Cited by

(“We cannot add words or meaning to a statute that were intentionally or inadvertently omitted.”).

(stating the court “cannot add words or meaning to a statute that were intentionally or inadvertently omitted”).

(stating “we will go beyond the plain language of the statute to determine the intent of the legislature” only “[w]hen the language is unclear or ambiguous.”).

(stating the court “cannot add words or meaning to a statute that were intentionally or inadvertently omitted.”).

And “[w]e cannot add words or meaning to a statute that were intentionally or inadvertently omitted.” (citation omitted); d 711, 717 (Minn. 2024) (“[I]f the Legislature had wanted to make the right to counsel unwaivable, it could have done so explicitly—just as it has in other statutes.”).

While section 117.031 is silent on the interaction of parts (a) and (b), “[w]e have recognized that silence does not render a statute ambiguous unless the silence renders the statute susceptible to more than one reasonable 11 interpretation.”

(“We cannot add words or meaning to a statute that were intentionally or inadvertently omitted.”).

(stating that only “[w]hen the language is unclear or ambiguous, however, will [we] go beyond the plain language of the statute to determine the intent of the legislature”); Minn. Stat. § 645.16(6) (“When the words of a law are not explicit, the intention of the legislature may be ascertained by c

v. County of Ramsey, ().

(stating that an appellate court will not “add words or meaning to a statute that were intentionally or inadvertently omitted”).

ure did not.” (quotation omitted) (citing Hutchinson Tech., Inc. v. Comm’r of Revenue, ); (explaining that we do not interpret statutes “to include language which is clearly not there”); -91 (Minn. 2012) (declining to add language to 6 I appreciate the participation of, information furnished by, and public-policy arguments from the amici, who represent parties interested in this matter.

But “[w]e cannot add words or meaning to a statute that were intentionally or inadvertently omitted.”

(“We cannot add words or meaning to a statute that were intentionally or inadvertently omitted.”).

urt has explained that the legislative purpose in enacting Minn. Stat. § 257C.08 “was to give grandparents and great-grandparents a legal right to visitation with their grandchildren,” which “had to come via statute because historically, grandparents had virtually no legal right to maintain a relationship with a grandchild independent of the wishes of the child’s parents.” (quotation omitted).

-92 (Minn. 2012) (citation and footnote omitted).

“If the plain language of a statute is clear and free from all ambiguity, we will not disregard the letter of the law under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.”

When considering silence, “courts are 10 not free to substitute amendment for construction and thereby supply the omissions of the legislature.” (quotation omitted).

And a statute’s silence “does not render a statute ambiguous unless the silence renders the statute susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.” ().

(“We cannot add words or meaning to a statute that were intentionally or inadvertently omitted.”).

(stating that this court will not “add words or meaning to a statute that were intentionally or inadvertently omitted”).

T he grandparent visitation statute follows “three guiding principles.”

(stating that this court “cannot add words or meaning to a statute that were intentionally or 1 Davis also cites an equivalent federal provision to support this point.

Moreover, were we to adopt J.C.L.’s interpretation of this statute as excluding from criminal behavior a juvenile disseminatin g pornographic work of themself, it would effectively “add words or meaning to a statut e that were intentionally or inadvertently 7 omitted.” Rohmiller v. Hart

(“We cannot add words or meaning to a statute that were intentionally or inadvertently omitted.”).

But if the text of the statute is unclear or ambiguous, we “will go beyond the plain language of the statute to determine the intent of the legislature.” Rohmiller v. Hart

Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68-69, 120 S. Ct. at 2061; -95 (Minn. 2012) (discussing Troxel).

ustodians have equal rights and responsibilities regarding matters of legal custody “unless the joint legal custodians disagree, in which case the relevant decision shall be made by the provider of the child’s primary residence.” This interpretation runs afoul of our limited role to not “add words or meaning to a statute that were intentionally or inadvert ently omitted.”

“We have recognized that silence does 16 not render a statute ambiguous unless the silence renders the statute susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.” Rohmiller v. Hart

(stating “presumption th at an omission in a statute is by deli berate choice, not inadvertence ” (quotation omitted)); (“We cannot add words or meaning to a statute that were intentionally or inadvertently omitted.”).

For us to add the word “unlaw ful” to subdivision 1(4), we would be doing what we cannot: “add words or mean ing to a statute that were intentionally or inadvertently omitted.”

Cf. Rohmiller v. Hart , (“We cannot add words or meaning to a statute th at were intentionally or inadvertently omitted.”).

But we cannot add language to a statute; rather, we “must apply the plain language of the statute as written[.]” -51 (Min n. 2016) ; see also Rohmiller v. Hart , (“We cannot add words or meaning to a statute that were intentionally or inadvertently omitted.”).

at 820 (citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 2060 (2000)); (noting Troxel is a plurality opinion).

(“We cannot add words or meaning to a statute that were intentionally or inadvertently omitted.”).