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r appellant’s motion to correct a sentence under Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 27.03, subdivision 9, which only challenged the lawfulness of his mandatory life sentences, such a motion is not subject to the limitations period imposed by Minnesota Statutes § 590.01, subdivision 4, and even if it were, the limitations period imposed by Minnesota Statutes § 590.01, subdivision 4 is not jurisdictional.

A postconviction petition is frivolous “if it is perfectly apparent, without argument, that the petition is without merit.” (quotation omitted).

“because the court in such a case has no jurisdiction to hear the untimely claim, as compliance with the time period is a condition of the statutory right.” Ariola, d at 348 ().

(stating that the first review of a conviction by a postconviction court is similar in scope to a direct appeal); d 590, 601 (Minn. 2012 ) (concluding that the statutory two-year time limit for filing a petition for postconviction relief was intended to act as a statute of limitations).

(internal citation omitted).

As a result, the Minnesota Supreme Court has “long held that the interests of justice are implicated only in exceptional and extraordinary situations.” Caldwell d at 141.

Carlton v. State , (“[T]he statute of limitations in Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd.

“[D]efendants do not have an unlimited right to review.” Carlton v. State

- 82 (Minn. 2013); - 07 (Minn. 2012) (holding that the related time limit in Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd.

We have “long held that the interests of justice are implicated only in exceptional and extraordinary situations.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

We note, however, that Kingbird’s counsel took 8 –02 (Minn. 2012), we explained the distinction between a waivable limitations period and a limitations period that serves as a jurisdictional bar to hearing the claim.

In a postconviction proceeding, a defendant must “be afforded a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.” (quotation omitted).

The interests-of-justice exception is “implicated only in exceptional and extraordinary situations.” (quotation omitted).

Finally, for the five Gassler factors considered when applying the interests-of-justice exception: (1)Whether the claim has substantive merit; (2) whether the defendant deliberately and inexcusably failed to raise the issue on direct appeal; (3) whether the party alleging error is at fault for that erro

The interests -of-justice exception is “implicated only in exc eptional and extraordinary situations.” Carlton v. State , (quotation omitted).

“We review the constitutionality of a statute de novo.” Carlton v. State , 11 (Minn. 2012).

615 –16 (Minn. 2012) (rejecting a due process challenge to applying the 2-year time limit in Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd.

The in terests-of-justice exception app lies “only in exceptional and extraordinary situations.”

4(c), is not jurisdictional and therefore is subject to waiver by the State.”

See Carlton v. State , (concluding that a statement in an earlier opinion was dicta because it was not necessary to the cour t’s ultimate holding).

On appeal from a denial of postconviction relief, appellate courts “review issues of law de novo.” (“[A] Blakely argument presents a constitutional issue, which this court reviews de novo.”).

This exception is only met in “exceptional and extraordinary situations.” (quotation omitted).

See Carlton v. State , -02 (Minn. 2012) (holding that the statute of limitations in Minn. Stat. § 590.01 is not jurisdictional and thus is waivable by the state).

See Carlton v. State , (saying that a statement was dicta “because the resolution of that question [was] not necessary to our ultimate holding”).

(explaining that courts should consider whether a petitioner has complied with the two- year time limit under subdivision 4(c) before determ ining whether the petitioner has satisfied an exce ption under subdivision 4(b)) .

Allowing the State to stand silent in this unusual context would be contrary to our longstanding jurisprudence that “equity is an important component of postconviction relief.”

A claim under this exception "must relate to an injustice that delayed the filing of the petition, not to the substantive merit of the petition," Hooper v. State , , 142 (Minn. 2016), and applies only in "exceptional and extraordinary situations," Carlton v. State , , 607 (Minn. 2012) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Postconviction courts invoke the statutory interests-of-justice exception only in “exceptional and extraordinary situations.” Carlton v. State

See Carlton v. State , , 601 (Minn. 2012) (explaining that a court lacks jurisdiction to hear an untimely claim when compliance with the time period is a condition of the statutory right).