Cited by

d 875, 878-80 (Minn. 2024); -50 (Minn. 2019) (analyzing circumstantial evidence in failure-to-register case and reversing conviction).

Under this approach, 5 appellate courts first identify the “circumstances proved,” deferring to “the jury’s acceptance of the proof of these circumstances and rejection of evidence in the record that conflicted with the circumstances proved by the State.” (quotation omitted).

We affirm if “the jury, acting with proper regard for the presumption of innocence and regard for the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty of the charged offense.” (quotation omitted).

Under this test, appellate courts first identify the “circumstances proved,” deferring to “the jury’s acceptance of the proof of these circumstances and rejection of evidence in the record that conflicted with the circumstances proved by the State.” (quotation omitted).

At this step, the reviewing court “defer[s] to the jury’s acceptance of the proof of these circumstances and rejection of evidence in the record that conflicted with the circumstances proved by the State.” (quotation omitted).

Under this approach, appellate courts first identify the “circumstances proved,” deferring to “the jury’s acceptance of the proof of these circumstances and rejection of evidence in the record that conflicted with the circumstances proved by the State.” (quotation omitted).

–47 (Minn. 2019), is instructive, where we analyzed the phrase “leaves a primary address.” See Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd.

The “relevant definition of a term depends 6 on the context in which the term is used.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“Circumstantial evidence review involves two steps.”

“By placing secondary addresses within the ambit of the statute, the Legislature understood that an offender, like any other person, will occasionally spend time elsewhere and that doing so does not vitiate the primary living arrangement.” .

“If the [l]egislature’s intent is clear from the statute’s plain language, then we interpret the statute according to its plain meaning.” d 641, 645 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted).

And “in the absence of statutory definitions, we may consider dictionary definitions to determine the meaning of a statutory term.”

.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation mark omitted).

See Sanschagrin, d at 625; see also State v. Alarcon , (“ In the absence of statutory definitions , we may consider dictionary definitions .

“In the absence of statutory definitions, we may consider dictionary definitions to determine the meaning of a statutory term.”

“In the absence of statutory definitions, we may consider dictionary definitions to determine the meaning of a statutory term.” State v. Alarcon

When interpreting a statute, we must construe the statute “as a whole and the words and sentences therein are to be unders tood in light of their context.” State v. Alarcon , (quotations omitted).

2d at 577 5 the term “excessive.” “In the absence of statutory definitions, we may consider dictionary definitions to determine the meani ng of a statutory term.” d 641, 646 (Minn. 2019).