Cited by

d 4 611 (Minn. 2016) (deemed dismissal of personal-injury action); (deemed dismissal of personal-injury action); & n.1 (Minn. 1988) (dismissal of breach-of-employment-contract and defamation action for failure to timely file “Note of Issue/Certificate of Readiness”).

“Although some showings may be stronger than others, the moving party must establish all four requirements for relief to be warranted.” d 634, 637 (Minn. 2016) (citation omitted).

“It is generally for the district court to determine whether 11 the excuse offered by the movant is true and reasonable under the circumstances.”

The district court bears the responsibility for determining “whether the excuse offered by the movant is true and reasonable under the circumstances.” see also Gams, d at 620 (stating “the district court is in the best position to evaluate the reasonableness of the excuse” (quotation omitted)).

(“[I]t is generally for the district court to determine whether the excuse offered by the movant is true and reasonable under the circumstances.”).

The movant is not entitled to relief unless they satisfy all four Finden factors based on an evaluation of “all the surrounding circumstances of [the] case.”

Under the reasonable-excuse factor, “mistakes of law, as well as mistakes of fact, may afford grounds for relief.” (quotation omitted).

“The moving party must establish all four requirements for relief to be warranted.” 4 d 634, 637 (Minn. 2016) .

These four factors are (1) “a reasonable defense on the merits,” (2) “a reasonable excuse” for the movant’s failure or neglect to act, (3) that the movant acted “with due diligence after learning of the error or omission,” and (4) “that no substantial prejudice will result to the other party.” (citations and quotations omitted).

Whether a default judgment should be reopened “is a matter largely within the discretion of the [district] court, and that court’s decision will not be reversed unless such discretion is abused.” see also Cole v. Wutzke , (“[W]e conclude that the district court abused its discretion by failing to properly apply the Finden test in this case.”).

While it is correct that prejudice cannot be inferred from delay alone, “the movant bears the burden of demonstrating that the delay resulting from his or her error or omission has not resulted in a real or particular harm to other party.”

(citing Finden, d at 750).

A party seeking to avoid default judgment must show “a debatably meritorious claim” that “presents a cognizable claim for relief.”

These four factors are (1) “a reasonable defense on the merits,” (2) “a reasonable excuse” for the movant’s failure or neglect to act, (3) that the movant acted “with due diligence after learning of the error or omission,” and (4) “that no substantial prejudice will result to the other party.” (citations and quotations omitted).

16 court and is based upon all the surrounding circumstances of each case.” Cole v. Wutzke

The moving party must provide “specific information” demonstrating the existence of a reasonable defense; “[c]onclusory allegations in moving papers are ordinarily insufficient.”

“Instead, [r]ule 5.04(a) is a procedural tool [the supreme court] promulgated to aid the orderly and efficient administration of justice.”

We begin with precedent establishing that rule 5.04(a) “is not a legislatively enacted statute of limitations designed to provide repose to a defendant.”

-18 (Minn. 2016); -39 (Minn. 2016).

See Gams v. Houghton , -18 (Minn. 2016); -39 (Minn. 2016).

18, 1987) ; see also Cole v. Wutzke , (“Although some showings may be stronger than others, the moving party must establish all four requirements for relief to be warranted.” (citations omitted)).

a debatably meritorious claim; (2) a reasonable excuse for [the] failure or neglect to act; (3) [the exercise of] due diligence after learning of the error or omission; and (4) that 3 no substantial prejudice will result to the other party.”

e 60.02(a) provides that the court may relieve a party from a final judgment and order a new tr ial or grant other reli ef in the event of “[m]istake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” Whether relief under this rule is appropriate is “committed to the sound discretion of the district court and is based upon all 10 the surrounding circumstances of each case.” Cole v. Wutzke

See, e.g. , Gams v. Houghton , , 615-21 (Minn. 2016) ; Cole v. Wutzke , , 637-39 (Minn. 2016) ; Nguyen v. State Farm Mut.

Whether relief unde r this rule is appropriate is “committed to the sound discretion of the district court and is based upon all the surrounding circumstances of each case.”

No. 1 , cf. Cole v. Wutzke , (analyzing a motion for relief under rule 60.02(a) based on counsel’s mistake and ignorance of the law).

“[A] debatably meritorious claim is one that, if established at trial, presents a cognizable claim for relief.” Cole v. Wutzke , .

See, e.g. , Cole v. Wutzke , , 638 (Minn. 2016) (reopening judgments under Minn. R. Civ.

Larson Ventures, Inc. , 2017 WL 1833318, at *4 (citing and discussing Gams v. Houghton , , ).

The Minnesota Supreme Court has “long said that mistakes of law, as well as mistakes of fact, may afford grounds for relief.” (quotations and alterations omitted).

4-45 (Minn. App. 2013), review denied (Minn. Oct.

debatably meritorious claim; (2) a reasonable excuse for his or her failure or neglect to act; (3) that he or she acted with due diligence after learning of the error or omission; and (4) that no substantial prejudice will result to the other party.” (quotations omitted); see Finden v. Klaas, 268 Minn. 268, 271, d 748, 750 (1964) (establishing these requirements) .