Cited by

6-67 (Minn. 2019) ( ); see also Minn. R. Evid.

(stating that, under the two-prong Strickland test, “[i]f one prong is not met, we need not address the other”).

16 Moreover, our consideration of CSLI evidence was relatively new at the time of Berry’s direct appeal, having been addressed in only three of our prior opinions:

-70 (Minn. 2019); d 540, 550-51 (Minn. 2006).

Although the state claims that the potential for the jury to use the four incidents for improper purposes was mitigated by the district court’s cautionary instructions, 15 each of 15 (declining to reverse a conviction on the basis of claimed Spreigl error in part because “the district court gave a proper limiting instruction before” the evidence was admitted and “again at the end of trial,” and because the state told the jury in closing arguments that it could not convict the

See, (determining that a limiting instruction “lessened the probability of 14 undue weight being given by the jury to the evidence”); (noting that the district court’s limiting instruction supported the conclusion that the Spreigl evidence was not unfairly prejudicial).

“The granting of a continuance is a matter within the discretion of the district court and its ruling will not be reversed absent a showing of clear abuse of discretion.” (quotation omitted).

“If the [appellant] fails on any one of the prongs, [an appellate court] need not consider the others.” d 257, 271 (Minn. 2019).

–68 (Minn. 2019).14 There, the victim of the prior shooting identified 14 The defendant in Smith I, is not related to the appellant.

Although we generally review a district court’s refusal to continue or reschedule a hearing for a future date for abuse of discretion, as the United States Supreme Court has recognized, there is a point when “a denial of a continuance is so arbitrary as to violate due process.” 18 Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589 (1964).

The district court also did not abuse its discretion when it determined that “the limited probative value of the evidence does not outweigh the substantial prejudicial value of introducing [the child’s] sexual history.” “Evidence is relevant and has probative value when it, in some degree, advances the inquiry.” (quotation omitted).

“We ‘review the evidence just as we would on a sufficiency challenge—in the light most favorable to the prosecution, and with all conflicts in the evidence resolved in favor of the verdict.’ ” ().

404(b)(1); (stating that Spreigl evidence “is not admissible to demonstrate that the defendant (a) has a propensity to commit crimes and (b) acted in accord with that propensity”) .

The district court also knew that, given these developments, new judicial branch orders may soon be issued regarding the 11 If we were evaluating the district court’s denial of a continuance here under the typical discretionary standard, we would only reverse upon “a showing of clear abuse of discretion.” (citation omitted).

In discerning whether the district court abused its discretion, this court must examine the circumstances when th e motion was made to “determine whether the defendant was so prejudiced in preparing or presenting a defense as to materially affect the outcome of the trial.” State v. Smith , (quotation omitted).

404(b)(1); (stating that “[g]enerally, other-crimes evidence is not admissible to demonstrate that the defendant (a) has a propensity to commit crimes and (b) acted in accord with that propensity”).

“If one prong is not met, we need not address the other.”

“The granting of a continuance is a matter within the discretion of the district court and its ruling will not be reversed absent a showin g of clear abuse of discretion.” State v. Smith , (quotation omitted).

see also State v. Smith , (“When a defendant fails to object at trial, the forfeiture doctrine gene rally precludes appellate relief.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); –79 (Minn. 2015).

d 257, 264 (Minn. 2019).

Accordingly, “a criminal conviction cannot be based on the un corroborated testimony of an accomplice.” State v. Smith , (quotation omitted); see Minn. Stat. § 634.04 (2018).

Evidence of a defendant ’s other bad acts, or Spreigl evidence, is “not admissible to 11 demonstrate that the defendant (a) has a pr opensity to commit crimes and (b) acted in accord with that propensity.” 6 (Minn. 2019) (citing Minn. R. Evid.

Corroborating evidence is sufficient if “it is weighty enough to restore confidence in the truth of the accomplice’s testimony.”

See State v. Smith , -67 (Minn. 2019).