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Minnesota courts have a responsibility to “safeguard for the people of Minnesota the protections embodied in our constitution.”

“It is axiomatic that [courts] are free to interpret the Minnesota Constitution as affording greater protection against unreasonable searches and seizures than the United States Constitution.”

“The actions of the police” during a traffic stop must be “reasonably related to and justified by the circumstances that gave rise to the stop in the first place.”

“Whether the exclusionary rule prohibits the admission of evidence in a particular case is a question of law, which we review de novo.” (d 353, 359 (Minn. 2004)); see also Harrison, d at 920 (explaining that, in an appeal from an implied-consent proceeding, we review questions of law concerning an alleged constitutional violation de novo).

pheld the warrantless search of a vehicle as a protective search , emphasizing the significance of the person’s suspected 3 Neither respondent challenged the officer’s entry into the car and seizure of the knife in the district court, and the lawfulness of that action is not before us. In any event, because each incremental intrusion during a traffic stop must be lawful, we address respondents’ challenge to the officer’s second entry into the car to search for additional weapons.

(stating that a police officer may order a driver to exit their vehicle during a lawful traffic stop “without an articulated reason”).

n. 12 (Minn. 2004) (“While not dispositive to our objective evaluation, the absence of any subjective perception of risk by [the officer] is noteworthy.” (emphasis added)).

“[A]rticle I, section 10 requires application of Terry principles to traffic stops.”

“An initially valid stop may become invalid if it becomes intolerable in its “intensity or scope.’” (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 17-18).

After lawful traffic stop “without an articulated reason.”

Under the Minnesota Constitution, “each incremental intrusion during a traffic stop [must] be tied to and justified by one of the following: (1) the original legitimate purpose of the stop, (2) independent probable cause, or (3) reasonableness, as defined in Terry.”

But “[a]n initially valid stop may become invalid if it becomes intolerable in its intensity or scope.” (quotation omitted).

An initially valid stop may become invalid if it becomes “intolerable” in its “intensity or scope.” (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 17-18).

[must be] tied to and justified by one of the following: (1) the original legitimate purpose of the stop, (2) independent probable cause, or (3) reasonable suspicion as defined by Terry.”

-60 (Minn. 2004) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1968); (adopting the Terry framework for “evaluating the reasonableness of seizures during traffic stops”).

8 The justification for an initial search or seizure “will not necessarily provide a basis for subsequent expansions of the scope of that search or seizure.”

Under the Minnesota Constitution, “each incremental intrusion during a traffic stop [must] be tied to and justified by one of the following: (1) the original legitimate purpose of the stop, (2) independent probable cause, or (3) reasonableness, as defined in Terry.”

IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10

An analysis of an investigative seizure at a traffic stop involves a “dual inquiry.”

366 (Minn. 2004) (concluding that officer who made stop for minor traffic violation acted unreasonably by confining driver in squad car solely for officer’s convenience).

Under article I, section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution, any expansion of the scope of the stop “not strictly tied to the circumstances that rendered the initiation of the stop permissible must be supported by at least a reasonable suspicion of additional illegal activity.” (citing State v. Askerooth, 8 -65 (Minn. 2004)); (explaining that “[e]xpansion of the scope of the stop to include investigation of other suspected illegal activity” requires “reasonable, articulable suspicion of such other

than to a formal arrest.”

These brief detentions are often called a “Terry” detention or “stop.” -60 (Minn. 2004) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 (1968)).

Under the Minnesota Constitution, “each incremental intrusion during a stop must be strictly tied to and justified by” one of the following: (1) the original legitimate purpose of the stop, (2) independent probable cause, or (3) “reasonableness to justify that particular intrusion.” (quotations omitted).

“[E] ach incremental intrusion during a traffic stop [must] be individualized to the person toward whom the intrusion is directed and tied to and justified by one of the following: (1) the original purpose of the stop, (2) independent probable cause, or (3) reasonableness[.]”

Although Engel raised suppression arguments pursuant to both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions, Engel argues on appeal that he is entitled to “more expansive protections” under the Minnesota Constitution, and

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1968); (adopting the Terry framework for “evaluating the reasonableness of seizures during traffic stops”).

the owner no longer has a reasonable expectation of privacy and the exclusionary rule will not apply.”