Cited by

-05 (Minn. 2013); , 233-34 (Minn. 2011).

Postconviction petitions are subject to certain procedural requirements including the Knaffla rule, which “provides that when a petition for postconviction relief follows a direct appeal of a conviction, all claims raised in the direct appeal and all claims of which the defendant knew or should have known at the time of the direct appeal are procedurally barred.”

(holding that appellant’s postconviction-relief claim asserting a Miranda violation was Knaffla-barred because it turned on “facts that were known or should have been known to him at the time of his direct appeal”).

Accordingly, when “a petition for postconviction relief follows a direct appeal of a conviction, all claims raised in the direct appeal and all claims of which the defendant knew or should have known at the time of the direct appeal are procedurally barred.” (citing Knaffla, d at 741); see Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd.

Appellant has not 10 articulated why either exception should apply, “and we have previously declined to apply the exceptions in the absence of such reasons.” (placing burden of proof on petitioner).

Nevertheless, a claim is not Knaffla-barred if (1) “the defendant presents a novel legal issue” or (2) “the interests-of-justice require the court to consider the claim.”

1 (2020), which states that a petition for postconviction relief filed after the disposition of a direct appeal “may not be based on grounds that could have been raised on direct appeal of the conviction or sentence.” interests of justice require the court to consider the claim.” Buckingham v. State

Buckingham v. State , d 229, 233 (Minn. 2011).

The Minnesota Supreme Court has held that “when a petition for postconviction relief follows a direct appeal of a conviction, a ll claims raised in the direct appeal and all claims of which the defendant knew or should have known at the time of the direct appeal are procedurally barred.” Davis v. State , (); see also Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd.

–32 (Minn. 4 In its order, the district court found that, because Ms. Collier is an unknown person and was not subject to qualification or cross-examination as a witness, the information she provided in her affidavit did not hold evidentiary value at this stage of

rict court noted that “[t]here is no interest[s] of justice exception based on new case law.” “The Knaffla rule provides that when a petition for postconviction relief follows a direct appeal of a conviction, all claims raised in the direct appeal and all claims of which the defendant knew or should have known at the time of the direct appeal are procedurally barred.”

“A claim is not Knaffla-barred, however, if (1) the defendant presents a novel legal issue or (2) the interests of justice require the court to consider the claim.”

“A claim is not Knaffla-barred, however, if (1) the defendant presents a novel legal issue or (2) the interests of justice require the court to consider the claim.”

(holding that an argument is Knaffla-barred because the petitioner failed to explain “why [the] argument was not available on direct appeal” and “why his failure to raise [the] argument should be excused”); (“A petitioner bear s the burd

See Buckingham v. State , , 232 (Minn. 2011) (holding that the petitioner's arguments were Knaffla barred because we had "expressly considered and rejected identical arguments in [petitioner's] direct appeal"); see also Minn. Stat. § 590.04 , subd.

“A claim is not Knaffla-barred, however, if (1) the defendant presents a novel legal issue or (2) the interests of justice require the court to conside r the claim.”

“A claim is not Knaffla-barred, however, if (1) the defendant presents a novel legal issue or (2) the interests of justice require t he court to consider the claim.”

Davis v. State , , 377 (Minn. 2016) (quoting Buckingham v. State , , 231 (Minn. 2011) ).

8 the defendant knew or should have known at the time of the direct appeal are procedurally barred.” Buckingham v. State

“To be reviewed in the interests of justice, a claim must have merit and be asserted without deliberate or inexcusable delay.” (quotation omitted).

3], we have consistently held that a claim raised on direct appeal will not be considered upon a1 subsequent petition for postconviction relief.” ()); , 232 n.1 (Minn. 2011) (noting that Minn. Stat. § 590.04 , subd.

“The Knaffla rule provides that when a petition for postconviction relief follows a direct appeal of a conviction, all claims raised in the direct appeal and all claims of which the defendant knew or should have known at the time of the direct appeal are procedurally barred.” see also Knaffla, 309 Minn. at 252, d at 741 (holding that, once a direct appeal has been taken, “all matters raised therein, and all claims known but not raised, will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postco

“The Knaffla rule provides that when a petition for postconviction relief follows a direct appeal of a conviction, all claims raised in the direct appeal and all claims of which the defendant knew or should have known at the time of the direct appeal are procedurally barred.”

(noting exceptions to the Knaffla bar).

(citing Knaffla, 309 Minn. at 252, d at 741); see Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd.

See Riley, d at 168 (applying the statute of limitations); -34 (Minn. 2011) (addressing Knaffla).

“The Knaffla rule provides that when a petition for postconviction relief follows a direct appeal of a conviction, all claims raised in the direct appeal and all claims of which the defendant knew or should have known at the time of the direct appeal are procedurally barred.” d 229, 231 (Minn. 2011).

-34 (Minn. 2011) (holding that a postconviction petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing when the “claims are Knaffla-barred”).

As a result, Lussier’s claim is “undoubtedly Knaffla-barred because we expressly considered and rejected [an] identical argument[],” d 229, 232 (Minn. 2011), in an appeal from the denial of Lussier’s first postconviction petition.