Cited by

(stating that the supreme court had “never addressed” the question of the appropriate standard of review 1 Father and the county did not file appellate briefs.

A district court has “broad discretion in ordering modifications to child support orders.”

Appellate courts “presume that the Legislature does not intend to abrogate the common law unless it does so by express wording or necessary implication.” (quotation omitted); (declining to view legislative silence as overruling similar common-law requirement in child- support context).

A district court has “broad discretion in ordering modifications to child support orders.”

But this rule is not “ironclad.”

We acknowledge that the Thiele rule is not “ironclad.” see also Minn. R. Civ.

While appellate courts generally will not consider issues not raised below, this rule is not “ironclad.”

“This is not, however, an ironclad rule.” d 343, 350 (Minn. 2002) (quotation omitted); see, e.g., Minn. R. Civ.

(noting the “strong state policy of assuring 15 that children have the adequate and timely economic support of their parents” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

First, appellants argue that the rule that we will not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal is not “ironclad.”

–54 (Minn. 2002) ( for its statement that the supreme court “cannot stress enough the importance of having findings of fact that demonstrate the [district] court actually did take all relevant factors into consideration” and holding that, “[b]ecau

See Putz v. Putz , (concluding that the child-support magistrate abused his discretion by failing to impute income ); (noting that the district court did not abuse its discretion by imputing income in maintenance context).

Miller, d at 653 (considering an issue not decided below when it was briefed by the parties and involved a question of law and there was no prejudice); d 343, 350 (Minn. 2002) (considering an issue not raised below and noting that neither party “was represented by counsel” at the relevant hearing).

But this rule is not “ironclad.”

This rule, however, is not ironclad, and we have “the authority to take any action ‘as the interest of justice may require.’ ” (quoting Minn. R. Civ.

-54 (Minn. 2002) (reversing and remanding for a CSM to reconsider child support and “stress[ing] .

(explaining that appellate courts generally decline to address issues raised for the first time on appeal); (citing Thiele but explaining that appellate courts may consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal in the interest of justice); see also Minn. R. Civ.

But this rule is not “ironclad,” (quotation omitted), and we may address new issues on appeal “as the interest of justice may require,” Minn. R. Civ.

(noting “the child’s paramount right to support and the public protec tion of the child’s best interests”); (no ting strong state policy of assuring that children have adequate and timely economic support of their parents).

Ludwigson, d at 445 -46 (citations omitted); d 343, 348 (Minn. 2002) (where there had been no district court review of a CSM’s order, the supreme court applied the abuse -of-discretion standard after noting that this cou rt “applied the abuse of discretion standard and the parties agree that it is the appropriate standard of review”).

Although questions that a district court did not decide are generally not amenable to appellate review, this rule is not “ironclad.” Putz v. Putz , see Minn. R. Crim.

But this rule is not “ironclad.” d 343, 350 (Minn. 2002).

See Putz v. Putz , (stating that the rule precluding consideration of issues not raised to the district court is not ironclad); see also Minn. R. Civ.

App. P. 103.04 , particularly with respect to pro se litigants

Moreover, although not “ironclad,” Putz v. Putz , (quotation omitted), the principle is regularly observed by both the supreme court and this court.

Father forfeited any objection to conducting the October 26 hearing without prior settlement efforts, see Putz v. Putz , and the district court did not abuse its discretion by giving mother a n opportunity to resp ond to father’s untimely motion to increase spousal maintenance, see Minn. R. Gen.

(child support); d 921, 923 (Minn. App. 1992) (spousal maintenance) .

“[A] district court enjoys broad discretion in ordering modifications to child support orders” provided that it exercises that discretion “within the limits set by the legislature.” Putz v. Putz

District courts must “make thorough and accurate findings of fact regarding the obligor’s monthly net income.”

While the district court has broad discretion in ordering a modification of child support, it abuses its discretion when it acts outside the statutory limits set by the legislature or resolves the matter “by reaching a clearly erroneous conclusion that is against logic and the facts on record.”

d 343, 347 (Minn. 2002).

However, 10 the rule that issues raised for the first time on appeal will not be addressed is not “ironclad.” Putz v. Putz , (quotation omitted); see Minn. R. Civ.

Putz v. Putz , , 350 (Minn. 2002) ; see also Minn. R. Civ.

App. P. 103.04 (providing that an appellate court may review any matter as the interests of justice may require); (stating appellate courts can take “any action as the interests of justice may require”) (quotation omitted).

A factual fi nding is clearly erroneous only if it is “against logic and the facts on record,” Putz v. Putz , leaving the 4 reviewing court with “the definite and firm conviction that a mistak e has been made.” (quotation omitted).