Cited by

The reasonable-suspicion standard is “not high.” (quotation omitted).

d 836, 842 (Minn. 2011).

“Evidence obtained as a result of a seizure without reasonable suspicion must be suppressed.”

See State v. Diede , -44 (Minn. 2011) (concluding reasonable, articulable suspicion must exist prior to a search and seizure).

-43 (Minn. 2011) (quotations and citations omitted).

(“Mere proximity to, or association with, a person who may have previously engaged in criminal activity is not enough to support reasonable suspicion.”).

But it must be based on specific, articulable facts that allow the officer to articulate “that he or she had a particularized and objective basis for suspe cting the seized person of 5 criminal activity.” State v. Diede , -43 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted).

“The United States and Minnesota Constitu tions protect the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, a nd effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” (quotation omitted) (citing U.S. Const. amend.

The district court’s findings of fact are clearly erroneous if an appellate court, after reviewing the record evidence, is “left with the definite and firm con viction that a mistake occurred.” State v. Diede , -47 (Minn. 2011).

A police officer may “stop and temporarily seize a person to investigate that person for criminal wrongdoing if the officer reasonably suspects that person of criminal activity.” State v. Diede , (quotation omitted).

Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 19-21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1878 -80 (1968); - 43 (Minn. 2011).

See, (recognizing that factual findings regarding motion to suppress are reviewed for clear error); State v. Chavarria-Cruz , (same).

“When reviewing a pretrial order on a motion to suppress, we review the district court’s factual findings [for clear error],” (citation omitted), and its determinations of reasonable, articulable suspicion de novo, State v. Diede , .

under an assumed or fictitious name”) ; –50 (Minn. 2011) (foregoing a harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt analysis when the State’s only evidence was obtained as fruit of the poisonous tree).

Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 439-40, 104 S. Ct. at 3150; -43 (Minn. 2011); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884-85 (1968).

The reasonable-suspicion standard is “not high.” (quo tation omitted).

Citing State v. Diede , appellant argues that “[m]ere proximity to, or association with, a person who may have previously engaged in criminal activity is not enough to support reasonable suspicion of possession of a contr olled substance.”

d States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio set forth the principle that officers may “temporarily detain a suspect without probable cause if (1) the stop was justified at its inception by reasonable articulable suspicion, and (2) the actions of the police during the stop were reasonably related to and justified by the circumstances that gave rise to the stop in the first place.” (quotations omitted).

However, an officer may conduct a brief investigatory stop if they have reasonable, articulable suspicion that “criminal activity may be afoot .” Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 30 , 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884 (1968); See also S tate v. Diede , d 836, 842 (Minn. 2011) .

Consent is one such exception.2

“When reviewing a district court’s pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence, we review the district court’s factual findin gs under a clearly erroneous standard and the district court’s legal determinations de novo.”

State v. Diede , (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968)).

“Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 10 of the Minnesota Constitution, warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable unless one of a few specifically established and well -delineated exceptions applies.” (quotations and citations omitted).

State v. Munson , (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968))

that he or she had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the seized person of criminal activity.’” -43 (Minn. 2011) ().

Reasonable suspicion is “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the seized person of criminal activity.”

(citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968))