“For a search to fall under the consent exception, the [s]tate must show by a preponderance of the evidence that consent was given freely and voluntarily.”

The reasonable-suspicion standard is not high but requires more than a “hunch,” or “mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity,” (quotation omitted).

(citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968)).

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1875 (1968)

-43 (Minn. 2011) (providing that a stop is justified if specific, articulable facts lead officer to reasonably suspect person of criminal activity and that the reasonable-suspicion standard is “not high”).

Terry, 392 U.S. at 12-13, 88 S. Ct. at 1875; State v. Diede , d 836, 842 (Minn. 2011).

“The reasonable- suspicion standard is not high .” State v. Diede , -43 (Minn. 2011).

Terry, 392 U.S. at 13, 88 S. Ct. at 1875