Cited by

(applying Terry principles to “traffic stops even when a minor law has be en violated”).

During a stop, each incremental intrusion “must be strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which rendered the initiation of the stop permissible.” (quotations omitted).

“[E]ach incremental intrusi on during a stop must be strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which rendered the initiation of the stop permissible.” State v. Askerooth , (quotations omitted).

-60 (Minn. 2004) (citing Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).

We apply principles derived from Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), to the expansion of minor traffic stops to “conduct a narcotics -detection dog sniff around the exterior of a motor vehicle.” Wiegand, d at 137; (applying Terry principles to “traffic stops even when a minor law has been violated”).

“[E]ach incremental intrusion during a stop must be strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which rendered the initiation of the stop permissible.” (quotations omitted).

Under the Minnesota Constitution, “each incremental intrusion during a traffic stop [must be] tied to and justified by one of the following: (1) the original legitimate purpose of the stop, (2) independent probable cause, or (3) reasonableness, as defined in Terry.”

-60 (Minn. 2004) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).

d 779, 783 (Minn. 1993) (“[W]e are not persuaded by the majority opinion in Hodari, and we are persuaded that there is no need to depart from the pre-Hodari approach.” (emphasis omitted)); see also State v. Askerooth , (Mi nn.

s interpreted article I, section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution to provide more protection than the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and has explicitly adopted the principles and framework of Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968) “for evaluating the reasonableness of seizures during traffic stops even when a minor law has been violated.”

Under our constitution, a police officer cannot expand the scope of a traffic stop beyond the original purpose of the stop without “at least a reasonable suspicion of additional criminal activity.” d 346, 350 (Minn. 2012); see also Minn. Const. art. I, § 10 (prohibiting unreasonable searches); (holding that “Article I, Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution requires that each incremental intrusion during a traffic stop be tied to and justified by one of the following: (1) the original legitima

In the absence of district court findings, we may “independently review the facts and determine whether, as a matter of law, the district court erred in suppressing or not suppressing the evidence.”

State v. Askerooth , 4 (Minn. 2004) (citing Terry, 9 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S. Ct. at 1880).

Even when a stop is justified at its inception, an officer’s actions must be “reasonably related to and justified by the circumstances that gave rise to the stop in the first place.”

“[E]ach incremental intrusion during a stop must be strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which rendered the initiation of the stop permissible.” 4 (quotation omitted).

“[E]ach incremental intrusion during a stop must be ‘strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which rendered [the initiation of the stop ] permissible.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Terry, 392 7 U.S. at 19, 88 S. Ct. at 1878) (other quotation omitted).

We have repeatedly said that we have a responsibility to “safeguard for the people of Minnesota the protections embodied in our constitution.” O’

An officer may then expand a traffic stop if each incremental intrusion is tied to and justified by “(1) the original legitimate purpose of the stop, (2) independent probable cause, or (3) reasonableness, as defined in Terry.”

d 353, 364 (Minn. 2004).

6 A stop that is initially valid may become unconstitutional “if it becomes intolerable in its intensity or scope.” (quotation omitted).

Although we need not reach the issue of whether the Minnesota Constitution affords greater protection than the Fourth Amendment as applied in Strieff, we note that Minnesota courts have declined to follow United States Supreme Court decisions when there is “a sharp departure from our traditional understanding of the protections from unreasonable seizures.”

(observing that police officer’s order for driver to exit his vehicle and sit in squad car was highly intrusive).

The scope of an investigatory seizure may be expanded only if doing so would be “reasonably related to the investigation of an offense lawfully discovered or suspected durin g the stop,” State v. Askerooth , and only if the officer “develops a reasonable, articulable suspicion” concerning the additional offenses “ ‘within the time necessary to resolve the originally - suspected offense,’” Diede, d at 845 (d 125, 136 (Minn. 2002)).

See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981); see also State v. Askerooth

State v. Askerooth , -63 (Minn. 2004).

Furthermore, an officer may expand a traffic stop if the incremental intrusion is tied to and justified by “(1) the original legitimate purpose of the stop, (2) independent probable cause, or (3) reasonableness, as defined in Terry.” State v. Askerooth

D E C I S I O N We review a pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence by independently reviewing the “facts to determine whether, as a matter of law, the district court erred in suppressing or not suppressing the evidence.” See State v. Askerooth

To be constitutional, “each incremental intrusion” during a stop must be connected to and justified by: “(1) the original legitimate purpose of the stop, (2) independent probable cause, or (3) reasonableness, as defined in Terry [v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884 (1968)].” (summarizing holding in Terry as “even in the absence of probable cause, the police may stop and frisk a person 7 when (1) they have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that a suspect might be engaged in criminal a