Cited by

Although the threshold for reasonable suspicion is “not high,” (quotation omitted), it requires “more than an unarticulated hunch.” -26 (Minn. 1989) (quotation omitted).

7 Yet an officer’s suspicion must be “more than an unarticulated hunch,” and “the officer must be able to point to something that objectively supports [the officer’s] suspicion.” –26 (Minn. 1989) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

(a trooper had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify a limited investigative traffic stop because of the driver’s “evasive conduct” of turning off the highway immediately after making eye contact with a 11 state trooper and then resuming in the same direction on the highway within

at 391-92 (-26 (Minn. 1989)).

is the consummate act of evasion” and “nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion.” Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124; (stating “if the driver’s conduct is such that the officer reasonably infers that the driver is deliberately trying to evade the officer and if, as a result, a reasonable police officer would suspect the driver of criminal activity, then the officer may stop the driver”).

An officer “must be able to point to objective facts” to support a suspicion of criminal activity, “and may not base his or her 9 conclusion on a ‘hunch.’” Cripps, d at 391-92 (-26 (Minn. 1989)).

(holding even “innocent activity might justify the suspicion of criminal activity”) (citation omitted); see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 22 (holding police may initiate a stop when “a series of acts, each of them perhaps innocent” if viewed separately, “warranted further investigation” when taken toge

We said there that “[t]o allow a vehicle search solely because an adult passenger smelled of D-5 v. Johnson, (stating that “innocent activity might justify the suspicion of criminal activity”).

827 (Minn. 1989) (concluding trooper had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant’s vehicle when defendant made eye contact with the trooper and engaged in “evasive” driving by immediately turning off the highway and returning within a minute).

In addition, “if the driver’s conduct is such that the officer reasonably infers that the driver is deliberately trying to evade the officer and if, as a result, a reasonable police officer would suspect the driver of criminal activity, then the officer may stop the driver.”

ior” he had learned about in drug interdiction training , and that it might indicate the driver may be “trying to avoid law enforcement.” The supreme court has held that evasive conduct may give rise to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity “if the driver’s conduct is such that the officer reasonably infers that the driver is deliberately trying to evade the officer.”

may well justify a stopping for investigation.” State v. Johnson , (quotation omitted).

she could be there to engage in criminal activity.2 2 The state also argues that reasonable suspicion was supported based on Brown’s “evasive behavior.” The supreme court has held that an officer may have reasonable suspicion to stop a driver “if the driver’s conduct is such that the officer reasonably infers that the driver is deliberately trying to evade the officer.”

See State v. Johnson , (stating that “innocent activity might justify the suspicion of criminal activity”).

-27 (Minn. 1989) (emphasis added).

State v. Johnson , -27 (Minn. 1989); see also State v. Martinson , (stating that innocent factors “in their totality, combined with the investigatin g officer’s experience in apprehending drug traffickers, can be sufficient bases for finding reasonable suspicion”).

In State v. Johnson, this court concluded that “[a]n evasive act alone, in the absence of other indicia of criminal activity or other extreme behavior, is no t a sufficient basis for conducting a Terry stop.” , rev’d, d 824 (Minn. 1989).

State v. Johnson , , 827 (Minn. 1989).

that might well elude an untrained person.” State v. 7 Johnson, (quotation omitted).

Such reasonable beliefs must be based on “more than an unarticulated ‘hunch;’ the officer must be able to point to something that objectively supports his suspicion.” -26 (Minn. 1989).

-26 (Minn. 1989) (citing United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S. Ct. 1581, 1585 (1989)).

at 502 () (quotation marks omitted).

may well justify a stopping for investigation.” (quotation omitted).

inferences and deductions that might well elude an untrained person.’ ” (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)).

against unreasonable searches and seizures.” A seizure is reasonable if the police officer has a “particular and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” (quotation omitted).

3 against unreasonable searches and seizures.” A seizure is reasonable if the police officer has a “particular and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” (quotation omitted).