Cited by

We also read the statute as a whole, see State v. Scovel , (discussing the whole-statute canon), and favor an interpretation tha t gives “each word or phrase in a statute a distinct, not an identical, meaning.” d 432, 437 (Minn. 2017) (discussing the canon against surplusage).

“A statute is ambiguous only if it is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.” (quotation omitted).

statute and amend it accordingly.” State v. Rick

d 432, 435 (Minn. 2017); A.M.F., d at 122.

When interpreting statutes, the canon against surplusage “favors giving each word or phrase in a statute a distinct, not identical, meaning.”

The canon against surplusage “favors giving each word or phrase in a statute a dist inct, not an identical, meaning.”

To interpret a statute, courts must firs t “determine whether the statute’s language, on its face, is ambiguous.”

(“A statute is ambiguous only if it is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.” (quotation omitted)).

“T he first step in statutory interpretation is to determine whether the st atute’s language, on its face, is ambiguous.”

2, which “presents a question of statutory interpretation that we review de novo,”

We give words and phrases within a statute their ordinary meaning, and may consult dictionary definitions to determine an undefined term’s common meaning, State v. Thonesavanh

“The first step in statutory interpretation is to determine whether the statute’s la nguage, on its face, is ambiguous.”

“A statut e is ambiguous only if it is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.”

Because the definition of the phrase “both parents” is ambiguous, we “turn to canons of construction to discern [the statute’s] meaning.” d 432, 436 (Minn. 2017).

State v. Thonesavanh , , 435 (Minn. 2017).

State v. Thonesavanh , , 436 (Minn. 2017).

Under our principles of statutory interpretation, we look to an outside statute or rule like Rule 9502.0315 only when a statute is ambiguous, see State v. Thonesavanh , , 437-38 (Minn. 2017) (explaining the in pari materia canon of construction), or when a word is a technical term with a special meaning, see Minn. Stat. § 645.08 (1) (2018).

–37 (Minn. 2017) (looking to dictionary definitions to determine common and ordinary meaning of undefined terms in statute).

State v. Thonesavanh , , 436 (Minn. 2017).

State v. Thonesavanh , , 437 (Minn. 2017).

See State v. Thonesavanh , , 440 (Minn. 2017) ("[T]he overwhelming weight of authority is that the rule of lenity is a canon of last resort, applicable 'only when, after consulting traditional canons of statutory construction, we are left with an ambiguous statute.'

(stating that the canon against surplusage favors giving each word and phrase in a statute a distinct non-identical meaning).

State v. Thonesavanh , , 435 (Minn. 2017) (quoting 500, LLC v. City of Minneapolis , , 290 (Minn. 2013) ); see also Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2018).

State v. Thonesavanh , , 436 (Minn. 2017).

Valspar Refinish, Inc. v. Gaylord’s, Inc.

(stating that the use of force "overcame the victim's power to resist and compelled his acquiescence both in the completed taking and in the contemporaneous carrying away of the [property]"); see also State v. Thonesavanh , , 438 (Minn. 2017) (noting that the supreme court had previously held that "even temporary 'control or dominion' over another's property was sufficient to 'complete' the offense of simple robbery, even if there was no evidence that the defendant had 'carr[ied] away' the prope