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Although Engel raised suppression arguments pursuant to both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions, Engel argues on appeal that he is entitled to “more expansive protections” under the Minnesota Constitution, and

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1968); (adopting the Terry framework for “evaluating the reasonableness of seizures during traffic stops”).

the owner no longer has a reasonable expectation of privacy and the exclusionary rule will not apply.”

14 for justifying an intrusion during a minor traffic stop be individualized to the driver toward whom the intrusion is directed.” see also Sargent, d at 43 (“Under Askerooth, to .

The legality of a traffic stop is subject to a two -prong analysis: whether (1) “the stop was justified at its inception[,]” and (2) “the actions of the police during the stop were reasonably related to and justified by the circumstances that gave rise to the stop in the first place.” (applying Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 -20 (1968) ).

But “[a]n initially valid stop may become invalid if it becomes intolerable in its intensity or scope.” (quotation omitted).

We thus analyze whether the remainder of the circumstances “sufficiently supplement” the presence of the butane torch “to make the sum any greater than the parts.”

the initial stop was to investigate Johnson for the “use, possession, or sale of drugs.” The agent’s initial questions 6 about whether there was anything illegal in the car were therefore appropriate because they were “strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which rendered the initiation of the stop permissible.” (quotation omitted).

Safety, d 183, 187 (Minn. 1994) (protection from suspicionless seizures at DUI checkpoints); (protection from unreasonable expansion of scope and extension of duration of seizures).

For instance, in State v. Askerooth, the supreme court stated, “It is axiomatic that we are free to interpret the Minnesota Constitution as affording greater protection against unreasonable searches and seizures than the United States Constitution.”

Appellate courts “may independently review the facts and determine whether, as a matter of law, the district court erred in suppressing or not suppressing the evidence.”

The Minnesota Supreme Court has adopted “the principles and framework of Terry [v. Ohio ] for evaluating the reasonableness of seizures during traffic stops .”

(1) the original legitimate purpose of the stop, (2) independent probable cause, or 10 (3) reasonableness.”

See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)

The Minnesota Supreme Court has “allow[ed] that the special training of police officers may lead them to arrive at inferences and deductions that might well elude an untrained person.” d 353, 369 (Minn. 2004) (quotation omitted).

The Minnesota Supreme Court has adopted “the principles and framework of Terry for evaluating the reasonableness of seizures during traffic stops even when a minor law has been violated.”

4 The law requires that “each incremental intrusion during a traffic stop be tied to and justified by one of the following: (1) the original legitimate purpose of the stop, (2) independent probable cause, or (3) reasonableness, as defined in Terry.”

notice of motion and motion to suppress, which moved the district court for an order “[s]uppressing the evidence seized as a result of investigative questioning during the traffic stop.” Appellant included a one sentence justification for the motion: “The questioning expanded the scope of the stop and was not supported by independent reasonable, articulable suspicion.”

Minnesota has expressly adopted Terry to evaluate “the reasonableness of seizures during traffic stops even when a minor law has been violated.”

[is] tied to and justified by one of the following: (1) the original legitimate purpose of the stop, (2) independent probable cause, or (3) reasonableness, as defined in Terry.”

–63 (Minn. 2004), we concluded that Atwater, like Sitz, inadequately balanced the state and individual privacy interests, particularly given that the “holding in Atwater may affect vast numbers of our residents in their interactions with the police on a daily basis.” We therefore held that under the Minnesota

“[E]ach incremental intrusion during a stop must be strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which rendered the initiation of the stop permissible.” (quotations omitted).

(taking into consideration the totality of several weaker justifications of suspicion to determine if the circumstances “sufficiently supplement one another to make the sum any greater than the parts”); aff’d, 508 U.S. 366 (1993) (con

d 353, 359 (Minn. 2004) ; cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968).