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We are “extremely deferential” to a district court’s decision whether to impose a departure, -96 (Minn. App. 2010), rev. denied (Minn. July 20, 2010), and we “cannot simply substitute our judgment for that of the [district] court,” d 473, 476 (Minn. App. 1984) (explaining that appellate courts “are loath to interfere” with district court’s dispositional departure from sentencing guidelines).

2 We afford the district court “great discretion” in its sentencing decisions and review departure decisions for “an abuse of discretion.”

17 We review sentencing decisions for an abuse of discretion and we “afford the [district] court great discretion in the imposition of sentences.”

Appellate courts “‘afford the [district] court great discretion in the imposition of sentences’ and reverse sentencing decisions only for an abuse of that discretion.” -08 (Minn. 2014) ().

An appellate court “afford[s] the trial court great discretion in the imposition of sentences.”

An appellate court affords the sentencing court wide discretion and will reverse a sentence “only for an abuse of that discretion.” -08 (Minn. 2014) ().

The district court has “great discretion in the imposition of sentences,” and appellate courts “cannot simply substitute [their] judgment for that of the [district] court.”

“[Reviewing courts] ‘afford the [district] court great 8 discretion in the imposition of sentences’ and reverse sentencing decisions only for an abuse of that discretion.” State v. Soto , - 08 (Minn. 2014) (footnote omitted) ().

We are “extremely deferential” to a district court ’s decision whether to impose a departure, Dillon, d at 595- 96, and “we cannot simply substitute our judgment for that of the [district] court,” see also Kindem, d at 7 (stating that appellate court will reverse departure decisions only 6 in “a rare case”).

Appellate courts “‘afford the [district] court great discretion in the imposition of sentences’ and reverse sentencing decisions only for an abuse of that discretion.” -08 (Minn. 2014) ().

“The purposes of the sentencing guidelines will not be served if the [district] courts generally fail to apply the presumptive sentences found in the guidelines.”

But as an appellate court applying a deferential standard of review, “we cannot simply substitute our judgment for that of the trial court.” (emphasizing that “[w]e afford the trial court great discretion in the imposition of sentences”).

5 “We ‘afford the [district] court great discretion in the imposition of sentences’ and reverse sentencing decisions onl y for an abuse of that discretion.” State v. Soto , -08 (Minn. 2014) (quoting State v. Spain , ).

We are “extremely deferential” to a district court’s decision whether to impose a departure, Dillon, d at 595-96, and we “cannot simply substitute our judgment for that of the [district] court,” (explaining that appellate courts are “loath to interfere” with a district court’s sentencing decision).

“In fact, a sentencing court has no discretion 14 to depart from the sentencing guidelines unless aggravatin g or mitigating factors are present.”

The district court is afforded “great discretion” in sentencing and “we cannot simply substitute our judgment for that of the [district] court.” d 85, 88 (Minn. 1999).

“We ‘afford the [district] court great discretion in the imposition of sentences’ and reverse sentencing decisions only for an abuse of that disc retion.” State v. Soto , -08 (Minn. 2014) (quoting State v. Spain , ).

Appellate courts “‘afford the [district] court great discretion in the imposition of sentences’ and reverse sentencing decisions only for an abuse of that discretion.” See State v. Soto , 4 -08 ( Minn. 2014) (footnote omitted) (quoting State v. Spain , ).

“We ‘afford the [district] court great discretion in the imposition of sentences’ and reverse sentencing decisions only for an abuse of that discretion.” State v. Soto , -08 (Minn. 2014) ( (M inn.

The district court has “great discretion” in sentencing and “we cannot simply substitute our judgment for that of the [district] court.”

The district court has “gre at discretion” in sent encing and “we cannot simply substitute our judgment for that of the [district] court.” State v. Spain

Dillon, d a t 596; State v. Spain , (“We afford the trial court great discretion in the imposition of sentences and we cannot simply substitute our judgment for that of the trial court.”).

“W hen a sentencing court departs from the presumptive sentence, it must still strive to determine a sentence that is proportional to the severity of the offense.” State v. Spain

We “review decisions to depart from the sentencing guidelines only for ‘an abuse of discretion.’ ” ().

“In fact, a sentencing court has no discretion to depart from the sentencing guidelines unless aggravating or mitigating factors are present.”

A district court may exercise its discretion to depart from the guidelines only if there are “identifiable, substantial, and compelling circumstances that distinguish a case and overcome the presumption in favor of the guidelines sentences.” Soto, d at 308 (quotation omitted); (“In fact, a sentencing court has no discretion to depart from the sentencing guidelines unless aggravating or mitigating factors are present.”).

The district court has “great discretion” in sentencing and “we cannot simply substitute our judgment for that of the [district] court.”

review denied (Minn. July 20, 2010).

Based on our “collective, collegial experience in reviewing a l arge number of criminal appeals from all the judicial districts,” (quotation omitted), we con clude that the district court’ s reasons are sufficient to support the downward dispositional departure.

Finally, the state, citing cases involving aggravated sentencin g, contends that the district court abused its discretion in the length of the departure ordered because Weaver’s offense did not involve “severe mitigating factors.” See, d 85, 89 (Minn. 1999) (noting proportionality in sentencing and holding that the district court abused its discretion in sentencing when aggravating factors di d not justify a triple durational sentencing departure).

“We ‘afford the [district] cour t great discretion in the impos ition of sentences’ and reverse sentencing decisions only for an abuse of that discretion.” -08 (Minn. 2014) ().

Appellate courts “afford the [district] court great discretion in the imposition of sentences,” State v. Spain , and review “the district court’s denial of a motion to correct a sentence for an abuse o f discretion,”

D E C I S I O N Appellate courts afford “‘the [district] court great discretion in the imposition of sentences’ and reverse sentencing decisions only for an abuse of that discretion.” -08 (Minn. 2014) ().

“We ‘afford the [district] court great discretion in the imposition of sentences’ and reverse sentencing decisions only for an abuse of that discretion.” State v. Soto , -08 (Minn. 2014) (quoting State v. Spain , ).

An appellate court affords a district court “great discretion in the imposition of sentences” and will not “simply substitute [its] judgment for that of the [district] court.”

“We ‘afford the [district] court great discretion in the imposition of sentences’ and reverse sentencing decisions only for an abuse of that discretion.” State v. Soto , -08 (Minn. 2014) (quoting State v. Spain , ).

“We ‘afford the [district] court great discretion in the imposition of sentences’ and reverse sentencing decisions only for an abuse of that discretion.” -08 (Minn. 2014) ().

“[A] sentencing court has no discretion to depart from the sentencing guidelines unless aggravating or mitigating factors are present.”

In reviewing a sentence, we will not “simply substitute our judgment for that of the trial court.” (citation omitted).

If one or more mitigating factor s is shown, “[w]hether to depart [downward] from the sentencing guidelines rests within the district court’s discretion, and the district court will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion.” – 54 (Minn. App. 2011) ().